List of practice Questions

During Bentham’s lifetime, revolutions occurred in the American colonies and in France, producing the Bill of Rights and the Declaration des Droits deHomme (Declaration of the Rights of Man), both of which were based on liberty, equality, and self-determination. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels published The Communist Manifesto in 1848. Revolutionary movements broke out that year in France, Italy, Austria, Poland, and elsewhere. In addition, the Indus trial Revolution transformed Great Britain and eventually the rest of Europe from an agrarian (farm-based) society into an industrial one, in which steam and coal increased manufacturing production dramatically, changing the nature of work, property ownership, and family. This period also included advances in chemistry, astronomy, navigation, human anatomy, and im munology, among other sciences.
Given this historical context, it is understandable that Bentham used reason and science to explain human behaviour. His ethical system was an attempt to quantify happiness and the good so they would meet the conditions of the scientific method. Ethics had to be empirical, quantifiable, verifiable, and reproducible across time and space. Just as science was beginning to understand the workings of cause and effect in the body, so ethics would explain the causal relationships of the mind. Bentham rejected religious authority and wrote a rebuttal to the Declaration of Independence in which he railed against natural rights as “rhetorical nonsense, nonsense upon stilts.” Instead, the fundamental unit of human action for him was utility—solid, certain, and factual.
What is utility? Bentham’s fundamental axiom, which underlies utilitarianism, was that all so cial morals and government legislation should aim for producing the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. Utilitarianism, therefore, emphasizes the consequences or ultimate purpose of an act rather than the character of the actor, the actor’s motivation, or the particu lar circumstances surrounding the act. It has these characteristics: (1) universality, because it applies to all acts of human behaviour, even those that appear to be done from altruistic mo tives; (2) objectivity, meaning it operates beyond individual thought, desire, and perspective; (3) rationality, because it is not based in metaphysics or theology; and (4) quantifiability in its reliance on utility.

“We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal and are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights”.
This statement, in spite of literal inaccuracy in its every phrase, served the purpose for which it was written. It expressed an aspiration, and it was a fighting slogan. In order that slogans may serve their purpose, it is necessary that they shall arouse strong, emotional belief, but it is not at all necessary that they shall be literally accurate. A large part of each human being’s time on earth is spent in declaiming about his “rights,” asserting their existence, complaining of their violation, describing them as present or future, vested or contingent, absolute or conditional, perfect or inchoate, alienable or inalienable, legal or equitable, in rem or in personam, primary or secondary, moral or jural (legal), inherent or acquired, natural or artificial, human or divine. No doubt still other adjectives are available. Each one expresses some idea, but not always the same idea even when used twice by one and the same person. 
They all need definition in the interest of understanding and peace. In his table of correlatives, Hohfeld set “right” over against “duty” as its necessary correlative. This had been done num berless times by other men. He also carefully distinguished it from the concepts expressed in his table by the terms “privilege,” “power,” and “immunity.” To the present writer, the value of his work seems beyond question and the practical convenience of his classification is convincing. However, the adoption of Hohfeld’s classification and the correlating of the terms “right” and “duty” do not complete the work of classification and definition.

The International Law Commission (ILC), in compliance with General Assembly resolution 177 (II), was directed to ”formulate the principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal”. The ILC’s task was to merely formulate the principles not to express an appreciation of them as principles of International law since they had already been affirmed by the General Assembly. & nbsp;
At its second session in 1950, the ILC adopted a formulation of seven Principles of International Law recognized in the Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal.

• Principle I: Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefor and liable to punishment. This is based on the general rule that international law may impose duties directly on individuals.
• Principle II: The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an international crime does not relieve the person who committed the act from international responsibility. This implies the ”supremacy” of international law over national law.
• Principle III: The fact that a person acted as Head of State or responsible Government official does not relieve him from responsibility under international law.
• Principle IV: Acting pursuant to an order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.
• Principle V: Any person charged with a crime under international law has the right to a fair trial on the facts and law.
• Principle VI: sets out the crimes punishable under international law:
  • Crimes against peace: Includes planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, as well as participation in a conspiracy for these acts. The ILC understands the term ”waging of a war of aggression” to refer only to high-ranking military personnel and high State officials. The Tribunal affirmed the illegality of aggressive war based on the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
  • War crimes: Violations of the laws or customs of war, such as murder, ill-treatment, deportation, killing of hostages, and plunder.
  • Crimes against humanity: Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhuman acts or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds, when done in execution of or in connection with a crime against peace or a war crime. These acts may constitute crimes against humanity even if committed by the perpetrator against their own population.
• Principle VII: Complicity in the commission of any of the crimes listed in Principle VI is a crime under international law.

The ILC also considered the General Assembly’s invitation to study the desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with genocide or other crimes. While some members questioned its effectiveness, particularly for grave international crimes, others argued that the creation of such a jurisdiction was desirable as an effective contribution to world peace and security, serving as a deterrent against aggressors.

“The power to pardon is a part of the constitutional scheme, and we have no doubt, in our mind, that it should be so treated also in the Indian Republic. It has been reposed by the people through the Constitution in the Head of the State, and enjoys high status. It is a constitutional responsibility of great significance, to be exercised when occasion arises in accordance with the discretion contemplated by the context. It is not denied, and indeed it has been repeatedly affirmed in the course of argument by learned counsels appearing for the Petitioner that the power to pardon rests on the advice tendered by the Executive to the President, who subject to the provisions of Article 74(1) of the Constitution, must act in accordance with such advice......”  
We are of the view that it is open to the President in the exercise of the power vested in him by Article 72 of the Constitution to scrutinise the evidence on the record of the criminal case and come to a different conclusion from that recorded by the court in regard to the guilt of, and sentence imposed on the accused. In doing so, the President does not amend or modify or supersede the judicial record. The judicial record remains intact, and undisturbed. The President acts in a wholly different plane from that in which the Court acted. He acts under a constitutional power, the nature of which is entirely different from the judicial power and cannot be regarded as an extension of it. This is so, notwithstanding that the practical effect of the Presidential act is to remove the stigma of guilt from the accused or to remit the sentence imposed on him.
It is apparent that the power under Article 72 entitles the President to examine the record of evidence of the criminal case and to determine for himself whether the case is one deserving the grant of the relief falling within that power. We are of opinion that the President is entitled to go into the merits of the case notwithstanding that it has been judicially concluded by the consideration given to it by this Court. In Kehar Singh v. Union of India, 1989 SC, this court stated that the same obviously means that the affected party need not be given the reasons. The question whether reasons can or cannot be disclosed to the Court when the same is challenged was not the subject-matter of consideration. In any event, the absence of any obligation to convey the reasons does not mean that there should not be legitimate or relevant reasons for passing the order.
Extract from the judgment of Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India 2014 (3) SCC 1

To recall, the petitioners while challenging the 1951 and 1965 amendments to the AMU Act in Azeez Basha argued that the amendments were violative of the right to administration guaran teed by Article 30(1). The Union of India responded to the argument with the submission that the Muslim minority cannot claim the right to administration since it did not ’establish’ the institution. Opposing this argument, the petitioners in Azeez Basha, submitted that Article 30(1) guarantees the ’right to administer’ an educational institution to minorities even if it was not established by them, if by ”some process, it had been administering the same before the Constitution came into force.” The argument of the petitioners was rejected. This Court held that the words ”establish” and ”administer” must be read conjunctively, that is, the guarantee of the right to administration is contingent on the establishment of the institution by religious or linguistic minorities... 
The issue before this Bench is the indicia for an educational institution to be a minority educa tional institution. Should it be proved that the institution was established by the minority, or it was administered by the minority, or both? The petitioners and the respondents agree that the words ’establish’ and ’administer’ must be read conjunctively. They argue that administration is a sequitur to establishment. However, they disagree on the test to be applied to identify a minority education institution. The petitioners argue that the only indicia for a minority ed ucational institution is that it must be established by a minority, while the respondents argue that the dual test of establishment and administration must be satisfied.
(Extracted with edits and revisions from Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors, 2024 SC 8)

Ahmadi.(as he then was) speaking for himself and PunchhiJ., endorsed the rec ommendations in the following words-The time is ripe for taking stock of the working of the various Tribunals set up in the country after the insertion of Articles 323A and 323B in the Constitution. After the incorporation of these two articles, Acts have been enacted where under tribunals have been constituted for dispensation of justice. Sufficient time has passed and experience gained in these last few years for taking stock of the situation with a view to finding out if they have served the purpose and objectives for which they were constituted. Complaints have been heard in regard to the functioning of other tribunals as well and it is time that a body like the Law Commission of India has a comprehensive look-in with a view to suggesting measures for their improved functioning. That body can also suggest changes in the different statutes and evolve a model on the basis whereof tribunals may be constituted or reconstituted with a view to ensuring greater independence. An intensive and extensive study needs to be undertaken by the Law Commission in regard to the Constitution of tribunals under various statutes with a view to ensuring their independence so that the public confidence in such tribunals may increase and the quality of their performance may improve. 
Before parting with the case it is necessary to express our anguish over the ineffectiveness of the alternative mechanism devised for judicial review. The judicial review and remedy are the fundamental rights of the citizens. The dispensation of justice by the tribunal is much to be desired.
(Extracted with Edits from R.K. Jain v. Union of India, 1993 (4) SCC 119)

The Companies Act, 2013 does not deal with insolvency and bankruptcy when the companies are unable to pay their debts or the aspects relating to the revival and rehabilitation of the companies and their winding up if revival and rehabilitation is not possible. In principle, it cannot be doubted that the cases of revival or winding up of the company on the ground of insolvency and inability to pay debts are different from cases where companies are wound up under Section 271 of the Companies Act 2013. The two situations are not identical. Under Section 271 of the Companies Act, 2013, even a running and financially sound company can also be wound up for the reasons in clauses (a) to (e). The reasons and grounds for winding up under Section 271 of the Companies Act, 2013 are vastly different from the reasons and grounds for the revival and rehabilitation scheme as envis aged under the IBC. The two enactments deal with two distinct situations and in our opinion, they cannot be equated when we examine whether there is discrimi nation or violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. For the revival and rehabilitation of the companies, certain sacrifices are required from all quarters, including the workmen. In case of insolvent companies, for the sake of survival and regeneration, everyone, including the secured creditors and the Central and State Government, are required to make sacrifices. The workmen also have a stake and benefit from the revival of the company, and therefore unless it is found that the sacrifices envisaged for the workmen, which certainly form a separate class, are onerous and burdensome so as to be manifestly unjust and arbitrary, we will not set aside the legislation, solely on the ground that some or marginal sacrifice is to be made by the workers. We would also reject the argument that to find out whether there was a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India or whether the right to life under Article 21 Constitution of India was infringed, we must word by word examine the waterfall mechanism envisaged under the Companies Act, 2013, where the company is wound up in terms of grounds (a) to (e) of Section 271 of the Companies Act, 2013; and the rights of the workmen when the insolvent company is sought to be revived, rehabilitated or wound up under the Code. The grounds and situations in the context of the objective and purpose of the two enactments are entirely different.
(Extracted, with edits and revision, from Moser Baer Karamchari Union v. Union of India, 2023 SCC Online SC 547)

This Court has tried to indicate in recent cases that the meaning of what could be described as a basic ”structure” of the Constitution must necessarily be found in express provisions of the construction and not merely in subjective notions about meanings of words. Similar must be the reasoning we must employ in extracting the meaning hidden between the interstices of statutory provisions. Each of us is likely to have a subjective notion about ”industry”. For objectivity, we have to look first to the, words used in the statutory provision defining industry in an attempt to find the meaning. If that meaning is clear, we need proceed no further. But, the trouble here is that the words found there do not yield a meaning so readily. They refer to what employers or workers may do as parts of their ordinary avocation or business in life.
(Extracted with edits from Bangalore Water Supply v. A. Rajappa & Others, AIR 1978 SC 548) 

The Act of 1948 defines “manufacturing process” and we clearly find that “washing, cleaning” and the activities carried out by the respondent with a view to its use, delivery or disposal are squarely attracted. The contention of the respondent that dry cleaning does not make any product usable, saleable or worthy of transport, delivery or disposal has only to be stated to be rejected. “Manufacturing process” has been defined to mean any process for washing or cleaning with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal. The linen deposited with the launderer is, after washing and cleaning, delivered to the customer for use. The ingredients of the section are fully satisfied. There is nothing in the Act of 1948, which is repugnant in the subject or context, constraining us to jettison the definition. Hence, we reject the findings of the High Court and hold that the activity carried out which is not disputed is clearly covered by the definition of “manu facturing process” under Section 2(k) which, in turn, would bring the premises in question of the respondent under the definition of “factory” under Section 2(m). If that were so, the complaint lodged against the respondent could not have been quashed. 
(Extracted with edits from The State of Goa v. Namita Tripathi, 2025 INSC 306)

The element of gift is traceable to both ’settlement’ and ’will’. As settled in law, the nomenclature of an instrument is immaterial and the nature of the document is to be derived from its contents. While so, a voluntary disposition can transfer the interest in praesenti and in future, in the same document. In such a case, the document would have the elements of both the settlement and will. Such document, then has to be registered and by operation of the doctrine of severability, becomes a composite document and has to be treated as both, a settlement and will and the respective rights will flow with regard to each disposition from the same document. It is pertinent to mention here that the reservation of life interest or any condition in the instrument, even if it postpones the physical delivery of possession to the donee/settlee, cannot be treated as a will, as the property had already been vested with the donee/settlee. 
[Extracted from: NP Saseendran v NP Ponnamma 2025 INSC 388.]

”Mortgage inter alia means transfer of interest in the specific immovable prop erty for the purpose of securing the money advanced by way of loan. Section 17(1)(c) of the Registration Act provides that a non-testamentary instrument which acknowledges the receipt or payment of any consideration on account of the creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or extension of any such right, ti tle or interest, requires compulsory registration. Mortgage by deposit of title-deeds in terms of Section 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act surely acknowledges the receipt and transfer of interest and, therefore, one may contend that its registration is compulsory.
However, Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act mandates that every mortgage other than a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds can be effected only by a registered instrument. In the face of it, in our opinion, when the debtor deposits with the creditor title-deeds of the property for the purpose of security, it becomes mort gage in terms of Section 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act and no registered instrument is required under Section 59 thereof as in other classes of mortgage. The essence of mortgage by deposit of title-deeds is handing over by a borrower to the creditor title-deeds of immovable property with the intention that those doc uments shall constitute security, enabling the creditor to recover the money lent. After the deposit of the title-deeds the creditor and borrower may record the trans action in a memorandum but such a memorandum would not be an instrument of mortgage. A memorandum reducing other terms and conditions with regard to the deposit in the form of a document, however, shall require registration under Section 17(1)(c) of the Registration Act, but in a case in which such a document does not incorporate any term and condition, it is merely evidential and does not require registration.”
tracted from: State of Haryana v Narvir Singh (2014) 1 SCC 105

Having heard the learned Counsels for the parties, and on perusal of the ma terial on record, the primary issue which arises for consideration of this Court is ”whether a review or recall of an order passed in a criminal proceeding initiated under section 340 of CrPC is permissible or not?” [...] A careful consideration of the statutory provisions and the aforesaid decisions of this Court clarify the now-well settled position of jurisprudence of Section 362 of CrPC which when summarized would be that the criminal courts, as envisaged under the CrPC, are barred from altering or reviewing in their own judgments except for the exceptions which are explicitly provided by the statute, namely, correction of a clerical or an arithmetical error that might have been committed or the said power is provided under any other law for the time being in force. As the courts become functus officio the very moment a judgment or an order is signed, the bar of Section 362 CrPC becomes applicable. Despite the powers provided under Section 482 CrPC which, this veil cannot allow the courts to step beyond or circumvent an explicit bar. It also stands clarified that it is only in situations wherein an application for recall of an order or judgment seeking a procedural review that the bar would not apply and not a substantive review where the bar as contained in Section 362 CrPC is attracted. Numerous decisions of this Court have also elaborated that the bar under said provision is to be applied stricto sensu. 
(Extracted with edits and revisions from Vikram Bakshi v. RP Khosla 2025 INSC 1020)

A glance over all the Sections related to extortion would reveal a clear distinction being carried out between the actual commission of extortion and the process of putting a person in fear for the purpose of committing extortion. Section 383 defines extortion, the punishment therefor is given in Section 384. Sections 386 and 388 provide for an aggravated form of extortion. These sections deal with the actual commission of an act of extortion, whereas Sections 385, 387 and 389 IPC seek to punish for an act committed for the purpose of extortion even though the act of extortion may not be complete and property not delivered. It is in the process of committing an offence that a person is put in fear of injury, death or grievous hurt. Section 387 IPC provides for a stage prior to committing extortion, which is putting a person in fear of death or grievous hurt ’in order to commit extortion’, similar to Section 385 IPC. Hence, Section 387 IPC is an aggravated form of 385 IPC, not 384 IPC. Having deliberated upon the offence of extortion and its forms, we proceed to analyze the essentials of both Sections, i.e.,383 and 387 IPC, the High Court dealt with.
(Extracted from Balaji Traders v. State of UP, 2025 INSC 806)

The reference essentially raises the following issue: whether a child who is conferred with legislative legitimacy under Section 16(1) or 16(2) is, by reason of Section 16(3), entitled to the ancestral/coparcenary property of the parents or is the child merely entitled to the self-earned/separate property of the parents. ... Holding that the consequence of legitimacy under sub-sections (1) or (2) of Section 16 is to place such an individual on an equal footing as a coparcener in the coparcenary would be contrary to the plain intendment of sub-section (3) of Section 16 of the HMA 1955 which recognises rights to or in the property only of the parents. In fact, the use of language in the negative by Section 16(3) places the position beyond the pale of doubt. We would therefore have to hold that when an individual falls within the protective ambit of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 16, they would be entitled to rights in or to the absolute property of the parents and no other person.
(Extracted with edits and revisions from Revanasiddappa & Anr v. Mallikarjun 2023 INSC 783) 

Live-in relationship, as such, as already indicated, is a relationship which has not been socially accepted in India, unlike many other countries. In Lata Singh v. State of U.P. [(2006) 5 SCC 475: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 478] it was observed that a live-in relationship between two consenting adults of heterosexual sex does not amount to any offence even though it may be perceived as immoral. However, in order to provide a remedy in civil law for protection of women, from being victims of such relationship, and to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the so ciety, first time in India, the DV Act has been enacted to cover the couple having relationship in the nature of marriage, persons related by consanguinity, marriages, etc. ... For the first time, though, the DV Act, Parliament has recognised a “rela tionship in the nature of marriage” and not a live- in relationship simpliciter. We have already stated, when we examine whether a relationship will fall within the expression “relationship in the nature of marriage” within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the DV Act, we should have a close analysis of the entire relationship In variably, it may be a question of fact and degree, whether a relationship between two unrelated persons of the opposite sex meets the tests judicially evolved.
(Extracted with edits and revisions from Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755) 

Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which is an inclusive definition, inter alia, provides that relinquishment of an asset or extinguishment of any right therein amounts to a transfer of a capital asset. While the taxpayer continues to remain a shareholder of the company even with the reduction of share capital, it could not be accepted that there was no extinguishment of any part of his right as a shareholder qua the company. A company under Section 66 of the Companies Act, 2013 has a right to reduce the share capital and one of the modes which could be adopted is to reduce the face value of the preference share. When as a result of reducing the face value of the share, the share capital is reduced, the right of the preference shareholder to the dividend or his share capital and the right to share in the distribution of the net assets upon liquidation is extinguished proportion ately to the extent of reduction in the capital. Such a reduction of the right of the capital asset clearly amounts to a transfer within the meaning of section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. 
(Extracted with edits and revisions from Principal Commissioner of Income Tax v. Jupiter Capital Pvt Ltd., (2025 INSC 38)

On the night of October 12th, the "Sunburst Medallion" was stolen from the highly secured display case in the city museum. The theft occurred sometime between the museum closing at 10:00 PM and the night guard, Mr. Hemant, completing his final round at 1:00 AM. Three primary suspects were identified, all of whom had recently been dismissed from their museum positions: Anjali, the former curator; Bharat, the former security expert; and Chitra, the former exhibits designer.

Here are the established facts and their alibis:

• The security system logs show that the display case was opened using a specific five-digit code, which only Anjali and the museum director (who was out of the country) knew.
• Bharat's alibi is that he was at a distant relative's birthday party from 8:00 PM to 1:30 AM. Multiple independent witnesses confirmed his presence throughout the entire period.
• Chitra's alibi is that she was working late at a downtown graphic design studio. A time-stamped security camera from the studio's entrance shows her entering at 7:00 PM and exiting at 11:45 PM. The studio is a 20-minute drive from the museum.
• Mr. Hemant, the night guard, stated he checked the medallion at 10:30 PM, and it was still there.

Further investigation revealed that a small, distinctive silver button was found near the display case. Anjali is known to frequently wear a coat with similar unique silver buttons. The security expert, Bharat, had previously boasted that he could remotely disable a certain type of magnetic lock—the same type used on the medallion's case—without needing the code, though the log suggests the code was used. (269 words)

In a small town lived a close-knit family where every relation could be expressed through simple symbols. For instance, when they said \( A \times B \), it meant \( A \) is the father of \( B \), while \( A \div B \) meant \( A \) is the mother of \( B \). The younger ones were often introduced with \( A + B \), meaning \( A \) was the daughter of \( B \), and the bond of brotherhood was shown by \( A - B \) (A is brother of B).

One day, the children in the family turned these symbols into a playful code. Instead of introducing their parents and siblings in words, they spoke only in symbols. “Look,” giggled little Meena, “\( M + N \div O \)!” Everyone laughed, because they knew it meant Meena was the daughter of \( N \), and \( N \) was the mother of \( O \), making her \( O \)’s sister. What started as a code soon became a family game, making the bonds of father, mother, daughter, and brother not just relations, but symbols of love and togetherness. (165 words)

Four teams – Red (R), Blue (B), Green (G), and Yellow (Y) – are competing in the final four rounds of the Inter-School Science Olympiad, labeled Round A, Round B, Round C, and Round D. Each round consists of one match between two teams, and every team plays exactly two matches. No team plays the same opponent more than once.

The final schedule must adhere to the following rules:

• Rule 1 (Consecutive Play): The Green team (G) must play their two matches in consecutive rounds.
• Rule 2 (Fixed Appearance): The Yellow team (Y) must play in Round B.
• Rule 3 (Positional Constraint): The Red team (R) must play against the Blue team (B) in a round that is immediately before a round in which neither R nor B is playing.
• Rule 4 (Timing): The Blue team's (B) first match must occur in an earlier round than the Green team's (G) first match.
• Rule 5 (Opponent Link): The team that plays against the Red team (R) in the round that is not against the Blue team (B), is the same team that plays in Round D.

(193 words)

Health insurance plays a vital role in ensuring financial protection and access to quality healthcare. In India, however, the extent and nature of health insurance coverage vary significantly between urban and rural areas. While urban populations often have better access to organized insurance schemes, employer-provided coverage, and awareness about health policies, rural populations face challenges such as limited outreach of insurance schemes, inadequate infrastructure, and lower awareness levels. This urban-rural divide in health insurance coverage highlights the broader issue of healthcare inequality, making it essential to analyze the factors contributing to this gap and explore strategies for more inclusive health protection. A state-level health survey was conducted.

The survey covered 1,80,000 adults across urban and rural areas. Urban residents formed 55% of the sample (that is, 99,000 people) while rural residents made up 45% (that is, 81,000 people). In each area, coverage was classified under four heads – Public schemes, Private insurance, Employer-provided coverage, and Uninsured. In urban areas, Public coverage accounted for 28% of the urban population, Private for 22%, Employer for 18%, and the remaining 32% were Uninsured. In rural areas, where formal coverage is generally lower, Public coverage stood at 35%, Private at 10%, Employer at 8%, while 47% were Uninsured.

For this survey, “Insured” includes everyone covered by Public + Private + Employer schemes, and “Uninsured” indicates those with no coverage at all. Officials noted that public schemes remain the backbone of rural coverage, while employer and private plans are relatively more prevalent in urban centres. (250 words)

A state electricity report serves as an important tool to assess energy production and track progress in the power sector. By providing quarterly data on generation measured in gigawatt hours (GWh), the report highlights the contribution of different energy sources such as coal, gas, hydro, solar, and wind. This not only helps in understanding the overall energy mix and dependence on conventional versus renewable sources but also enables policymakers, planners, and stakeholders to evaluate trends, address gaps, and promote sustainable energy development. A state electricity report provides quarterly generation (in GWh) by source – Coal, Gas, Hydro, Solar, and Wind.

In Q1

Generation from Coal is 2,200 GWh, Gas contributes 800 GWh, Hydro 900 GWh, Solar 700 GWh, and Wind 400 GWh, for a total of 5,000 GWh.

In Q2

Coal rises to 2,400 GWh, while Gas dips to 700 GWh; Hydro improves to 1,000 GWh, Solar to 800 GWh, and Wind to 600 GWh, bringing the quarterly total to 5,500 GWh.

In Q3

Coal moderates to 2,100 GWh, Gas increases to 900 GWh, Hydro softens to 800 GWh, but Solar advances to 1,000 GWh and Wind to 700 GWh, keeping the total at 5,500 GWh.

In Q4

Coal moves to 2,300 GWh, Gas to 850 GWh, Hydro to 1,100 GWh, Solar to 900 GWh, and Wind to 850 GWh, for a total of 6,000 GWh.

For analysis, Renewables are taken as Hydro + Solar + Wind. A carbon policy scenario proposes cutting Coal by 10%, shifting the entire energy reduction equally into Solar and Wind. (255 words)

Trump's Triple Whammy on India

US president Donald Trump has landed a triple whammy on India by torpedoing the H-1B visa programme, days after revoking sanctions waiver on Chabahar port in Iran and weeks after imposing a 50% tariff on Indian exports to the US. The White House also maintained a conspicuous silence on the Pakistan-Saudi Arabia mutual defence treaty amid reports that neither country informed Washington of the pact, suggesting a growing US indifference to India's concerns. The triple blow has shaken US-India ties to the foundation, mystifying experts who expected a reset after an exchange of friendly messages between Modi and Trump. While some observers see in the crackdown on H-1B a pressure tactic to make India bend on the trade deal, sources familiar with the dynamics of the current White House say the two issues are unrelated and Trump was convinced of the need to “reform” the guest worker visa programme ever since MAGA hardliners persuaded him that American workers were being gamed out of jobs by foreign companies and US big tech acting in tandem. (174 words)

[Extracted from the newspaper, The Times of India, September 21, 2025]

Indian Chess recorded yet another great moment on Monday, as Divya Deshmukh won the Women’s World Cup in the Georgian city of Batumi. In the final, the 19-year-old defeated fellow-Indian Koneru Humpy in the tiebreakers. While Humpy contesting the final wasn’t much of a surprise—she is the World No. 5 and has been one of the best female players for the last couple of decades—not many would have anticipated Divya’s stunning show. But, given her obvious talent and the way she has been playing for the past two years, it didn’t come as a big surprise. By winning the World Cup, one of the biggest events organized by the world chess governing body FIDE, Divya also achieved another significant milestone. She became India’s 88th Grandmaster and is only the fourth Indian woman after Humpy, D. Harika and R. Vaishali to get that coveted title. Last year, Divya won the World junior championship in Ahmedabad with a dominant display. She also played a key role in India’s historic gold in the Chess Olympiad at Budapest. India was the top seed there, though. At the World Cup, the Indian women exceeded expectations, with four of them making it to the quarterfinals. (198 words)

[Extracted from the newspaper, The Hindu July 29, 2025]

I rise to apprise this august House of the foreign policy dimension of our response to the Pahalgam terrorist attack, going into the preparations for Operation Sindoor and how foreign policy was handled during Operation Sindoor. As all the honourable members would appreciate, it was important to send a clear, strong and resolute message after the Pahalgam attack. Our red lines had been crossed and we had to make it very apparent that there would be serious consequences. As a result, the first step which was taken was that a meeting of the Cabinet Committee of Security took place on the 23rd of April, and that meeting decided that:

• One, the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 will be held in abeyance with immediate effect until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross-border terrorism.
• Two, the integrated checkpost Attari would be closed with immediate effect.
• Three, Pakistani nationals who were traveling under SAARC visa exemption scheme would no longer be allowed to do that.
• Four, the Defence, Naval and Air Advisors of the Pakistani High Commission would be declared persona non-grata and,
• Five, the overall strength of the High Commission would be brought down to 30 from the number of 55. (207 words)

(Excerpts from Statement made by Minister of External Affairs Dr. S Jaishankar on special discussion in Lok Sabha on Operation Sindoor dated 28th Jul 2025)