Question

The power to promulgate an ordinance is an instance of the:

• A. Executive power of the Governor
• B. Delegated power of the Governor
• C. Sovereign prerogative power of the Governor
• D. None of the above
• A. Legislative power is vested in the legislatures by the Constitution of India
• B. It is a colourable exercise of power under the Constitution of India
• C. The role of the Executive is to implement a law, not make it
• D. None of the above
• A. Both Houses are not in session
• B. When a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation
• C. When the state has been placed under President’s rule
• D. None of the above
• A. Six weeks
• B. Six months
• C. Seven-and-a-half months (
• D. One year
• A. An Ordinance which is not laid before the Legislature in the manner prescribed by Article 213 shall not have any legal effect and consequences.
• B. An Ordinance which is not laid before the Legislature in the manner prescribed by Article 213 shall be void from the date that it should have obtained approval.
• C. An Ordinance which is not laid before the Legislature in the manner prescribed by Article 213 shall be void from the date the ordinance is replaced by a law made by the Legislature to replace the Ordinance.
• D. An Ordinance which is not laid before the Legislature in the manner prescribed by Article 213 shall be considered as a temporary statute.
• A. (i) alone is correct
• B. (i) and (ii) are correct
• C. (i), (ii) and (iii) are correct
• D. None of the above are correct
• A. (i), (ii), and (iii) are correct
• B. (ii) and (iii) are correct
• C. (i) and (iii) are correct
• D. None is correct
• A. Is not subject to judicial review since it is a political question
• B. Is subject to judicial review with regard to the relevancy of the material on which such satisfaction is based
• C. Is subject to judicial review with regard to the adequacy of materials on which such satisfaction is based
• D. None of the above
• A. (i), (ii), and (iii) are correct
• B. (ii) and (iii) are correct
• C. (i) and (iii) are correct
• D. All the above are correct
• A. Statutory in nature and has binding effect upon the Government
• B. A mere expression of the opinion of the House
• C. A decision of the House relating to the control of its proceedings
• D. An exercise of delegated legislation

Answer 1

The Correct Option is D

The correct option is (D): None of the above.

Answer 2

This question checks whether you can place the Governor's ordinance-making power correctly within the scheme of executive, delegated, and legislative powers under the Constitution. Look at each label on its own constitutional footing before picking one.

1. Executive power of the Governor: Under Article 154 and Article 162, the executive power of a State covers matters on which the legislature can make law, and its normal job is to carry out and administer laws that already exist. An ordinance under Article 213 does something an ordinary executive act can never do: it creates a rule with the same force and effect as an Act of the legislature. Since executive power by itself cannot make binding law, this label does not capture what an ordinance is.
2. Delegated power of the Governor: Delegated legislation is subordinate rule making, where the legislature passes an Act and hands the executive authority to fill in details within limits the Act itself sets. There is no parent Act here handing the Governor this authority. Article 213 gives the Governor this power directly from the Constitution, not on loan from the legislature, so calling it delegated power is inaccurate.
3. Sovereign prerogative power of the Governor: A prerogative power, in the common law sense, is a residual discretionary power the Crown holds outside statute, answerable to no written condition. The ordinance power is the opposite of that: it exists only because Article 213 creates it, and it comes wrapped in strict conditions, the legislature must not be in session, the Governor must be separately satisfied that immediate action is necessary, and the ordinance automatically lapses under the time limits in Article 213(2). A power hedged in by written constitutional conditions is not a prerogative power.
4. None of the above: In Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, the seven judge bench described the ordinance making power as a legislative power that the executive exercises in an emergent situation, precisely because the ordinary legislature cannot be summoned in time. That description does not match any of the first three options, it is its own category.

Since none of the first three labels correctly describes the ordinance power, the only option left standing is the fourth one.

So the correct answer is None of the above (D).

Answer 3

The correct option is (B): It is a colourable exercise of power under the Constitution of India.

Answer 4

This question tests why the Constitution Bench in D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar called repeated re-promulgation of ordinances a "fraud on the Constitution." The reasoning turns on one specific legal idea, not a general statement about separation of powers, so look closely at what each option actually says.

1. Legislative power is vested in the legislatures by the Constitution of India: this is true as a general proposition, Article 245 and related provisions do vest law making authority in the legislature, but it is too general to explain why re-promulgation specifically amounts to fraud. Ordinance power itself is a recognised, constitutionally valid exception to that general rule, so stating the general rule alone does not show why repeating it becomes fraudulent.
2. It is a colourable exercise of power under the Constitution of India: this is the actual reasoning the Bench gave. Article 213 lets the Governor promulgate an ordinance only as a stopgap, for use when the legislature cannot be reached, and clause (2) forces it to be laid before the legislature and expire unless approved. When the executive instead keeps re-issuing the same ordinance again and again without ever letting the legislature vote on it, it uses the emergency ordinance route to achieve the effect of permanent legislation, something the Constitution never authorises the executive to do on its own. Doing indirectly, through repeated ordinances, what the Constitution does not allow directly is the definition of a colourable exercise of power, and that is precisely the fraud the Bench identified.
3. The role of the Executive is to implement a law, not make it: this statement is too broad and not even fully accurate here, since Article 213 itself lets the executive make law temporarily in an emergent situation. The problem in Wadhwa was not that the executive made law at all, ordinance power permits that, the problem was that it kept making the same law over and over as a substitute for going to the legislature, which is a narrower and different point than a blanket claim about implementation versus law making.
4. None of the above: incorrect, since option B states the Bench's actual holding accurately.

The Bench's own words centre on the misuse, the colourable exercise, of the ordinance power, not on a general separation of powers statement.

So the correct answer is It is a colourable exercise of power under the Constitution of India (B).

Answer 5

The correct option is (D): None of the above.

Answer 6

Article 213(1) does not set a single, one-line test for when a Governor may promulgate an ordinance. It lays down two conditions that must both be met together. Check each option against the full text of the clause, not just part of it.

1. Both Houses are not in session: this is only half of what Article 213(1) requires. The clause needs, first, that the Legislative Assembly is not in session, or in a bicameral State that both Houses are not in session, and second, separately, that the Governor is satisfied that circumstances exist which make it necessary for him to take immediate action. An option that mentions only the non-session condition and leaves out the Governor's separate satisfaction of necessity states an incomplete version of the constitutional test, so it cannot be picked as the complete answer on its own.
2. When a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation: Article 213 does not make an ordinance conditional on a national or state emergency being in force under Articles 352 or 356. Ordinances are an ordinary, day to day constitutional tool for gaps between legislative sessions, an emergency proclamation is a separate and much rarer mechanism altogether, so this condition has nothing to do with when a Governor may promulgate an ordinance.
3. When the state has been placed under President's rule: President's rule under Article 356 is again a distinct constitutional mechanism, triggered by failure of constitutional machinery in the State, and it is not a precondition Article 213 lays down for ordinance making. Linking ordinance power to President's rule mixes up two unrelated provisions.
4. None of the above: correct, because the only option that even resembles the real test, both Houses not in session, is stated incompletely, missing the Governor's satisfaction of necessity, and the other two options describe conditions Article 213 never mentions at all.

Since no listed option correctly and completely states the two part test in Article 213(1), the residual option is the right one.

So the correct answer is None of the above (D).

Answer 7

The correct option is (C): One year.

Answer 8

This question asks for the theoretical maximum lifespan of an ordinance, which means combining two separate constitutional time limits rather than looking at just one of them. Work out each option against the actual arithmetic the Constitution sets up.

1. Six weeks: six weeks is only the second half of the calculation, the window Article 213(2)(a) gives the legislature after it reassembles to approve or disapprove the ordinance before it automatically ceases to operate. Taken alone, six weeks ignores how long the legislature could have stayed out of session before that six week clock even starts running, so it understates the true maximum.
2. Six months: six months is the other half of the calculation, the longest gap Article 174 allows between two sessions of a State legislature. If a Governor promulgates an ordinance the day after a session ends, the legislature is not constitutionally required to reassemble for up to six months, so the ordinance could sit in force, unapproved, for that entire stretch. But six months alone leaves out the further six weeks the legislature then gets after it reassembles, so this option also understates the maximum.
3. Seven-and-a-half months: this is what you get by adding the two limits together correctly. Take the worst case: an ordinance issued right after a session ends can lawfully wait up to six months, under Article 174, before the legislature is even required to meet again, and then it survives a further six weeks, about one and a half months, under Article 213(2)(a) before it must be approved or it lapses. Six months plus six weeks comes to about seven and a half months, the true outer limit.
4. One year: there is no constitutional provision that stretches an ordinance's life to a full year, this figure does not correspond to Article 174's six month gap or Article 213(2)(a)'s six week window, whether taken alone or added together.

Adding the six month maximum gap between sessions to the six week post-reassembly window gives the real outer limit on how long an ordinance can remain in force.

So the correct answer is Seven-and-a-half months (C).

Answer 9

The correct option is (A): An Ordinance which is not laid before the Legislature in the manner prescribed by Article 213 shall not have any legal effect and consequences..

Answer 10

This question tests what the seven judge bench in Krishna Kumar Singh v State of Bihar actually decided about an ordinance that is never laid before the legislature the way Article 213 requires, and why it departed from two earlier five judge benches on that point.

1. An Ordinance which is not laid before the Legislature in the manner prescribed by Article 213 shall not have any legal effect and consequences: The seven judge bench held that the power to promulgate an ordinance is a conditional and temporary power meant to meet an emergent need, and it is answerable to the legislature through the laying requirement in Article 213. Where that requirement is not met and the ordinance lapses, it does not carry forward any legal effect or consequence merely because it once operated. This is the actual holding of the majority.
2. ...shall be void from the date that it should have obtained approval: This option tries to pin a specific retrospective date, the date approval was due, as the moment the ordinance becomes void. The bench did not fix any such date. It framed the question in terms of consequences ceasing on lapse, not in terms of the ordinance being void from a particular earlier date, so this statement overstates what was decided.
3. ...shall be void from the date the ordinance is replaced by a law made by the Legislature to replace the Ordinance: This too invents a fixed trigger date, replacement by a substituting law, which the Court never adopted as the test. Many ordinances lapse without ever being replaced by a corresponding Act, so tying voidness to a replacement law cannot be the general rule the bench laid down.
4. ...shall be considered as a temporary statute: This is the very analogy the seven judge bench rejected. The two earlier five judge benches had reasoned that an ordinance behaves like a temporary statute, so its effects survive expiry the same way rights and liabilities under a lapsed temporary Act survive. KK Singh expressly overruled that reasoning and held the temporary statute analogy does not hold for ordinances.

Since the Court rejected the temporary statute analogy and declined to fix any specific retroactive date, the only option that matches the actual holding is that an ordinance not laid as Article 213 requires carries no legal effect or consequences.

So the correct answer is option (A): An Ordinance which is not laid before the Legislature in the manner prescribed by Article 213 shall not have any legal effect and consequences.

Answer 11

The correct option is (A): (i) alone is correct.

Answer 12

This question checks three separate claims about an ordinance under Article 213, whether it counts as law for fundamental rights purposes, whether it always needs the President's approval first, and whether it is free from the usual subject matter limits on state legislation, then asks which combination of those claims is correct.

1. (i) alone is correct: Statement (i) says an ordinance is treated as law for the purposes of Article 13. Article 13 defines "law in force" broadly enough to include ordinances, since they are made under a constitutional power to legislate in the legislature's absence. Because an ordinance is law in this sense, it can be struck down like any statute if it violates a fundamental right. Statement (i) is true, and since statements (ii) and (iii) are both false, as shown below, selecting (i) alone is the correct combination.
2. (i) and (ii) are correct: This adds statement (ii), that an ordinance shall in all cases require the President's prior approval. That is not correct. The Governor can promulgate most ordinances on the Governor's own satisfaction without first sending them to the President. Presidential reservation is only required in the specific situations covered by the proviso to Article 213(1), which mirrors the proviso to Article 200 governing Bills, not as a blanket rule for every ordinance. Since (ii) is false, this combination fails even though (i) is true.
3. (i), (ii) and (iii) are correct: This adds statement (iii) as well, that an ordinance is not constrained by the subject matter limits of Article 246 read with the Seventh Schedule. That is false too. An ordinance is a substitute for an Act of the state legislature, so it can only cover subjects the state legislature itself is competent to legislate on. A Governor cannot use the ordinance route to reach a subject outside the state list or concurrent list. With both (ii) and (iii) false, this combination cannot be correct.
4. None of the above are correct: This would only be right if statement (i) were also false. Since (i) correctly states that an ordinance counts as law for Article 13, at least one statement is correct, so "none of the above" cannot be the answer.

Statement (i) stands alone as true, while (ii) and (iii) both misstate the legal position, so the combination that survives is (i) alone.

The correct answer is option (A): (i) alone is correct.

Answer 13

The correct option is (B): (ii) and (iii) are correct.

Answer 14

This question is about when Article 213 actually obliges the Governor to reserve an ordinance for the President's consideration, rather than promulgate it on the Governor's own authority, and it tests three specific triggering statements.

1. (i), (ii), and (iii) are correct: This keeps statement (i), that reservation is required in all cases when the state is under President's Rule under Article 356. That is not the position under Article 213. Article 356 changes who exercises the Governor's functions, it does not by itself convert every ordinance into one requiring Presidential reservation as a blanket rule. Since (i) is not correct as stated, this combination fails.
2. (ii) and (iii) are correct: Statement (ii) says reservation is required when the ordinance touches the proviso to Article 304(b), imposing reasonable restrictions in the public interest on freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse. That mirrors the same requirement for Bills under Article 304(b), and the proviso to Article 213(1) carries it over to ordinances, so (ii) is correct. Statement (iii) says reservation is required when the ordinance is on a Concurrent List matter that is repugnant to a law made by Parliament. That too tracks the proviso to Article 200 as applied through Article 213(1), since a state ordinance that conflicts with existing Union law on a Concurrent List subject needs Presidential consideration to avoid an automatic repugnancy problem. With both (ii) and (iii) correct, this combination holds.
3. (i) and (iii) are correct: This combination keeps the false statement (i) and drops (ii), which is actually a correct trigger. Because it keeps a wrong statement and omits a right one, it cannot be the answer.
4. None is correct: This would only hold if none of the three statements were correct. Since (ii) and (iii) both correctly state situations calling for reservation, this option is wrong.

Only statements (ii) and (iii) correctly describe when Article 213 requires reservation for the President's consideration, so that is the surviving combination.

The correct answer is option (B): (ii) and (iii) are correct.

Answer 15

The correct option is (B): Is subject to judicial review with regard to the relevancy of the material on which such satisfaction is based.

Answer 16

This question is about how far a court can go in reviewing the Governor's satisfaction under Article 213 that circumstances exist requiring immediate action, the trigger that lets the Governor promulgate an ordinance in the first place.

1. Is not subject to judicial review since it is a political question: The seven judge bench did not treat the Governor's satisfaction as completely beyond the reach of courts. Placing executive satisfaction entirely outside judicial scrutiny would let a Governor promulgate ordinances on no material at all, or on considerations that have nothing to do with the constitutional requirement, without any check. The bench allowed at least a limited check, so this option overstates how insulated the satisfaction is.
2. Is subject to judicial review with regard to the relevancy of the material on which such satisfaction is based: This matches the actual holding. The court can examine whether the material the Governor relied on was relevant to the question of whether immediate action was needed, and can strike down the exercise of power if it was based on considerations that have nothing to do with that question or was exercised in bad faith. This keeps courts from rubber stamping the power while still respecting that the Governor, not the court, decides on the facts.
3. Is subject to judicial review with regard to the adequacy of materials on which such satisfaction is based: This goes further than what the bench allowed. Courts checking relevancy ask whether the material had a rational connection to the decision, they do not sit in judgment on how much material was enough or weigh its sufficiency, because that would put the court in the Governor's shoes and turn a limited check into a full merits review. The bench did not extend judicial review that far.
4. None of the above: Since one of the three specific descriptions, relevancy review, does correctly capture the bench's holding, this option is incorrect.

The bench drew the line at relevancy, not adequacy, and rejected treating the satisfaction as a pure political question.

The correct answer is option (B): Is subject to judicial review with regard to the relevancy of the material on which such satisfaction is based.

Answer 17

The correct option is (D): All the above are correct.

Answer 18

This question is about the Supreme Court's majority ruling in Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar on how an Ordinance that stops operating under Article 213 should be understood in law. The stem lists four separate propositions, numbered (i) to (iv), and each option below picks a different combination of these propositions. To find the right option, check each proposition on its own before matching it to a combination.

1. (i), (ii), and (iii) are correct: This combination picks up the first three propositions, that a lapsed Ordinance differs from a void law, from a temporary statute, and from a repealed statute. Each of these three is indeed part of the majority reasoning. But this option leaves out proposition (iv), about the absence of a savings clause in Article 213, which the majority also affirmed. Since a true proposition is left uncounted, this combination is incomplete.
2. (ii) and (iii) are correct: This combination accepts only two of the four true propositions and drops both (i) and (iv). Proposition (i), that a lapsed Ordinance is not the same as a void law, is a distinct point the majority made about the nature of cessation as opposed to constitutional invalidity. Leaving it out, along with (iv), makes this option too narrow.
3. (i) and (iii) are correct: This combination again selects only two propositions and omits (ii) and (iv). The majority treated the distinction from a temporary statute (proposition ii) as a separate and necessary point, since a temporary statute expires by the legislature's own design while an Ordinance lapses through a constitutional time limit tied to the reassembly of the House. Skipping this proposition makes the option incomplete.
4. All the above are correct: Each of the four propositions holds up independently. A lapsed Ordinance is not void from the start, unlike an unconstitutional law. It is not a temporary statute, because its end is fixed by the Constitution and not by the legislature's own drafting choice. It is not equivalent to a repealed statute, because repeal is a deliberate legislative act while cessation is automatic. And because Article 213 carries no savings clause of its own, rights and liabilities created while the Ordinance was in force are not automatically preserved the way Section 6 of the General Clauses Act preserves them after a repeal.

Since every one of the four propositions is independently sound and no combination option except the last one captures all four, the correct choice must include all of them.

Therefore, the correct answer is All the above are correct.

Answer 19

The correct option is (A): Statutory in nature and has binding effect upon the Government.

Answer 20

Article 213 lets a Governor issue an Ordinance when the State Legislature is not in session, but that power is not unchecked. The Legislature can bring the Ordinance to an end early by passing a resolution disapproving it. The question asks what kind of act that disapproval resolution is.

1. Statutory in nature and has binding effect upon the Government: Article 213 itself gives the Legislature this power, so a resolution passed under it does not stay as mere talk inside the House. The moment such a resolution is passed, the Ordinance stops having effect. That direct, automatic legal consequence is what makes the resolution binding and statutory in character, not simply advisory.
2. A mere expression of the opinion of the House: This description would be true for many ordinary resolutions the House passes on policy matters, which carry political weight but no direct legal force. A disapproval resolution under Article 213 is different, because the Constitution itself attaches an immediate legal consequence, the end of the Ordinance, to its passing.
3. A decision of the House relating to the control of its proceedings: This description fits internal matters such as adjournment or the conduct of debate, which the House manages under its own procedural rules and which have no effect outside the House. A disapproval resolution reaches outside the House and directly ends a law that was operating in the State, so it cannot be reduced to a procedural, internal matter.
4. An exercise of delegated legislation: Delegated legislation is law-making that Parliament or a Legislature hands down to another authority, such as the Executive, to fill in details under an enabling statute. Disapproving an Ordinance is the opposite process, the Legislature taking back and ending a law the Executive had temporarily made, not the Legislature receiving delegated power itself.

Because Article 213 gives the resolution a direct legal effect on the Ordinance's validity, and that effect binds the Government the moment the resolution passes, the disapproval resolution is a statutory act carrying binding force, not just a political statement or an internal procedural step.

Therefore, the correct answer is Statutory in nature and has binding effect upon the Government.