Question

When a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener, who has a child legitimised under section 16 of Hindu Marriage Act 1955, dies intestate, after the 2005 Amendment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, what is the legal mechanism that determines the child's share in the parent's interest in the coparcenary property?

• A. The Child becomes a coparcener by birth, and the entire coparcenary property is divided equally amongst all the coparceners.
• B. The parent's interest devolves by traditional rule of survivorship, and the section 16 child receives no share
• C. The parent's interest is first determined through a notional partition immediately before death under section 6 (3) of Hindu Succession Act 1956 and this determined share then devolves by intestate succession to all the deceased's children (including the section 16 child) under section 8/10 of Hindu Succession Act 1956.
• D. The share of section 16 child is limited to receiving maintenance from the joint family estate.
• A. Such a child is a coparcener
• B. Such a child is not a coparcener
• C. Such a child is a coparcener, and has the power to seek partition of coparcenary property
• D. Such a child is a coparcener, but does not have the power to seek partition of coparcenary property
• A. Only I is correct
• B. Only II is correct
• C. Both I and II are correct
• D. Both I and II are incorrect
• A. Such a child can ask for partition of coparcenary property
• B. Such a child can claim share in their own right in the undivided coparcenary property of his parents
• C. Such a child has rights only to self-acquired property of his parents
• D. Such a child cannot ask for partition of coparcenary property
• A. Such children are entitled to coparcenary rights in the ancestral property to their parents, equal to children born within a valid marriage
• B. Such children are entitled only to the self-acquired or separate property of their parents, and not to ancestral/coparcenary property
• C. Such children are entitled to inherit property only if no legitimate heirs exist from a valid marriage
• D. Such children have no rights in any property of the parents, whether self-acquired or ancestral

Answer 1

The Correct Option is C

Step 1: Understanding the Question:
The question asks for the process by which a child legitimized under Section 16 HMA can inherit a share in their parent's interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property when the parent dies without a will after 2005.
Step 2: Detailed Explanation:
The passage establishes that a Section 16 child has rights only in the "property of the parents," not in the coparcenary property as a whole. This means they are not coparceners by birth. So, how do they inherit? The mechanism is provided by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.


Notional Partition: When a male Hindu coparcener dies intestate, Section 6(3) of the Hindu Succession Act mandates a "notional partition." This means a partition is deemed to have taken place immediately before his death to ascertain his specific share in the coparcenary property.
Devolution of Share: This ascertained share is then treated as his separate property.
Intestate Succession: This separate property then devolves according to the rules of intestate succession under Section 8 of the Act to his Class I heirs, which includes all his children (legitimate, adopted, and those legitimized under Section 16 HMA).
This entire process is described perfectly in option (C). Option (A) is wrong because the passage states the child is not a coparcener. Option (B) is wrong because the rule of survivorship has been largely abrogated by the 2005 amendment in favor of succession. Option (D) is incorrect as the child is entitled to a share in the parent's property, not just maintenance.
Step 3: Final Answer:
The legal mechanism involves a notional partition to crystallize the parent's share, which then devolves by intestate succession to all heirs, including the Section 16 child.

Answer 2

The question asks how a Section 16 legitimised child actually gets a share once a coparcener-parent dies without a will after the 2005 amendment. Since the child is not a coparcener, each option needs to be tested against the mechanism the Hindu Succession Act actually provides for a deceased coparcener's interest.

1. The child becomes a coparcener by birth and the entire property is divided equally among all coparceners: This treats the child as a coparcener, but that status has already been ruled out, a Section 16 child's rights are confined to the property of the parents, not a birthright share in the joint family's coparcenary as a whole.
2. The parent's interest devolves by survivorship, and the child gets nothing: Before the 2005 amendment, survivorship applied and would indeed have excluded such a child. But the 2005 amendment replaced survivorship with succession for a coparcener's interest, so this describes the pre-2005 position, not the law that actually governs this case.
3. The parent's interest is first fixed through a notional partition under Section 6(3) of the Hindu Succession Act immediately before death, and that share then devolves by intestate succession under Sections 8/10 to all children including the Section 16 child: This is exactly the two-step process the 2005 amendment created. Step one carves out what the deceased's share would have been had a partition happened just before death. Step two treats that carved-out share as ordinary separate property, which then passes to Class I heirs, a category that includes a Section 16 legitimised child, under the ordinary succession rules.
4. The child's share is limited to maintenance from the joint family estate: Maintenance is a right distinct from, and much narrower than, a share in property by succession. The 2005 amendment gives the child an actual inheritable share, not merely upkeep, so this understates the child's entitlement.

The two-step process, notional partition to fix the parent's share, followed by intestate succession to distribute it among all Class I heirs including the Section 16 child, is the mechanism the amended Act actually provides.

Therefore, the correct answer is the parent's interest is first determined through a notional partition immediately before death under section 6(3) of Hindu Succession Act 1956 and this determined share then devolves by intestate succession to all the deceased's children (including the section 16 child) under section 8/10 of Hindu Succession Act 1956.

Answer 3

Step 1: Understanding the Question:
The question asks for the correct legal status of a child legitimized under Section 16 HMA, specifically whether they are a coparcener or not.
Step 2: Detailed Explanation:
The passage from the Supreme Court's judgment in {Revanasiddappa v. Mallikarjun} is explicit on this point. It holds that:
"Holding that the consequence of legitimacy under sub-sections (1) or (2) of Section 16 is to place such an individual on an equal footing as a coparcener in the coparcenary would be contrary to the plain intendment of sub-section (3) of Section 16...".
This is a direct and unambiguous statement that a child legitimized under Section 16 is NOT a coparcener. Their rights are limited to the property of their parents only. Therefore, options (A), (C), and (D), all of which claim the child is a coparcener, are incorrect. Option (B) accurately reflects the legal position as clarified by the Supreme Court.
Step 3: Final Answer:
The Supreme Court has clearly held that a child conferred with legitimacy under Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act is not a coparcener.

Answer 4

This question is really about whether legitimacy under Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act carries with it the status of coparcener. Testing each option against what coparcener status actually means settles it.

1. Such a child is a coparcener: Coparcener status by birth belongs only to those born within the joint family in a valid or legally recognised marriage, giving them a right by birth in the ancestral estate itself. Legitimacy under Section 16 fictionally treats a child as legitimate for succession purposes, but that legal fiction was never extended to also make them a coparcener, so this option overstates the child's status.
2. Such a child is not a coparcener: The legitimacy conferred by Section 16 is deliberately confined to the property of the parents, and does not extend the child's status into the wider joint family as a coparcener with a birthright in the ancestral estate. This matches the narrower scope Section 16(3) itself places on the fiction of legitimacy.
3. Such a child is a coparcener with the power to seek partition: The power to demand partition is a coparcener's right, and since the child is not a coparcener, this power cannot follow either. This option assumes the very status that has been denied.
4. Such a child is a coparcener but without the power to seek partition: This option still wrongly grants coparcener status while inconsistently withholding one of its core incidents, which is not how the law actually treats the position, the child is denied the status altogether, not given a partial or limited version of it.

Since coparcener status is a birthright confined to those born within the coparcenary itself, and Section 16 legitimacy is limited to rights in the parents' own property, the child is correctly described as not a coparcener.

Therefore, the correct answer is such a child is not a coparcener.

Answer 5

Step 1: Understanding the Question:
The question asks to evaluate two statements concerning the legal legitimacy of children born from void marriages under Hindu Law.
Step 2: Key Formula or Approach:
The answer lies in Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and the effect of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976.
Step 3: Detailed Explanation:


Statement I: Section 16(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, explicitly states that any child born of a marriage which is null and void under Section 11 shall be deemed to be legitimate. This legislative provision grants legitimacy to such children for the purpose of inheriting their parents' property. Therefore, Statement I is correct.

Statement II: The original Section 16 only protected children of voidable marriages. The Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976, substituted the old section with the new Section 16, which extended this protection to children of void marriages as well. The Supreme Court has interpreted this amendment to have retrospective effect, meaning it applies to children born even before the 1976 amendment came into force. Therefore, the conferment of legitimacy is irrespective of the child's date of birth relative to the 1976 amendment. Statement II is also correct.

Step 4: Final Answer:
Since both statements I and II are legally correct, the most appropriate option is (C).

Answer 6

This question checks two claims about the scope of legitimacy under Section 16 HMA. Each needs its own check against the actual text and history of the provision.

1. Only I is correct: Statement I says a child born of a null and void marriage is treated as legitimate. Section 16(1) expressly deems such a child legitimate, so Statement I is true, which already rules out this option since it would also require Statement II to be false.
2. Only II is correct: Statement II says this legitimacy applies whether the child was born before or after the 1976 amending Act came into force. Courts have read the 1976 amendment as applying retrospectively to protect children regardless of their date of birth, so Statement II is also true, which rules out this option too since it would require Statement I to be false.
3. Both I and II are correct: Since Section 16(1) legitimises children of void marriages (Statement I) and that protection is not restricted by the child's date of birth relative to the 1976 amendment (Statement II), both statements hold up independently, making this the fitting option.
4. Both I and II are incorrect: This would require both statements to fail, but each one is separately supported, by the statutory text for Statement I and by the settled retrospective reading for Statement II, so this option cannot be right.

Both the statutory deeming of legitimacy for children of void marriages and its retrospective, birth-date-independent application are legally accurate, so both statements stand.

Therefore, the correct answer is both I and II are correct.

Answer 7

Step 1: Understanding the Question:
The question asks to identify the correct statement regarding the property rights of children legitimized under Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act.
Step 2: Detailed Explanation:
The Supreme Court's decision in {Revanasiddappa v. Mallikarjun (2023)}, as referenced in the preceding comprehension passage, clarified this issue. The court held that such children are not coparceners by birth. Their rights are limited to the property of their parents.
Let's analyze the options based on this:

(A) & (B): The right to ask for partition and the right to claim a share in undivided coparcenary property are rights that belong to a coparcener. Since the Supreme Court has held that these children are not coparceners, these statements are incorrect.

(C): This is incorrect because the child's right extends to the "property of his parents," which includes not only their self-acquired property but also their interest in the ancestral property (which is determined by a notional partition upon the parent's death). Stating they have rights *only* in self-acquired property is too restrictive.

(D): This statement is correct. As the child is not a coparcener, they do not possess the right to demand a partition of the joint family's coparcenary property during the lifetime of their parents or other coparceners. They can only inherit their parent's share after the parent's death.
Step 3: Final Answer:
A child legitimized under Section 16 HMA is not a coparcener and therefore cannot demand a partition of the coparcenary property.

Answer 8

Since a Section 16 legitimised child is not a coparcener, each option needs to be checked against what rights actually follow, or do not follow, from that non-coparcener status.

1. Such a child can ask for partition of coparcenary property: The right to demand partition belongs only to a coparcener. Since this child is not a coparcener, this right cannot be exercised, making this option incorrect.
2. Such a child can claim a share in their own right in the undivided coparcenary property: A claim to an undivided share "in their own right" while the property is still joint is again a coparcener's right, exercisable during the coparcenary's existence. That right does not extend to a Section 16 child, so this option is also incorrect.
3. Such a child has rights only to self-acquired property of the parents: This is too narrow. The child's rights extend to the property of the parents generally, which includes the parent's own separate share once carved out of the ancestral estate through notional partition on death, not merely what the parent personally earned or bought.
4. Such a child cannot ask for partition of coparcenary property: Since the child is not a coparcener, they hold no standing to demand a partition of the joint family estate while other coparceners are alive. Their entitlement only crystallises later, as an heir to whatever share the parent is found to hold on death.

Because coparcener status alone carries the power to demand partition, and this child does not hold that status, the accurate statement is that they cannot demand partition of the coparcenary property.

Therefore, the correct answer is such a child cannot ask for partition of coparcenary property.

Answer 9

Step 1: Understanding the Question:
The question asks for the best summary of the Supreme Court's conclusion on the property rights of children legitimized under Section 16 of the HMA.
Step 2: Detailed Explanation:
The comprehension passage from {Revanasiddappa v. Mallikarjun} provides a direct summary. It concludes that a Section 16 child is "entitled to rights in or to the absolute property of the parents and no other person." The judgment contrasts this with being "on an equal footing as a coparcener in the coparcenary." This means their right is confined to the property owned by their parents, which includes their parents' self-acquired property and their parents' defined share in ancestral property. It does not give them a right in the ancestral property of the larger joint family.
Let's evaluate the options:

(A) is directly contradicted by the judgment. They are not coparceners.
(B) This statement is the closest summary. When the court says they are entitled to the "separate property of their parents" and "not to ancestral/coparcenary property," it means they cannot claim a share from the common family pot as a coparcener. Their claim is restricted to what belongs exclusively to the parent (self-acquired) or what can be carved out as the parent's share from the ancestral property upon death (which then becomes their separate estate for succession). This option correctly captures the essence of this limitation.
(C) is incorrect. They are Class I heirs and inherit alongside other legitimate children.
(D) is incorrect. They definitely have rights in their parents' property.
Step 3: Final Answer:
The judgment's conclusion is that the rights of such children are restricted to the separate property of their parents, not the ancestral property of the joint Hindu family.

Answer 10

This question asks for the best overall summary of the Supreme Court's holding on Section 16 children's property rights. Checking each option against the actual scope the Court gave the child's rights settles which one fits best.

1. Entitled to coparcenary rights in the ancestral property equal to children born within a valid marriage: The Court held the opposite, that treating such a child on an equal footing as a coparcener in the coparcenary would go against the plain intent of Section 16(3), so this option contradicts the holding directly.
2. Entitled only to the self-acquired or separate property of the parents, and not to ancestral/coparcenary property: This matches the Court's own language that the child is entitled to rights "in or to the absolute property of the parents and no other person," language that deliberately excludes the wider ancestral estate of the joint family, leaving only what belongs to the parents themselves.
3. Entitled to inherit only if no legitimate heirs exist from a valid marriage: Nothing in the ruling makes the Section 16 child's inheritance conditional on the absence of other heirs, they inherit as Class I heirs alongside any other children of the parent, not as a last resort.
4. No rights in any property of the parents, whether self-acquired or ancestral: This goes too far in the other direction, the child does have real inheritable rights, just confined to the parents' own property rather than the joint family's ancestral estate.

The Court's own phrase, rights in the property of the parents "and no other person," is best summarised as confining the child to the parents' separate or self-acquired property, not the wider ancestral or coparcenary estate.

Therefore, the correct answer is such children are entitled only to the self-acquired or separate property of their parents, and not to ancestral/coparcenary property.