Comprehension
We may note that even though rights in land are no more a fundamental right, still it remains a constitutional right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India, and the provisions of any Act seeking to divest any person from the rights in property have to be strictly followed. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right; however, it continued to be a human right in a welfare State, and a Constitutional right under Article 300A of the Constitution. Article 300A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300A, can be inferred in that Article. The State in exercise of its power of eminent domain may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor must be paid. The right to property is recognised as a basic human right. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different political thinkers that some amount of property right is an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property. “Property must be secured; else liberty cannot subsist” was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed, the view that property itself is the seed bed which must be conserved if other constitutional values are to flourish is the consensus among political thinkers and jurists.
Question: 1
Right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the
Right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- Constitution (Sixty Ninth Amendment) Act, 1991.
- Constitution (Forty Second Amendment) Act, 1976
- Constitution (Seventy First Amendment) Act, 1992
- Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978.
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The Correct Option is D
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The correct option is (D) : Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978.
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The question asks which constitutional amendment removed the right to property from the list of fundamental rights. This can be answered by recalling what each listed amendment actually did, rather than by simply naming the correct one.
- Constitution (Sixty Ninth Amendment) Act, 1991: This amendment inserted Articles 239AA and 239AB, giving Delhi the special status of National Capital Territory with its own Legislative Assembly. It has no connection to property rights.
- Constitution (Forty Second Amendment) Act, 1976: Often called the mini-Constitution, this amendment added the words socialist and secular to the Preamble, inserted Part IVA on fundamental duties, and expanded Parliament's amending power, among other changes. It did not touch the right to property.
- Constitution (Seventy First Amendment) Act, 1992: This amendment added Konkani, Manipuri and Nepali to the Eighth Schedule of languages, a subject unrelated to property.
- Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978: Enacted after the Emergency to restore several civil liberties curtailed by the Forty Second Amendment, this Act repealed Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31, and inserted the new Article 300A, converting the right to property from a fundamental right into a mere constitutional right that can only be taken away by authority of law.
None of the amendments in options A to C deals with property at all, while the Forty Fourth Amendment is the one that made this specific change of shifting property out of Part III.
Therefore, the correct answer is Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978.
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Question: 2
In which of the following cases the Supreme Court of India held that provisions of law seeking to divest the right provided under Article 300A of the Constitution of India must be strictly construed?
In which of the following cases the Supreme Court of India held that provisions of law seeking to divest the right provided under Article 300A of the Constitution of India must be strictly construed?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, (2008) 15 SCC 517
- Tukaram Kana Joshi v. M.I.D.C., (2013) 1 SCC 353.
- P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 152
- Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat, (1995) Supp. 1 SCC 596.
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The Correct Option is A
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The correct option is (A) : N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, (2008) 15 SCC 517
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The question is looking for the case where the Supreme Court held that any statute divesting a person of rights under Article 300A must be strictly construed. Each option can be checked against what that case actually decided.
- N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, (2008) 15 SCC 517: This case dealt with a land dispute where the Court emphasised that since Article 300A protects a person's property from being taken away except by authority of law, any statutory provision that seeks to divest a person of that right must be construed strictly, in favour of the person whose property is affected. This is precisely the strict-construction principle the question describes.
- Tukaram Kana Joshi v. M.I.D.C., (2013) 1 SCC 353: This case dealt with the State's failure to pay compensation for decades after taking possession of land, and it held that undue delay in payment amounts to a violation of the right to property as a human right. It is about delayed compensation, not about strict construction of divesting provisions.
- P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 152: This is a service law case about undue delay in challenging a promotion or seniority decision, and has nothing to do with property or Article 300A.
- Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat, (1995) Supp. 1 SCC 596: This case examined the validity of a mining law under the distribution of legislative powers between Parliament and the States, touching on Article 300A only incidentally while resolving a competence dispute, not laying down the strict-construction rule for divesting statutes.
Only the first case squarely lays down that provisions divesting property rights must be strictly followed and construed, which is exactly what the question is asking for.
Therefore, the correct answer is N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, (2008) 15 SCC 517.
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Question: 3
Right to property is a basic human right. Which of the following statements is true regarding human rights?
Right to property is a basic human right. Which of the following statements is true regarding human rights?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc
- Human rights have gained a multifaceted dimension.
- Human rights are statutory rights.
- Both (A) and (B).
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The Correct Option is D
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The correct option is (D) : Both (A) and (B).
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The question asks which statement correctly describes the nature of human rights, building on the idea that the right to property is a basic human right. Each statement needs to be tested on its own for accuracy.
- Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc: This is an accurate description. Human rights jurisprudence has long recognised these as core individual entitlements necessary for a dignified life.
- Human rights have gained a multifaceted dimension: This is also accurate. Over time human rights have expanded well beyond civil and political rights to cover economic, social, cultural, environmental and group rights, giving the concept a genuinely multifaceted character.
- Human rights are statutory rights: This is incorrect. Human rights are treated as inherent and inalienable, owed to a person by virtue of being human, and are recognised rather than created by statute. Reducing them to statutory rights would mean they exist only because a legislature grants them, which contradicts their foundational character.
- Both (A) and (B): Since statements A and B are each independently correct and statement C is false, the combined option that picks out A and B together is the accurate one.
Because both the individual-rights description and the multifaceted-dimension description hold true while the statutory-rights description does not, the option combining the two correct statements is the right answer.
Therefore, the correct answer is Both (A) and (B).
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Question: 4
‘Eminent Domain’ is defined as
‘Eminent Domain’ is defined as
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- The power of sovereign to take public property for public use with the owner’s consent upon the payment of just compensation
- The power of sovereign to take public property for private use without the owner’s consent upon the payment of just compensation.
- The power of sovereign to take property for public use without the owner’s consent upon the payment of just compensation
- The power of sovereign to take property for public use with the owner’s consent upon the payment of just compensation.
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The Correct Option is C
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The correct option is (C) : The power of sovereign to take property for public use without the owner’s consent upon the payment of just compensation
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Eminent domain is a specific legal concept with a precise definition, and the four options differ only in small but decisive details, namely whether the taking is of public or private property, whether it is for public or private use, and whether the owner's consent is required.
- Power to take public property for public use with consent, upon compensation: This is wrong on two counts. Eminent domain is the power to take property from private owners, not property that is already public, and it operates precisely because the owner does not consent, since consensual transfers would simply be a sale or acquisition by agreement.
- Power to take public property for private use without consent, upon compensation: This is wrong because eminent domain must be exercised for a public purpose, not to benefit a private use, and again it wrongly refers to public property rather than the private property that eminent domain actually targets.
- Power to take property for public use without consent, upon payment of just compensation: This captures the doctrine correctly. Eminent domain is the sovereign power to compulsorily acquire private property for a public purpose, without needing the owner's agreement, subject to the constitutional and statutory requirement of paying just compensation.
- Power to take property for public use with consent, upon compensation: This is incorrect because it inserts a consent requirement that defeats the very purpose of eminent domain, which exists precisely to allow the State to acquire land even when the owner refuses to part with it.
The only option that gets both elements right, taking without consent and for a public use, is the third one.
Therefore, the correct answer is the power of sovereign to take property for public use without the owner's consent upon the payment of just compensation.
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Question: 5
According to which of the following jurists, property is the objective manifestation of the personality of an individual?
According to which of the following jurists, property is the objective manifestation of the personality of an individual?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- John Austin
- Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
- Jeremy Bentham
- Roscoe Pound
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The Correct Option is B
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The correct option is (B) : Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
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This question is about jurisprudential theories of property, and each jurist listed is associated with a distinct school of thought on what property actually represents.
- John Austin: Austin is the founder of analytical positivism and is known for his command theory of law, defining law as the command of a sovereign backed by sanction. His work centres on the nature of law and sovereignty, not on property as an expression of personality.
- Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Hegel's philosophy of right treats property as the means by which a person's free will becomes concrete in the external world. For Hegel, when a person takes possession of a thing, that thing becomes an extension of the person's will and personality, so property is literally the objective manifestation of individual personality. This matches the question exactly.
- Jeremy Bentham: Bentham, the founder of utilitarianism, viewed property as a creature of law and an expectation of being able to draw an advantage from a thing, famously stating that property is nothing but a basis of expectation. His theory is grounded in utility and expectation, not personality.
- Roscoe Pound: Pound is known for sociological jurisprudence and his theory of social engineering, where property is analysed in terms of competing individual and social interests that law must balance. This is a functional and social account, not a personality-based one.
Of the four, only Hegel's theory specifically frames property as the objectification of the individual's personality in an external object.
Therefore, the correct answer is Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.
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Question: 6
Which of the following statements is true regarding right to property?
Which of the following statements is true regarding right to property?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- Right to property is recognised as part and parcel of the right to life and personal liberty.
- Right to property is recognised as part and parcel of the right to carry on any occupation, trade or business.
- Right to property is not a basic feature of the Constitution of India.
- Right to property is an inalienable right.
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The Correct Option is A
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The correct option is (A) : Right to property is recognised as part and parcel of the right to life and personal liberty.
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This question tests the current judicial understanding of where the right to property stands after the Forty Fourth Amendment, building on the theme that property remains a human right and a constitutional right under Article 300A even though it is no longer a fundamental right.
- Right to property is recognised as part and parcel of the right to life and personal liberty: Courts have repeatedly stressed that being deprived of property without following a valid legal procedure strikes at a person's dignity, livelihood and security, values that lie at the core of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21. This statement reflects that link between property, dignity and personal liberty.
- Right to property is recognised as part and parcel of the right to carry on any occupation, trade or business: This narrows the connection to Article 19(1)(g) alone, but property serves many purposes beyond running a trade or business, including shelter and personal security, so tying it exclusively to occupation and trade is too restrictive to be the accurate general statement.
- Right to property is not a basic feature of the Constitution of India: While courts have indeed held that the right to property is not part of the basic structure, that principle answers a different question, namely whether the right to property limits Parliament's amending power, and is not what is being tested by the passage's emphasis on human dignity and life.
- Right to property is an inalienable right: This is incorrect because the entire premise of Article 300A, and the passage's own reference to the State's power of eminent domain, is that property can lawfully be taken away by the State through a valid legal procedure, which is the opposite of being inalienable.
The statement that best reflects the passage's emphasis on dignity and the continuing human-rights character of property is the one tying it to the right to life and personal liberty.
Therefore, the correct answer is Right to property is recognised as part and parcel of the right to life and personal liberty.
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Top CLAT PG Questions
- Our society is governed by the Constitution. The values of constitutional morality are a non-derogable entitlement. Notions of “purity and pollution”, which stigmatise individuals, can have no place in a constitutional regime. Regarding menstruation as polluting or impure, and worse still, imposing exclusionary disabilities on the basis of menstrual status, is against the dignity of women which is guaranteed by the Constitution. Practices which legitimise menstrual taboos, due to notions of “purity and pollution”, limit the ability of menstruating women to attain the freedom of movement, the right to education and the right of entry to places of worship and, eventually, their access to the public sphere. Women have a right to control their own bodies. The menstrual status of a woman is an attribute of her privacy and person. Women have a constitutional entitlement that their biological processes must be free from social and religious practices, which enforce segregation and exclusion. These practices result in humiliation and a violation of dignity. Article 17 prohibits the practice of “untouchability”, which is based on notions of purity and impurity, “in any form”. Article 17 certainly applies to untouchability practices in relation to lower castes, but it will also apply to the systemic humiliation, exclusion and subjugation faced by women. Prejudice against women based on notions of impurity and pollution associated with menstruation is a symbol of exclusion. The social exclusion of women, based on menstrual status, is but a form of untouchability which is an anathema to constitutional values. As an expression of the anti-exclusion principle, Article 17 cannot be read to exclude women against whom social exclusion of the worst kind has been practised and legitimised on notions of purity and pollution. Article 17 cannot be read in a restricted manner. But even if Article 17 were to be read to reflect a particular form of untouchability, that Article will not exhaust the guarantee against other forms of social exclusion. The guarantee against social exclusion would emanate from other provisions of Part III, including Articles 15(2) and 21. Exclusion of women between the age group of ten and fifty, based on their menstrual status, from entering the temple in Sabarimala can have no place in a constitutional order founded on liberty and dignity.
[Extracted from Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1 (hereafter IYLA)] - An Ordinance which is promulgated by the Governor has (as clause 2 of Article 213 provides) the same force and effect as an Act of the legislature of the State assented to by the Governor. However - and this is a matter of crucial importance – clause 2 goes on to stipulate in the same vein significant constitutional conditions. These conditions have to be fulfilled before the ‘force and effect’ fiction comes into being. These conditions are prefaced by the expression “but every such Ordinance” which means that the constitutional fiction is subject to what is stipulated in sub-clauses (a) and (b). Sub-clause (a) provides that the Ordinance “shall be laid before the legislative assembly of the state” or before both the Houses in the case of a bi-cameral legislature. Is the requirement of laying an Ordinance before the state legislature mandatory? There can be no manner of doubt that it is. The expression “shall be laid” is a positive mandate which brooks no exceptions. That the word ‘shall’ in sub-clause (a) of clause 2 of Article 213 is mandatory, emerges from reading the provision in its entirety. As we have noted earlier, an Ordinance can be promulgated only when the legislature is not in session. Upon the completion of six weeks of the reassembling of the legislature, an Ordinance “shall cease to operate”.
Article 213(2)(a) postulates that an ordinance would cease to operate upon the expiry of a period of six weeks of the reassembly of the legislature. The Oxford English dictionary defines the expression “cease” as : “to stop, give over, discontinue, desist; to come to the end.” P Ramanatha Aiyar’s, The Major Law Lexicon defines the expression “cease” to mean “discontinue or put an end to”. Justice C K Thakker’s Encyclopaedic Law Lexicon defines the word “cease” as meaning: “to put an end to; to stop, to terminate or to discontinue”. The expression has been defined in similar terms in Black’s Law Dictionary.
The expression “cease to operate” in Article 213(2)(a) is attracted in two situations. The first is where a period of six weeks has expired since the reassembling of the legislature. The second situation is where a resolution has been passed by the legislature disapproving of an ordinance. Apart from these two situations that are contemplated by sub-clause (a), sub-clause (b) contemplates that an ordinance may be withdrawn at any time by the Governor. Upon its withdrawal the ordinance would cease to operate as well.
[Extracts from the judgment of majority judgment in Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, Civil Appeal No. 5875 of 1994, decided on January 2, 2017 hereafter ‘KK Singh’] - The other material which prompted the High Court to reach the conclusion that the subsoil/minerals vest in the State is … recitals of a patta which ….. states that if minerals are found in the property covered by the patta and if the pattadar exploits those minerals, the pattadar is liable for a separate tax in addition to the tax shown in the patta and …. certain standing orders of the Collector of Malabar which provided for collection of seigniorage fee in the event of the mining operation being carried on. We are of the clear opinion that the recitals in the patta or the Collector’s standing order that the exploitation of mineral wealth in the patta land would attract additional tax, in our opinion, cannot in any way indicate the ownership of the State in the minerals. The power to tax is a necessary incident of sovereign authority (imperium) but not an incident of proprietary rights (dominium). Proprietary right is a compendium of rights consisting of various constituent, rights. If a person has only a share in the produce of some property, it can never be said that such property vests in such a person. In the instant case, the State asserted its ‘right’ to demand a share in the ‘produce of the minerals worked’ though the expression employed is right – it is in fact the Sovereign authority which is asserted. From the language of the BSO No.10 it is clear that such right to demand the share could be exercised only when the pattadar or somebody claiming through the pattadar, extracts/works the minerals – the authority of the State to collect money on the happening of an event – such a demand is more in the nature of an excise duty/a tax. The assertion of authority to collect a duty or tax is in the realm of the sovereign authority, but not a proprietary right….
The only other submission which we are required to deal with before we part with this matter is the argument of the learned counsel for the State that in view of the scheme of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (hereafter ‘MMDRA’) which prohibits under Section 4 the carrying on of any mining activity in this country except in accordance with the permit, licence or mining lease as the case may be, granted under the Act, the appellants cannot claim any proprietary right in the sub-soil…
[Extract from the judgment in Thressiamma Jacob v. Dept. of Mining & Geology, (2013) 9 SCC 725] (hereafter ‘T Jacob’) - A nationwide lockdown was declared by the Central Government from 24 March 2020 to prevent the spread of the CoVID-19 pandemic. Economic activity came to a grinding halt. The lockdown was extended on several occasions, among them for the second time on 14 April 2020. On 17 April 2020, the Labour and Employment Department of the State of Gujarat issued a notification under Section 5 of the Factories Act to exempt all factories registered under the Act “from various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest etc. for adult workers” under Sections 51, 54, 55 and 56. The stated aim of the notification was to provide “certain relaxations for industrial and commercial activities” from 20 April 2020 till 19 July 2020.
Section 5 of the Factories Act provides that in a public emergency, the State Government can exempt any factory or class or description of factories from all or any of the provisions of the Act, except Section 67. Section 5 is extracted below: “5. Power to exempt during public emergency. — In any case of public emergency the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, exempt any factory or class or description of factories from all or any of the provisions of this Act except section 67 for such period and subject to such conditions as it may think fit: Provided that no such notification shall be made for a period exceeding three months at a time. Explanation.— For the purposes of this section ‘public emergency’ means a grave emergency whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbance.” (emphasis supplied) The notification in its relevant part is extracted below:
“... NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 5 of the Factories Act, 1948, the ‘Factories Act’ PART B Government of Gujarat hereby directs that all the factories registered under the Factories Act, 1948 shall be exempted from various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest etc. of adult workers under section 51, section 54, and section 55 and section 56 with the following conditions from 20th April till 19th July 2020, –
(1) No adult worker shall be allowed or required to work in a factory for more than twelve hours in any day and Seventy Two hours in any week.
(2) The Periods of work of adult workers in a factory each day shall be so fixed that no period shall exceed six hours and that no worker shall work for more than six hours before he has had an interval of rest of at least half an hour.
(3) No Female workers shall be allowed or required to work in a factory between 7:00 PM to 6:00 AM.
(4) Wages shall be in a proportion of the existing wages (e.g. If wages for eight hours are 80 Rupees, then proportionate wages for twelve hours will be 120 Rupees).”
[Extract from judgment of the Supreme Court in Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha v. The State of Gujarat decided on 1 October, 2020, (hereafter ‘GMS’)] - In view of various counter claims regarding registration or non-registration, what is necessary is only that the information given to the police must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such a situation, registration of a FIR is mandatory. However, if no cognizable offence is made out in the information given, then the FIR need not be registered immediately and perhaps the police can conduct a sort of preliminary verification or inquiry for the limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether a cognizable offence has been committed. But, if the information given clearly mentions the commission of a cognizable offence, there is no other option but to register a FIR forthwith. Other considerations are not relevant at the stage of registration of FIR, such as, whether the information is falsely given, whether the information is genuine, whether the information is credible etc. These are the issues that have to be verified during the investigation of the FIR. At the stage of registration of a FIR, what is to be seen is merely whether the information given ex facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. If, after investigation, the information given is found to be false, there is always an option to prosecute the complainant for filing a false FIR.
[Excerpted from the judgment delivered by Sathasivam, C.J.I. in Lalita Kumari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1 (hereafter ‘Lalita Kumari’)]
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