Question

In the concluding part of the judgment excerpted above, preliminary inquiries were permitted for which of the following class or classes of cases?

• A. Offences related to matrimonial disputes
• B. Allegations of corruption against public officers
• C. Where the information was received after substantial delay, such as more than three months after the alleged incident
• D. All the above
• A. That a cryptic phone call, without complete details and information about the commission of a cognizable offence cannot always be treated as a F.I.R.
• B. That non-reading-over of the recorded complaint by the police to the informant will vitiate the recording of the F.I.R.
• C. That F.I.R.s are substantive pieces of evidence at the trial and can be duly proved to establish the facts in issue at a trial.
• D. That F.I.R.s are necessarily hearsay statements and cannot be relied upon to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein.
• A. That the police officer has not followed the mandatory procedure of sending a copy of the F.I.R. to the jurisdictional magistrate upon registration.
• B. That the statement recorded as the F.I.R. is a hearsay statement made by the police officer himself and therefore cannot be admissible in evidence.
• C. That the recorded F.I.R. becomes a statement under Section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, because the Station House Diary entry will be considered the F.I.R.
• D. That the procedure set out in Section 190, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has been violated by the police officer.
• A. Violative of right against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India.
• B. A statement that cannot be proved as a confession hit by Section 25, Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
• C. A statement that can be used as substantive evidence against its maker, since there was no accusation against him at the time he made the statement.
• D. A statement that can be retracted by the accused person at the time of trial, and thereafter the commission of the offence cannot be proved.
• A. Admitted the commission of the offence in the terms of the offence.
• B. Admitted the commission of the ingredients for the commission of the offence.
• C. Either (A) or (B)
• D. Both (A) and (B)
• A. Refers to a standard where a document by its stated terms displays the sought fact.
• B. Refers to a standard where a document by very simple perusal displays the sought fact.
• C. Refers to a standard which calls for an application of mind by the finder of fact to infer a conclusion.
• D. Refers to a standard which requires no consideration unless proved otherwise by the opposite side.
• A. Within a period not exceeding fifteen days
• B. Within a period not exceeding seven days
• C. As expeditiously as possible but the Court did not specify a timeline
• D. Within such time as may be permitted by the jurisdictional Magistrate
• A. The entire information will be treated as disclosing cognizable offences and registered as an F.I.R.
• B. The police officer will sever the parts disclosing non-cognizable offences and shall only register the parts disclosing cognizable offences
• C. The police officer shall refer the informant to the jurisdictional Magistrate for a direction to register the F.I.R., and thereafter, once such direction is received, register the F.I.R.
• D. The F.I.R. registered, which contains information of non-cognizable offences, is subject to confirmation by a Magistrate under Sections 156 and 157 of Cr.P.C.
• A. Cogent and reliable information disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence.
• B. Higher than the requirement under Section 154 of Cr.P.C. as the Section uses the term “reason to suspect the commission of an offence”.
• C. Precisely the same standard under Section 154 of Cr.P.C. and the police have no discretion in the matter.
• D. At the same standard as for a non-cognizable complaint being scrutinised by a Judicial Magistrate.
• A. That the informant must be believed for the purposes of registering the F.I.R.
• B. That the information must be taken as true for the purposes of registering the F.I.R.
• C. That the police cannot reject any information disclosing the commission of a cognisable offence on the basis of it being false.
• D. All the above

Answer 1

The Correct Option is D

The correct option is (D): All the above.

Answer 2

The question asks which categories of cases the Court allowed a preliminary inquiry for, before the mandatory registration rule kicks in, as set out in the concluding part of Lalita Kumari.

1. Offences related to matrimonial disputes: This is correct. The Court specifically listed matrimonial or family disputes as a category where a brief preliminary check is allowed, since such complaints often need a first look to sort out genuine criminal conduct from a family dispute that has not yet reached that level.
2. Allegations of corruption against public officers: This is correct. Corruption allegations were also placed in this list, since they often involve documents and complex facts that benefit from a quick preliminary check before a formal FIR is registered against a public officer.
3. Where the information was received after substantial delay, such as more than three months after the alleged incident: This is correct. The Court included cases with abnormal delay in reporting, giving over three months as an illustrative example, as another category where police may first satisfy themselves that a genuine cognizable offence is disclosed.
4. All the above: Since each of the three specific categories above was individually named by the Court as falling within the permitted preliminary inquiry categories, the combined answer covering all of them is the accurate one.

The Court did not restrict preliminary inquiry to just one type of case; it listed several illustrative categories together, including matrimonial disputes, corruption allegations, and cases marked by substantial unexplained delay.

Therefore, the correct answer is All the above.

Answer 3

The correct option is (A): That a cryptic phone call, without complete details and information about the commission of a cognizable offence cannot always be treated as a F.I.R..

Answer 4

This question is about the three-judge bench decision in Netaji Achyut Shinde (Patil) v. State of Maharashtra, which reaffirmed certain settled principles about what can and cannot count as an FIR.

1. That a cryptic phone call, without complete details and information about the commission of a cognizable offence, cannot always be treated as an F.I.R.: This is correct. Courts have long held, going back to cases like Tapinder Singh, that a bare, incomplete phone call which does not itself disclose a cognizable offence is not automatically an FIR, and the actual first document that clearly discloses the offence is the one treated as the FIR.
2. That non-reading-over of the recorded complaint by the police to the informant will vitiate the recording of the F.I.R.: This is incorrect as a general rule. While reading over a statement is good practice and required under certain provisions for confirmation by the informant, a failure to do so does not automatically invalidate or vitiate the registration of the FIR itself.
3. That F.I.R.s are substantive pieces of evidence at the trial and can be duly proved to establish the facts in issue at a trial: This is incorrect. Settled law treats an FIR as a prior statement, not substantive evidence of the truth of its contents; it can at best be used to corroborate or contradict the maker under the Evidence Act, not as proof of the facts stated in it.
4. That F.I.R.s are necessarily hearsay statements and cannot be relied upon to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein: This overstates the position. An FIR is generally not usable to prove the truth of its contents, but it is not treated as "necessarily" inadmissible hearsay in every circumstance, for instance it can fall within specific exceptions such as being a dying declaration or part of the res gestae in particular fact situations.

Of the four statements, only the first correctly restates a principle the Court reiterated in this case, the limited evidentiary weight of a cryptic, incomplete phone call.

Therefore, the correct answer is That a cryptic phone call, without complete details and information about the commission of a cognizable offence cannot always be treated as a F.I.R.

Answer 5

The correct option is (C): That the recorded F.I.R. becomes a statement under Section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, because the Station House Diary entry will be considered the F.I.R..

Answer 6

In the scenario described, the officer records the complaint in the Station House Diary first, then goes and investigates, and only afterward, the next day, records a formal FIR. This sequence is exactly the kind of situation Lalita Kumari was designed to prevent, since the FIR is supposed to be registered before investigation begins, not after.

1. That the police officer has not followed the mandatory procedure of sending a copy of the F.I.R. to the jurisdictional magistrate: This is not the ground raised by the facts given. Nothing in the scenario suggests a failure to send a copy to the magistrate; the defect described lies earlier, in the timing and sequence of registration itself.
2. That the statement recorded as the F.I.R. is a hearsay statement made by the police officer himself and therefore cannot be admissible in evidence: This does not fit either. The FIR content originates from the informant, not from the police officer's own personal knowledge, so this is not the applicable ground.
3. That the recorded F.I.R. becomes a statement under Section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, because the Station House Diary entry will be considered the F.I.R.: This is correct. Since the Station House Diary entry, made before investigation began, itself already disclosed a cognizable offence, that first entry is legally the FIR. Whatever was recorded later, after the spot visit and witness statements, is not a fresh FIR at all; it is really a statement recorded during investigation, which falls under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, not under Section 154.
4. That the procedure set out in Section 190, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has been violated by the police officer: Section 190 concerns a magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, not the police officer's duty to register an FIR, so this section is not the one implicated by the facts.

The real defect is that investigation preceded formal registration, so the earlier diary entry legally functions as the FIR and the later document is downgraded to a Section 161 statement.

Therefore, the correct answer is That the recorded F.I.R. becomes a statement under Section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, because the Station House Diary entry will be considered the F.I.R.

Answer 7

The correct option is (B): A statement that cannot be proved as a confession hit by Section 25, Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Answer 8

In Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar, the accused himself walked into the police station and gave a statement, later registered as the FIR, admitting to killing his family members. The question is how the Court characterised this self-incriminating FIR.

1. Violative of right against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India: This is incorrect as the ground the Court relied on. Article 20(3) protects a person from being compelled to be a witness against himself; since the accused walked in voluntarily and was not compelled by the police, the constitutional protection against compelled self-incrimination was not the basis for the Court's ruling.
2. A statement that cannot be proved as a confession hit by Section 25, Indian Evidence Act, 1872: This is correct. The Court held that since the entire FIR amounted to a confession made to a police officer, Section 25 of the Evidence Act, which bars any confession made to a police officer from being proved against the accused, applied to bar the confessional parts of the statement, regardless of how voluntarily it was made.
3. A statement that can be used as substantive evidence against its maker, since there was no accusation against him at the time he made the statement: This is incorrect. The bar under Section 25 does not depend on whether an accusation existed before the statement was made; it applies to confessional statements made to a police officer as such, so this reasoning does not match the Court's actual analysis.
4. A statement that can be retracted by the accused person at the time of trial, and thereafter the commission of the offence cannot be proved: This is incorrect. The bar on using the confessional FIR does not depend on the accused retracting it at trial; the statement is inadmissible as a confession from the outset because of Section 25, independent of any later retraction, though the prosecution may still separately prove the offence through other admissible evidence.

The Court's reasoning rests squarely on the statutory bar in Section 25 of the Evidence Act against confessions made to police officers, not on voluntariness, prior accusation, or retraction.

Therefore, the correct answer is A statement that cannot be proved as a confession hit by Section 25, Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Answer 9

The correct option is (C): Either (A) or (B).

Answer 10

In Pakala Narayanaswami v. King Emperor, the Privy Council gave the classic definition of what counts as a confession under Indian evidence law. The question asks which option best captures that definition.

1. Admitted the commission of the offence in the terms of the offence: This alone is only half the test. A statement that directly admits guilt in so many words is certainly a confession, but the Privy Council's definition was not limited to this narrow form.
2. Admitted the commission of the ingredients for the commission of the offence: This alone is also only half the test. A statement admitting all the facts that together constitute the offence, even without using the language of guilt, is also treated as a confession, but again this is not the complete definition by itself.
3. Either (A) or (B): This is correct. The Privy Council held that a confession is a statement which either admits the offence in terms, or substantially admits all the facts which constitute the offence. It does not require both forms to be present together; either one, on its own, is enough to make a statement a confession.
4. Both (A) and (B): This is incorrect because it wrongly requires the statement to satisfy both forms of admission at once, when the actual test is satisfied by either form standing alone.

The Privy Council's test is disjunctive, a direct admission in terms of the offence or a substantial admission of the facts constituting it, either is sufficient.

Therefore, the correct answer is Either (A) or (B).

Answer 11

The correct option is (A): Refers to a standard where a document by its stated terms displays the sought fact..

Answer 12

The excerpt from Lalita Kumari uses the phrase "ex facie" to describe the standard applied at the stage of registering an FIR, that the information must, ex facie, disclose a cognizable offence. The question asks what this standard means in law.

1. Refers to a standard where a document by its stated terms displays the sought fact: This is correct. "Ex facie" literally means "on the face of it," and in legal usage it refers to what a document says in its own stated terms, without needing to look beyond the document or draw inferences from outside material.
2. Refers to a standard where a document by very simple perusal displays the sought fact: This comes close but shifts the emphasis to how easy the reading is (a "simple perusal") rather than to what the document itself states in its own terms. The Lalita Kumari standard is about the content stated on the face of the document, not primarily about how quick or easy the reading process is.
3. Refers to a standard which calls for an application of mind by the finder of fact to infer a conclusion: This is incorrect. An "ex facie" standard is the opposite of requiring inference or deeper reasoning; it is meant to be a plain, surface-level reading, not a standard that calls for weighing evidence or drawing conclusions.
4. Refers to a standard which requires no consideration unless proved otherwise by the opposite side: This is incorrect. This describes something closer to a rebuttable presumption, which shifts a burden onto an opposing party, and is a different legal concept from the plain, face-value reading that "ex facie" describes.

Since "ex facie" is about what a document's own stated terms show, without requiring inference or placing a burden on anyone to disprove it, the first option captures the standard most accurately.

Therefore, the correct answer is Refers to a standard where a document by its stated terms displays the sought fact.

Answer 13

The correct option is (A): Within a period not exceeding fifteen days.

Answer 14

Having permitted preliminary inquiries for a limited set of categories, the Court in Lalita Kumari also fixed an outer time limit for completing such inquiries, so that the exception does not become a way of indefinitely delaying registration.

1. Within a period not exceeding fifteen days: This is correct. The Court fixed this outer limit for concluding a preliminary inquiry, so that police cannot use the preliminary inquiry exception as a device to sit on a complaint indefinitely.
2. Within a period not exceeding seven days: This is incorrect. Seven days was not the timeline fixed by the Court in this judgment for preliminary inquiries.
3. As expeditiously as possible but the Court did not specify a timeline: This is incorrect. The Court did specify a definite outer limit rather than leaving the timing open-ended, precisely to prevent the exception from being misused.
4. Within such time as may be permitted by the jurisdictional Magistrate: This is incorrect. The timeline was fixed directly by the Supreme Court in its judgment; it does not depend on a case by case extension granted by a magistrate.

By fixing a firm outer limit rather than leaving it open-ended or delegating it to a magistrate, the Court made sure the preliminary inquiry exception stays a narrow, time-bound tool rather than an escape route from the registration requirement.

Therefore, the correct answer is Within a period not exceeding fifteen days.

Answer 15

The correct option is (A): The entire information will be treated as disclosing cognizable offences and registered as an F.I.R..

Answer 16

This question deals with information that discloses both cognizable and non-cognizable offences arising out of the same set of facts, and asks how such mixed information should be treated for registration purposes.

1. The entire information will be treated as disclosing cognizable offences and registered as an F.I.R.: This is correct. Once any part of the same transaction discloses a cognizable offence, the whole case is treated as a cognizable case for the purpose of registration and investigation, rather than being artificially split apart offence by offence.
2. The police officer will sever the parts disclosing non-cognizable offences and shall only register the parts disclosing cognizable offences: This is incorrect. The law does not require the police to carve the information into separate cognizable and non-cognizable slices when they arise from the same facts; doing so would fragment a single set of facts into an artificial and impractical division.
3. The police officer shall refer the informant to the jurisdictional Magistrate for a direction to register the F.I.R., and thereafter, once such direction is received, register the F.I.R.: This is incorrect. Referring the informant to a magistrate for prior permission applies to non-cognizable offences standing alone, not to a case where a cognizable offence is already disclosed as part of the same facts, which triggers direct, mandatory registration.
4. The F.I.R. registered, which contains information of non-cognizable offences, is subject to confirmation by a Magistrate under Sections 156 and 157 of Cr.P.C.: This is incorrect. Sections 156 and 157 empower and guide police investigation of cognizable offences; they do not impose a requirement of magisterial confirmation before an FIR covering mixed offences can be acted upon.

The governing rule treats the entire transaction as cognizable once any cognizable offence is disclosed within it, avoiding both artificial splitting of the facts and unnecessary detours through the magistrate.

Therefore, the correct answer is The entire information will be treated as disclosing cognizable offences and registered as an F.I.R.

Answer 17

The correct option is (B): Higher than the requirement under Section 154 of Cr.P.C. as the Section uses the term “reason to suspect the commission of an offence”.

Answer 18

Section 154 governs the police officer's duty to register an FIR when information discloses a cognizable offence, while Section 157 governs the officer's power to actually proceed to the spot and launch an investigation once he has "reason to suspect the commission of an offence." The question asks how Lalita Kumari characterised the relationship between these two thresholds.

1. Cogent and reliable information disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence: This mixes in an evidentiary quality requirement, "cogent and reliable," that goes beyond the plain statutory language of "reason to suspect," so it does not accurately track what the Court said about the Section 157 threshold.
2. Higher than the requirement under Section 154 of Cr.P.C. as the Section uses the term "reason to suspect the commission of an offence": This is correct. Section 157 uses distinct wording, requiring the officer to have "reason to suspect" before physically proceeding to investigate, which the Court read as importing a degree of satisfaction beyond the bare disclosure needed to trigger registration under Section 154.
3. Precisely the same standard under Section 154 of Cr.P.C. and the police have no discretion in the matter: This does not match, since it collapses the distinct language of the two sections into an identical test, ignoring the differently worded threshold Section 157 actually uses.
4. At the same standard as for a non-cognizable complaint being scrutinised by a Judicial Magistrate: This does not match, since the scrutiny a magistrate applies to a non-cognizable complaint is a separate procedural track altogether, not the test a police officer applies when deciding whether to proceed to investigate a cognizable case under Section 157.

The distinct statutory phrase "reason to suspect" in Section 157 was read by the Court as setting a threshold of its own, one that is not identical to the disclosure test that triggers registration under Section 154.

Therefore, the correct answer is Higher than the requirement under Section 154 of Cr.P.C. as the Section uses the term "reason to suspect the commission of an offence".

Answer 19

The correct option is (D): All the above.

Answer 20

Lalita Kumari held that the police cannot weigh the genuineness of information at the registration stage. The question asks what this actually means in practical terms, testing whether the student understands the full implication of that rule rather than just its one-line statement.

1. That the informant must be believed for the purposes of registering the F.I.R.: This is correct. Since genuineness cannot be questioned at this stage, the practical effect is that the police must take the informant's account as the basis for registration, without first deciding whether they personally find the informant credible.
2. That the information must be taken as true for the purposes of registering the F.I.R.: This is also correct. It follows directly from not weighing genuineness that the content of the information is treated as true for the limited purpose of deciding whether to register the FIR, leaving the actual truth or falsehood to be tested later during investigation.
3. That the police cannot reject any information disclosing the commission of a cognisable offence on the basis of it being false: This is also correct. If information discloses a cognizable offence, the police cannot refuse registration by pre-judging it as false; any assessment of falsity comes only after investigation, with prosecution for a false report as the remedy if that turns out to be the case.
4. All the above: Since each of the three statements is simply a different practical consequence of the same underlying rule, that genuineness is not assessed at the registration stage, none of them can be excluded.

Believing the informant, treating the information as true, and refusing to reject it as false are not three separate rules, they are three ways of describing the same "no genuineness check at registration" principle.

Therefore, the correct answer is All the above.