Question

In IYLA, the Supreme Court held that the worshippers of Lord Ayyappa:

• A. are not a religious denomination because they have not registered themselves as such
• B. are not a religious denomination because they do not have a distinct name, a common set of beliefs, and a common organisational structure
• C. are a religious denomination because they have been recognised as such by the state
• D. are a religious denomination because they have consistently been treated as such by themselves as well as by society in general
• A. Essential Religious Practice Test
• B. Sincerity of Belief Test
• C. Proportionality Test
• D. Constitutional Morality Test
• A. The Abolition of Untouchability Act, 1951
• B. The Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955
• C. The Constitutional Offences Act, 1951
• D. The Untouchability Offences (Prohibition, Protection, and Remedies) Act, 1950
• A. Living Constitutionalism
• B. Originalism
• C. Structuralism
• D. Textualism
• A. Vertical application
• B. Horizontal application
• C. Indirect horizontal application
• D. None of the above
• A. Scope of “public order, morality and health” in Article 25(1)
• B. Scope of expression “section of Hindus” in Article 25(2)(b)
• C. Scope of “judicial recognition” to PILs filed by people not belonging to a religious denomination to contest a religious practice
• D. All the above
• A. Justice R.F. Nariman
• B. Justice Dipak Misra
• C. Justice Indu Malhotra
• D. None of the above
• A. Coming out as Dalit
• B. Goolami
• C. Annihilation of Caste
• D. All the above
• A. Cannot be extracted under any circumstances
• B. Cannot be precisely determined
• C. Cannot be infringed under any circumstances
• D. None of the above
• A. Special Leave Petition from the decision of the Kerala High Court
• B. Public Interest Litigation
• C. Writ Appeal from a petition filed under Article 226
• D. None of the above

Answer 1

The Correct Option is B

The correct option is (B): are not a religious denomination because they do not have a distinct name, a common set of beliefs, and a common organisational structure.

Answer 2

This question checks whether you know the legal test the Supreme Court uses to decide if a group counts as a "religious denomination" under Article 26 of the Constitution, and how the Court applied that test to the worshippers of Lord Ayyappa in the Sabarimala case.

1. Not a religious denomination because they have not registered themselves as such: registration under any statute has never been part of the constitutional test for a religious denomination. The Court has never asked whether a group filed papers with the state; it asks about shared identity and structure. This option invents a requirement that does not exist in the case law, so it is wrong.
2. Not a religious denomination because they do not have a distinct name, a common set of beliefs, and a common organisational structure: this tracks the three part test the Supreme Court laid down in earlier cases such as S.P. Mittal v. Union of India and applied again in IYLA: a group must have a distinctive name, a common faith or body of beliefs, and a common organisation. The majority in IYLA found that devotees of Lord Ayyappa are Hindus who worship at many temples besides Sabarimala, follow no separate creed apart from mainstream Hindu practice, and have no dedicated organisational structure that binds them together as a distinct sect. Since all three limbs of the test failed, the Court held they are not a religious denomination. This is correct.
3. A religious denomination because they have been recognised as such by the state: state recognition plays no role in the test at all. Whether a group is a denomination is a factual and legal inquiry the Court carries out itself; the executive does not get to confer or deny that status. This option is wrong.
4. A religious denomination because they have consistently been treated as such by themselves as well as by society in general: self perception and popular reputation are not substitutes for the actual three part test. A community may see itself as distinct without meeting the legal requirements of a shared name, doctrine, and organisation, and the Court in IYLA looked past general perception to the concrete facts. This option is wrong.

The Sabarimala devotees fail the distinctive name, common faith and common organisation test, so option (B) is the one the Court accepted.

So the correct answer is (B) are not a religious denomination because they do not have a distinct name, a common set of beliefs, and a common organisational structure.

Answer 3

The correct option is (A): Essential Religious Practice Test.

Answer 4

Article 25 protects the freedom to practise and propagate religion, but that protection is not unlimited, so courts need some yardstick to decide which religious practices actually count as "religion" for constitutional purposes. This question asks which yardstick the Supreme Court uses.

1. Essential Religious Practice Test: under this test, first developed in the Shirur Mutt case and used consistently since, including in IYLA, a court asks whether a practice is essential and integral to the religion itself, such that removing it would change the religion's basic character. Only practices that clear this bar get Article 25 protection. This is the test the Court used in IYLA to examine whether excluding menstruating women from Sabarimala was essential to Ayyappa worship, and it found the exclusion was not an essential practice. Correct.
2. Sincerity of Belief Test: this test, associated with United States constitutional law, asks only whether a person's religious belief is sincerely held, without probing whether the practice is essential to the religion. Indian courts have not adopted this as the operative standard under Article 25; the essentiality inquiry is broader and more searching. Wrong.
3. Proportionality Test: proportionality is used across Indian constitutional law to check whether a restriction on a fundamental right goes further than necessary to achieve its purpose, for example in privacy and free speech cases. It is not the specific tool for deciding whether a practice counts as religious under Article 25. Wrong.
4. Constitutional Morality Test: constitutional morality is a broader value the Court invoked in IYLA to test social practices against constitutional principles like dignity and equality, but it is not the specific doctrinal test used to define the scope of a religious practice under Article 25. Wrong.

The Court's actual method for deciding what falls inside Article 25 has always been the Essential Religious Practice Test.

So the correct answer is (A) Essential Religious Practice Test.

Answer 5

The correct option is (B): The Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955.

Answer 6

Article 17 abolishes "untouchability" and forbids its practice in any form, and it also says that enforcing any disability arising out of untouchability is an offence punishable by law. That last part needed an actual statute from Parliament to define offences and penalties, and this question asks which statute did that job.

1. The Abolition of Untouchability Act, 1951: no statute by this name exists. It sounds close to the constitutional text of Article 17 but Parliament never enacted a law under this exact title. Wrong.
2. The Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955: Parliament enacted this law in 1955, originally under the title Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955, to give teeth to Article 17 by criminalising the practice of untouchability, including denial of access to shops, restaurants, hotels, places of worship, water sources and other public places on grounds of untouchability. In 1976 Parliament renamed and expanded it to the Protection of Civil Rights Act to widen its scope and stiffen penalties. This is the statute that gives effect to Article 17. Correct.
3. The Constitutional Offences Act, 1951: there is no such enactment. "Constitutional offences" is not a real statutory category in Indian law, and this option is invented. Wrong.
4. The Untouchability Offences (Prohibition, Protection, and Remedies) Act, 1950: the year and the extra words here are wrong on two counts, the actual 1955 Act was simply called the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955, not this longer 1950 title, so this option misstates both the date and the name. Wrong.

Parliament's actual response to Article 17 was the 1955 Act, later renamed the Protection of Civil Rights Act in 1976.

So the correct answer is (B) The Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955.

Answer 7

The correct option is (B): Originalism.

Answer 8

Constitutional interpretation methods are usually named for the kind of material a judge treats as the main guide to meaning. This question asks which method fits looking back at the Constituent Assembly Debates, the recorded discussions of the body that drafted the Constitution, to decide what a word in the text was meant to cover.

1. Living Constitutionalism: this approach reads the Constitution as a document that grows with changing social values and present day understanding, deliberately looking forward rather than backward to how the framers understood a term. Relying on old debates from the framing era is the opposite instinct. Wrong.
2. Originalism: this method interprets a constitutional provision by asking what it meant, or was understood to mean, at the time it was adopted, and treats the framers' own discussions as strong evidence of that meaning. Justice Chandrachud looked at the Constituent Assembly Debates to show that the framers intended the word "untouchability" in Article 17 to be read broadly enough to cover exclusionary social practices generally, not narrowly limited to caste based untouchability, and he used that historical material as his anchor. This is originalist reasoning. Correct.
3. Structuralism: this method reads a provision in light of the overall architecture of the Constitution, drawing inferences from how different parts and institutions relate to each other, rather than from historical debate transcripts. It is a different tool from digging into what was said at the framing stage. Wrong.
4. Textualism: this method sticks closely to the plain words of the provision as written, without looking outside the text to history or debates. Going to the Constituent Assembly Debates is precisely what a strict textualist would avoid doing. Wrong.

Because Justice Chandrachud grounded his reading of Article 17 in what the framers said and intended at the time of drafting, his method is best described as originalist.

So the correct answer is (B) Originalism.

Answer 9

The correct option is (B): Horizontal application.

Answer 10

Fundamental rights are normally understood as claims a citizen holds against the state, but a few provisions of the Constitution are different, and this question tests whether you know how Justice Chandrachud classified Article 17 in that respect.

1. Vertical application: this describes a right that can only be enforced against the state and its instrumentalities, not against private individuals. Most Part III rights, such as Article 19, work this way. Justice Chandrachud specifically rejected confining Article 17 to this narrow reach, because untouchability is practised by private individuals and communities, not primarily by the state. Wrong.
2. Horizontal application: this describes a right that binds private individuals directly, enforceable person against person and not only against the state. Justice Chandrachud held that Article 17 has horizontal application precisely because untouchability, including the exclusionary practices he discussed, is typically carried out by private actors in social and religious life, and confining Article 17 to state action would leave the core mischief the provision was written to stop untouched. Correct.
3. Indirect horizontal application: this is a weaker version where a right does not bind private parties on its own force but shapes how courts interpret ordinary laws that do apply between private parties. Chandrachud J went further than this middle position and held Article 17 applies directly to private conduct, not merely indirectly through statutory interpretation. Wrong.
4. None of the above: since one of the three named categories, horizontal application, correctly describes his holding, this catch all option does not apply. Wrong.

Because Article 17 targets a practice carried out mainly by private individuals, Chandrachud J read it as directly binding on private conduct, which is horizontal application.

So the correct answer is (B) Horizontal application.

Answer 11

The correct option is (D): All the above.

Answer 12

A review bench does not reopen the merits of a five-judge Constitution Bench ruling on its own strength. What the 2019 review order did instead was flag three questions of constitutional interpretation that kept surfacing across pending faith-based entry disputes, not just Sabarimala, and hand all of them to a nine-judge bench for a common answer. Each option below names one of the strands the referring bench actually raised.

1. Scope of public order, morality and health in Article 25(1): Article 25(1) subjects the right to practice and propagate religion to public order, morality and health. The review bench asked how far a court can use morality, as opposed to constitutional morality, to override a religious denomination's own claim about its practice. This question was in fact referred.
2. Scope of section of Hindus in Article 25(2)(b): Article 25(2)(b) lets the State throw open Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes of Hindus, and the dispute was whether Ayyappa devotees form a distinct section or denomination that can claim protection from that clause instead. The bench referred this too, since it decides whether Article 25(2)(b) can even be invoked against the temple.
3. Whether PILs by outsiders to a denomination can be entertained: A separate strand asked whether a person who does not follow a particular faith or belong to its denomination can maintain a PIL challenging that faith's internal practice, given that Article 26 vests such matters in the denomination itself. The bench referred this as well, since it goes to whether the original petition should have been heard at all.
4. All the above: The review order treated these three questions as interconnected rather than picking one and leaving the others aside, since an answer on any one of them would affect the reasoning on the others. That is exactly why a nine-judge bench, not a smaller one, was thought necessary.

Since all three constitutional questions were part of the same reference and none of them was left out, the answer is option (D), all the above.

So the correct answer is All the above.

Answer 13

The correct option is (C): Justice Indu Malhotra.

Answer 14

Article 17 abolishes untouchability and forbids its practice in any form. In IYLA, the majority, led by Justice Chandrachud in his concurring opinion, read this to cover the social exclusion of women from Sabarimala as a form of untouchability. Checking each name against what that judge actually wrote settles the question.

1. Justice R.F. Nariman: Nariman was part of the majority that struck down the exclusion, and his reasoning did not turn on Article 17 at all, he relied mainly on Article 25 and the test for what counts as an essential religious practice. He did not take a contrary position to Chandrachud on Article 17.
2. Justice Dipak Misra: Misra, writing for himself and Justice Khanwilkar, also formed part of the majority striking down the exclusion, and again the reasoning centred on Articles 14 and 25 rather than a dispute with Chandrachud's Article 17 analysis.
3. Justice Indu Malhotra: Malhotra dissented from the majority outcome itself, and specifically rejected extending Article 17 to this case. Her view was that the framers intended untouchability in Article 17 to cover caste-based untouchability alone, not the exclusion of women from a temple on grounds of age and physiological factors. This is a direct and named disagreement with Chandrachud's Article 17 reasoning.
4. None of the above: This would only be right if no judge on the bench contested Chandrachud's Article 17 reading, but Justice Malhotra did exactly that, so this option does not hold.

Since Justice Malhotra is the one member of the bench who directly disagreed with the Article 17 reasoning, option (C) is correct.

The correct answer is Justice Indu Malhotra.

Answer 15

The correct option is (C: Annihilation of Caste.

Answer 16

Justice Chandrachud's concurring opinion traced the idea of untouchability in Article 17 back to Dr. B.R. Ambedkar's writing on caste, since Ambedkar's work shaped how the framers understood the term. Checking each title against Ambedkar's actual body of work answers the question.

1. Coming out as Dalit: This is a memoir by Yashica Dutt, published decades after Ambedkar's death, and has no connection to him. It is not a source Chandrachud could have cited as Ambedkar's own writing.
2. Goolami: Gulamgiri, meaning Slavery, is a well known nineteenth century work, but it was written by Jyotirao Phule, not Ambedkar. It gets confused with Ambedkar's writing because both authors wrote on caste, but the authorship is different.
3. Annihilation of Caste: This is Ambedkar's own 1936 text, originally written as an undelivered speech, and it is one of his most cited works on the structure and logic of caste oppression. Chandrachud drew on it directly while explaining the intended reach of Article 17.
4. All the above: This only works if all three titles were genuinely Ambedkar's, but two of the three belong to other authors or contexts entirely, so this option overreaches.

Since only Annihilation of Caste is both a real Ambedkar work and the one actually cited, option (C) is correct.

The correct answer is Annihilation of Caste.

Answer 17

The correct option is (C): Cannot be infringed under any circumstances.

Answer 18

Non-derogable is a term from rights law, built from derogate, which means to take away from or lessen something. Applying that root to a right tells us what the word is doing in the passage.

1. Cannot be extracted under any circumstances: Extract means to pull something out or draw it from a source, which is not what derogate means. This confuses the sound of the word with an unrelated meaning and does not fit legal usage.
2. Cannot be precisely determined: This describes vagueness or uncertainty about a right's content, a completely different idea from whether a right can be taken away. Non-derogable says nothing about how precisely a right is defined.
3. Cannot be infringed under any circumstances: This matches derogate directly. A non-derogable right or entitlement is one that cannot be suspended, curtailed, or taken away, even in an emergency or under competing State interest. This is the standard legal sense of the word.
4. None of the above: Would only be correct if none of the three definitions matched, but option (C) matches exactly, so this is ruled out.

Because non-derogable tracks the idea of a right that cannot be infringed under any circumstances, option (C) is the correct reading.

The correct answer is Cannot be infringed under any circumstances.

Answer 19

The correct option is (B): Public Interest Litigation.

Answer 20

The nature of a petition depends on how and where it entered the court system. IYLA did not arrive at the Supreme Court by way of any lower court order, which narrows down which of these labels can apply.

1. Special Leave Petition from the decision of the Kerala High Court: An SLP under Article 136 challenges a judgment or order already passed by a lower court or tribunal. There was no prior Kerala High Court ruling on the Sabarimala entry ban that IYLA was appealing from, so this label does not fit.
2. Public Interest Litigation: IYLA, an association, approached the Supreme Court directly under Article 32 to enforce the fundamental rights of women devotees who were being excluded, rather than to vindicate a personal grievance of its own. That is the defining feature of a PIL, and it is exactly how this case began.
3. Writ Appeal from a petition filed under Article 226: A writ appeal would mean a High Court had already decided a writ petition and the case was moving up on appeal. Since no Article 226 petition or High Court decision preceded this case, there is nothing to appeal from, so this option is wrong.
4. None of the above: Would only be correct if the case fit none of the given descriptions, but it fits the PIL description precisely, so this is ruled out.

Since the case began as a direct Article 32 petition brought in the public interest, with no lower court proceeding behind it, option (B) is correct.

The correct answer is Public Interest Litigation.