Comprehension
There is a general presumption that every Hindu family is presumed to be joint unless the contrary is proved. It is open even if one coparcener has separated, to the non -separating members to remain joint and to enjoy as members of a joint family. The protection of rights of daughters as coparcener is envisaged in the substituted Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 recognises the partition brought about by a decree of a court or effected by a registered instrument. A special definition of partition has been carved out in the Explanation. The intendment of the provisions is not to jeopardise the interest of the daughter and to take care of sham or frivolous transaction set up in defence unjustly to deprive the daughter of her right as coparcener and prevent nullifying the benefit flowing from the provisions as substituted. The intendment of Section 6 of the Act is only to accept the genuine partitions that might have taken place under the prevailing law, and are not set up as a false defence and only oral ipse dixit is to be rejected outrightly. It has to be remembered that the courts cannot defeat the object of the beneficial provisions made by the Amendment Act. The exception is carved out by us as earlier execution of a registered document for partition was not necessary, and the court was rarely approached for the sake of family prestige. The statutory fiction of partition created by the proviso to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as originally enacted did not bring about the actual partition or disruption of coparcenary. The fiction was only for the purpose of ascertaining share of deceased coparcener when he was survived by a female heir, of Class I as specified in the Schedule to the 1956 Act or male relative of such female. The provisions of the substituted Section 6 are required to be given full effect.
Question: 1
Which of the following judgments is not related to property rights of daughter as a coparcener under Hindu law?
Which of the following judgments is not related to property rights of daughter as a coparcener under Hindu law?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, (2020) 9 SCC 1.
- Danamma v. Amar, (2018) 3 SCC 343
- Prakash v. Phulavati, (2016) 2 SCC 36
- Kalindi Damodar Garde v. Manohar Laxman Kulkarni, (2020) 4 SCC 335
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The Correct Option is D
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The correct option is (D) : Kalindi Damodar Garde v. Manohar Laxman Kulkarni, (2020) 4 SCC 335
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The question asks which judgment is NOT related to the property rights of a daughter as a coparcener under Hindu law, so each case must be checked for whether it actually deals with a daughter's coparcenary rights under the Hindu Succession Act.
- Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, (2020) 9 SCC 1: This is a landmark judgment settling that a daughter becomes a coparcener by birth under the substituted Section 6, irrespective of whether the father was alive on the date the 2005 amendment came into force. It is directly about a daughter's coparcenary rights.
- Danamma v. Amar, (2018) 3 SCC 343: This case dealt with whether daughters could claim a coparcenary share where a preliminary decree in a partition suit had already been passed before the 2005 amendment, again a case squarely about a daughter's coparcenary entitlement.
- Prakash v. Phulavati, (2016) 2 SCC 36: This case examined whether the daughter's rights under the amended Section 6 require the father-coparcener to be alive on the date of the amendment, another judgment directly concerned with a daughter's coparcenary property rights.
- Kalindi Damodar Garde v. Manohar Laxman Kulkarni, (2020) 4 SCC 335: This case concerns the validity and effect of testamentary succession, that is, disputes over a will, rather than a daughter's statutory coparcenary rights under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act. It stands apart from the other three, which are all coparcenary-rights judgments.
Three of the four cases are central authorities on a daughter's coparcenary rights, while the fourth deals with a different subject, testamentary succession, making it the odd one out.
Therefore, the correct answer is Kalindi Damodar Garde v. Manohar Laxman Kulkarni, (2020) 4 SCC 335.
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Question: 2
Based on the given excerpt from a judgment, which of the following statements is not correct in relation to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005?
Based on the given excerpt from a judgment, which of the following statements is not correct in relation to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- It deals with devolution of interest in coparcenary property.
- A daughter will not be subject to the same liabilities in respect of the said coparcenary property as that of a son.
- A daughter becomes a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son
- A daughter shall have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a son.
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The Correct Option is B
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The correct option is (B) : A daughter will not be subject to the same liabilities in respect of the said coparcenary property as that of a son.
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The question asks which statement about Section 6 of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 is NOT correct, so each statement needs to be checked against the actual text and effect of that provision.
- It deals with devolution of interest in coparcenary property: This is accurate, since Section 6 as substituted governs precisely how a coparcener's interest in coparcenary property devolves, including on a daughter.
- A daughter will not be subject to the same liabilities in respect of the said coparcenary property as that of a son: The substituted Section 6 expressly provides that a daughter is subject to the same liabilities in respect of coparcenary property as a son, so a statement claiming she is not subject to the same liabilities directly contradicts the provision and is therefore incorrect.
- A daughter becomes a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son: This is accurate, since the entire object of the amendment was to make a daughter a coparcener by birth in the same manner as a son, not merely a dependent claimant.
- A daughter shall have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a son: This is also accurate and mirrors the express language of the substituted provision equating a daughter's rights with those of a son.
Three of the four statements accurately reflect the text and purpose of the amendment, while the statement about liabilities reverses what the provision actually says, since it imposes equal liabilities on the daughter rather than exempting her from them.
Therefore, the correct answer is A daughter will not be subject to the same liabilities in respect of the said coparcenary property as that of a son.
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Question: 3
Which of the following is the doctrine of legal fiction created to ascertain the share of the deceased in a joint property?
Which of the following is the doctrine of legal fiction created to ascertain the share of the deceased in a joint property?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- Doctrine of Notional Partition
- Doctrine of Factum Valet
- Doctrine of General Partition
- Doctrine of Partial Partition
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The Correct Option is A
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The correct option is (A) : Doctrine of Notional Partition
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This question asks for the name of the legal fiction used to work out the share of a deceased coparcener in a joint Hindu family property, which can be identified by matching the concept described to the doctrine it is actually called.
- Doctrine of Notional Partition: Under the proviso to the original Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, when a male Hindu died leaving behind a Class I female heir, the law deemed a partition to have taken place immediately before his death solely for the purpose of computing his share in the joint family property. This deemed, notional partition did not actually break up the joint family in reality, it was only a fiction to calculate what the deceased's share would have been. This is exactly the doctrine described in the question.
- Doctrine of Factum Valet: This is a different principle altogether, used to validate an act done in violation of a directory rule where the act cannot be undone, and it has no connection with computing a deceased coparcener's share.
- Doctrine of General Partition: This is not a recognised term in Hindu law for this purpose, and there is no established doctrine by this name governing the ascertainment of a deceased coparcener's share.
- Doctrine of Partial Partition: This refers to a partition of only some properties or some members of a joint family while the rest remains joint, a real, factual partition rather than the fictional, deemed partition used purely for computing a deceased person's share.
Only the doctrine of notional partition matches the description of a legal fiction created purely to ascertain a deceased coparcener's share.
Therefore, the correct answer is Doctrine of Notional Partition.
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Question: 4
Which of the following is related to the judgment of Kiran Devi v. the Bihar State Sunni Wakf Board, [2021 SCC OnLine SC 280]?
Which of the following is related to the judgment of Kiran Devi v. the Bihar State Sunni Wakf Board, [2021 SCC OnLine SC 280]?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- Mediation in Matrimonial Matters
- Joint Custody
- Presumption of Hindu Joint Family Property
- Guardianship of a minor
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The Correct Option is C
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The correct option is (C) : Presumption of Hindu Joint Family Property
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This question asks what subject the case of Kiran Devi v. the Bihar State Sunni Wakf Board, [2021 SCC OnLine SC 280] is related to, and each option can be tested against the general subject matter it represents.
- Mediation in Matrimonial Matters: This subject concerns resolving marital disputes through mediation, an area of family law procedure that has no connection with a case involving a Wakf Board and a property dispute of this kind.
- Joint Custody: This concerns child custody arrangements between separated or divorced parents, again unrelated to a dispute involving a Wakf Board.
- Presumption of Hindu Joint Family Property: This case examined the general presumption that a Hindu family is presumed to be joint unless the contrary is proved, and clarified that even where one coparcener has separated, the remaining members may continue as a joint family and enjoy the property jointly. This is precisely the subject the case addresses.
- Guardianship of a minor: This subject deals with who may act as legal guardian for a child, a matter unconnected to the presumption of jointness in a Hindu family's property.
Only the option concerning the presumption of Hindu joint family property matches the actual legal question the Court examined in this case.
Therefore, the correct answer is Presumption of Hindu Joint Family Property.
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Question: 5
As per the given excerpt from a judgment, which of the following is correct in relation to the living status of a father in ensuring coparcenary property rights to a daughter?
As per the given excerpt from a judgment, which of the following is correct in relation to the living status of a father in ensuring coparcenary property rights to a daughter?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- The coparcenary rights can be claimed by the daughter born earlier with effect from September 9, 2005 with savings as provided in Section 6(1) of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005.
- Since the right in coparcenary to a daughter is by birth, it is necessary that father coparcener should be living as on September 9, 2005
- Living status of father is a pre-condition for coparcenary rights to a daughter.
- Since the right in coparcenary to a daughter is by birth, it is not necessary that father coparcener should be living as on September 9, 2005.
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The Correct Option is D
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The correct option is (D) : Since the right in coparcenary to a daughter is by birth, it is not necessary that father coparcener should be living as on September 9, 2005.
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The question asks which statement correctly captures the effect of the father coparcener's living status on a daughter's coparcenary rights under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, as amended in 2005.
- Option A: This treats the daughter's right as arising "with effect from" 9 September 2005, subject to savings under Section 6(1). That framing is inaccurate because the amendment does not create a fresh, prospective right on that date - it recognises a right that is traceable to the daughter's birth, so tying it to a cut-off date with savings misstates its character.
- Option B: This makes the daughter's coparcenary right conditional on the father coparcener being alive as on 9 September 2005. If the right genuinely accrued by birth, it cannot simultaneously depend on the father's survival on a particular date - the two ideas are mutually inconsistent, so this option fails on its own logic.
- Option C: This goes further and states the father's living status is a precondition outright, without qualification. Since coparcenary status is not inherited but vests by birth, treating survival of a specific individual as a precondition contradicts the very nature of a right that is meant to be automatic and independent of anyone else's status.
- Option D: This is the only option consistent with treating the right as one that vests by birth - it correctly states that the father coparcener's living status as on 9 September 2005 is irrelevant to the daughter's entitlement. This is the position affirmed by the Supreme Court in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, which held that a daughter becomes a coparcener by birth in the same manner as a son, and that this status is not defeated merely because the father died before the 2005 amendment came into force.
Testing each option against the settled "right by birth" principle shows that only option (D) is internally consistent - a right that vests by birth cannot logically be made to depend on whether a particular individual was alive on a particular date.
Hence, the correct answer is (D) Since the right in coparcenary to a daughter is by birth, it is not necessary that father coparcener should be living as on September 9, 2005.
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Question: 6
In which of the following judgments was it held that a Hindu joint family is presumed to be joint in food, worship and estate unless the contrary is proved?
In which of the following judgments was it held that a Hindu joint family is presumed to be joint in food, worship and estate unless the contrary is proved?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- Shanti Devi v. Union of India, (2020) 19 SCC 766.
- Rachna v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 140.
- Adiveppa v. Bhimappa, (2017) 9 SCC 586
- Harshit Agarwal v. Union of India, (2021) 2 SCC 710.
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The Correct Option is C
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The correct option is (C) : Adiveppa v. Bhimappa, (2017) 9 SCC 586
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This question asks which judgment held that a Hindu joint family is presumed to be joint in food, worship and estate, unless the contrary is shown.
- Option A: Shanti Devi v. Union of India does not deal with this presumption of jointness in a Hindu family - it belongs to a different area of adjudication, so it is not the source of this proposition.
- Option B: Rachna v. Union of India likewise does not concern the classical Mitakshara presumption of jointness among family members and is unrelated to this specific principle of Hindu law.
- Option C: Adiveppa v. Bhimappa is the judgment that reaffirms the long-standing presumption under Hindu law - every member of a joint family is presumed to be living jointly in food, worship and estate unless a partition or separation is proved, and the burden of displacing that presumption lies on the person alleging separation.
- Option D: Harshit Agarwal v. Union of India does not deal with the presumption of jointness in a Hindu family either, and is drawn from a different subject area entirely.
Since only Adiveppa v. Bhimappa directly addresses and restates this specific presumption of Hindu joint family law, it is the correct citation.
Hence, the correct answer is (C) Adiveppa v. Bhimappa, (2017) 9 SCC 586.
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Top CLAT PG Questions
- Our society is governed by the Constitution. The values of constitutional morality are a non-derogable entitlement. Notions of “purity and pollution”, which stigmatise individuals, can have no place in a constitutional regime. Regarding menstruation as polluting or impure, and worse still, imposing exclusionary disabilities on the basis of menstrual status, is against the dignity of women which is guaranteed by the Constitution. Practices which legitimise menstrual taboos, due to notions of “purity and pollution”, limit the ability of menstruating women to attain the freedom of movement, the right to education and the right of entry to places of worship and, eventually, their access to the public sphere. Women have a right to control their own bodies. The menstrual status of a woman is an attribute of her privacy and person. Women have a constitutional entitlement that their biological processes must be free from social and religious practices, which enforce segregation and exclusion. These practices result in humiliation and a violation of dignity. Article 17 prohibits the practice of “untouchability”, which is based on notions of purity and impurity, “in any form”. Article 17 certainly applies to untouchability practices in relation to lower castes, but it will also apply to the systemic humiliation, exclusion and subjugation faced by women. Prejudice against women based on notions of impurity and pollution associated with menstruation is a symbol of exclusion. The social exclusion of women, based on menstrual status, is but a form of untouchability which is an anathema to constitutional values. As an expression of the anti-exclusion principle, Article 17 cannot be read to exclude women against whom social exclusion of the worst kind has been practised and legitimised on notions of purity and pollution. Article 17 cannot be read in a restricted manner. But even if Article 17 were to be read to reflect a particular form of untouchability, that Article will not exhaust the guarantee against other forms of social exclusion. The guarantee against social exclusion would emanate from other provisions of Part III, including Articles 15(2) and 21. Exclusion of women between the age group of ten and fifty, based on their menstrual status, from entering the temple in Sabarimala can have no place in a constitutional order founded on liberty and dignity.
[Extracted from Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1 (hereafter IYLA)] - An Ordinance which is promulgated by the Governor has (as clause 2 of Article 213 provides) the same force and effect as an Act of the legislature of the State assented to by the Governor. However - and this is a matter of crucial importance – clause 2 goes on to stipulate in the same vein significant constitutional conditions. These conditions have to be fulfilled before the ‘force and effect’ fiction comes into being. These conditions are prefaced by the expression “but every such Ordinance” which means that the constitutional fiction is subject to what is stipulated in sub-clauses (a) and (b). Sub-clause (a) provides that the Ordinance “shall be laid before the legislative assembly of the state” or before both the Houses in the case of a bi-cameral legislature. Is the requirement of laying an Ordinance before the state legislature mandatory? There can be no manner of doubt that it is. The expression “shall be laid” is a positive mandate which brooks no exceptions. That the word ‘shall’ in sub-clause (a) of clause 2 of Article 213 is mandatory, emerges from reading the provision in its entirety. As we have noted earlier, an Ordinance can be promulgated only when the legislature is not in session. Upon the completion of six weeks of the reassembling of the legislature, an Ordinance “shall cease to operate”.
Article 213(2)(a) postulates that an ordinance would cease to operate upon the expiry of a period of six weeks of the reassembly of the legislature. The Oxford English dictionary defines the expression “cease” as : “to stop, give over, discontinue, desist; to come to the end.” P Ramanatha Aiyar’s, The Major Law Lexicon defines the expression “cease” to mean “discontinue or put an end to”. Justice C K Thakker’s Encyclopaedic Law Lexicon defines the word “cease” as meaning: “to put an end to; to stop, to terminate or to discontinue”. The expression has been defined in similar terms in Black’s Law Dictionary.
The expression “cease to operate” in Article 213(2)(a) is attracted in two situations. The first is where a period of six weeks has expired since the reassembling of the legislature. The second situation is where a resolution has been passed by the legislature disapproving of an ordinance. Apart from these two situations that are contemplated by sub-clause (a), sub-clause (b) contemplates that an ordinance may be withdrawn at any time by the Governor. Upon its withdrawal the ordinance would cease to operate as well.
[Extracts from the judgment of majority judgment in Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, Civil Appeal No. 5875 of 1994, decided on January 2, 2017 hereafter ‘KK Singh’] - The other material which prompted the High Court to reach the conclusion that the subsoil/minerals vest in the State is … recitals of a patta which ….. states that if minerals are found in the property covered by the patta and if the pattadar exploits those minerals, the pattadar is liable for a separate tax in addition to the tax shown in the patta and …. certain standing orders of the Collector of Malabar which provided for collection of seigniorage fee in the event of the mining operation being carried on. We are of the clear opinion that the recitals in the patta or the Collector’s standing order that the exploitation of mineral wealth in the patta land would attract additional tax, in our opinion, cannot in any way indicate the ownership of the State in the minerals. The power to tax is a necessary incident of sovereign authority (imperium) but not an incident of proprietary rights (dominium). Proprietary right is a compendium of rights consisting of various constituent, rights. If a person has only a share in the produce of some property, it can never be said that such property vests in such a person. In the instant case, the State asserted its ‘right’ to demand a share in the ‘produce of the minerals worked’ though the expression employed is right – it is in fact the Sovereign authority which is asserted. From the language of the BSO No.10 it is clear that such right to demand the share could be exercised only when the pattadar or somebody claiming through the pattadar, extracts/works the minerals – the authority of the State to collect money on the happening of an event – such a demand is more in the nature of an excise duty/a tax. The assertion of authority to collect a duty or tax is in the realm of the sovereign authority, but not a proprietary right….
The only other submission which we are required to deal with before we part with this matter is the argument of the learned counsel for the State that in view of the scheme of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (hereafter ‘MMDRA’) which prohibits under Section 4 the carrying on of any mining activity in this country except in accordance with the permit, licence or mining lease as the case may be, granted under the Act, the appellants cannot claim any proprietary right in the sub-soil…
[Extract from the judgment in Thressiamma Jacob v. Dept. of Mining & Geology, (2013) 9 SCC 725] (hereafter ‘T Jacob’) - A nationwide lockdown was declared by the Central Government from 24 March 2020 to prevent the spread of the CoVID-19 pandemic. Economic activity came to a grinding halt. The lockdown was extended on several occasions, among them for the second time on 14 April 2020. On 17 April 2020, the Labour and Employment Department of the State of Gujarat issued a notification under Section 5 of the Factories Act to exempt all factories registered under the Act “from various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest etc. for adult workers” under Sections 51, 54, 55 and 56. The stated aim of the notification was to provide “certain relaxations for industrial and commercial activities” from 20 April 2020 till 19 July 2020.
Section 5 of the Factories Act provides that in a public emergency, the State Government can exempt any factory or class or description of factories from all or any of the provisions of the Act, except Section 67. Section 5 is extracted below: “5. Power to exempt during public emergency. — In any case of public emergency the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, exempt any factory or class or description of factories from all or any of the provisions of this Act except section 67 for such period and subject to such conditions as it may think fit: Provided that no such notification shall be made for a period exceeding three months at a time. Explanation.— For the purposes of this section ‘public emergency’ means a grave emergency whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbance.” (emphasis supplied) The notification in its relevant part is extracted below:
“... NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 5 of the Factories Act, 1948, the ‘Factories Act’ PART B Government of Gujarat hereby directs that all the factories registered under the Factories Act, 1948 shall be exempted from various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest etc. of adult workers under section 51, section 54, and section 55 and section 56 with the following conditions from 20th April till 19th July 2020, –
(1) No adult worker shall be allowed or required to work in a factory for more than twelve hours in any day and Seventy Two hours in any week.
(2) The Periods of work of adult workers in a factory each day shall be so fixed that no period shall exceed six hours and that no worker shall work for more than six hours before he has had an interval of rest of at least half an hour.
(3) No Female workers shall be allowed or required to work in a factory between 7:00 PM to 6:00 AM.
(4) Wages shall be in a proportion of the existing wages (e.g. If wages for eight hours are 80 Rupees, then proportionate wages for twelve hours will be 120 Rupees).”
[Extract from judgment of the Supreme Court in Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha v. The State of Gujarat decided on 1 October, 2020, (hereafter ‘GMS’)] - In view of various counter claims regarding registration or non-registration, what is necessary is only that the information given to the police must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such a situation, registration of a FIR is mandatory. However, if no cognizable offence is made out in the information given, then the FIR need not be registered immediately and perhaps the police can conduct a sort of preliminary verification or inquiry for the limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether a cognizable offence has been committed. But, if the information given clearly mentions the commission of a cognizable offence, there is no other option but to register a FIR forthwith. Other considerations are not relevant at the stage of registration of FIR, such as, whether the information is falsely given, whether the information is genuine, whether the information is credible etc. These are the issues that have to be verified during the investigation of the FIR. At the stage of registration of a FIR, what is to be seen is merely whether the information given ex facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. If, after investigation, the information given is found to be false, there is always an option to prosecute the complainant for filing a false FIR.
[Excerpted from the judgment delivered by Sathasivam, C.J.I. in Lalita Kumari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1 (hereafter ‘Lalita Kumari’)]
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