Comprehension
The Supreme Court has observed that in international human rights law, equality is founded upon two complementary principles: non-discrimination and reasonable differentiation. The principle of non-discrimination seeks to ensure that all persons can equally enjoy and exercise all their rights and freedoms. Discrimination occurs due to arbitrary denial of opportunities for equal participation. Equality not only implies preventing discrimination (example, the protection of individuals against unfavourable treatment by introducing anti-discrimination laws), but goes beyond in remedying discrimination against groups suffering systematic discrimination in society. In concrete terms, it means embracing the notion of positive rights, affirmative action and reasonable accommodation. The move from the patronising and paternalistic approach to persons with disabilities represented by the medical model to viewing them as members of the community with equal rights has also been reflected in the evolution of international standards relating specifically to disabilities, as well as in moves to place the rights of persons with disabilities within the category of universal human rights. Disabled people no longer see their physical or mental limitations as a source of shame or as something to overcome in order to inspire others. What non-disabled people do not understand is that people with disabilities also have some rights, hopes and aspirations as everyone else. They do not want to depend on others. For this they want the proper environment to grow. It is the thinking of Disability Rights Movement, USA that it is not so much the disabled individual who needs to change, but the society
Question: 1
A ‘person with disability’ as per the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 means
A ‘person with disability’ as per the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 means
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- A person with long term physical, intellectual or sensory impairment which, in interaction with barriers, hinders his full and effective participation in society equally with others.
- A person with long term physical, mental, or sensory impairment which, in interaction with barriers, hinders his full and effective participation in society equally with others
- A person with long term mental, intellectual or sensory impairment which, in interaction with barriers, hinders his full and effective participation in society equally with others
- A person with long term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairment which, in interaction with barriers, hinders his full and effective participation in society equally with others
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The Correct Option is D
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The correct option is (D) : A person with long term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairment which, in interaction with barriers, hinders his full and effective participation in society equally with others.
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The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 defines "person with disability" in Section 2(s), and the four options each omit or alter one word from that definition, so comparing each option against the complete statutory phrase identifies the accurate one.
- Option A: This drops "mental" impairment from the list, leaving only physical, intellectual and sensory impairment, which is an incomplete rendering of the statutory categories the Act actually covers.
- Option B: This drops "intellectual" impairment, leaving physical, mental and sensory impairment, again omitting one of the four categories the Act names.
- Option C: This drops "physical" impairment, leaving mental, intellectual and sensory impairment, once more missing one of the statutory categories.
- Option D: This is the only option that lists all four categories together, physical, mental, intellectual and sensory impairment, matching the statutory definition in full, along with the qualifying condition that the impairment, in interaction with barriers, hinders full and effective participation in society equally with others.
Since the statute names all four categories of impairment together, only the option that omits none of them correctly states the definition.
Therefore, the correct answer is A person with long term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairment which, in interaction with barriers, hinders his full and effective participation in society equally with others.
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Question: 2
Which of the following judgments held that heart ailment is not a disability covered under the ambit of Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016?
Which of the following judgments held that heart ailment is not a disability covered under the ambit of Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- Shanti Devi v. Union of India, (2020) 19 SCC 766
- Rachna v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 140
- Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 74.
- Harshit Agarwal v. Union of India, (2021) 2 SCC 710
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The Correct Option is C
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The correct option is (C) : Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 74.
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The question asks which judgment held that a heart ailment falls outside the disabilities recognised under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016. Checking what subject matter each cited case actually deals with narrows this down.
- Shanti Devi v. Union of India: This citation does not concern the specific question of whether cardiac conditions qualify as a disability under the 2016 Act.
- Rachna v. Union of India: This case similarly does not address the heart ailment classification issue raised here.
- Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India: This is the judgment where the Court considered a claim involving a heart condition and held that a heart ailment, as such, does not fall within the disabilities specified and covered under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, since the statutory list of recognised disabilities does not extend to cardiac conditions in this manner.
- Harshit Agarwal v. Union of India: This citation also does not concern the heart ailment question posed here.
Of the four cases, it is the Nawal Kishore Sharma decision that specifically addresses and rejects treating a heart ailment as a covered disability under the 2016 Act.
Therefore, the correct answer is Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 74.
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Question: 3
Based on the given excerpt, which of the following judgments deals with the rights of disabled persons?
Based on the given excerpt, which of the following judgments deals with the rights of disabled persons?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 761
- Bharatha Matha v. R. Vijaya Renganathan, (2010) 11 SCC 483
- Seema v. Ashwani Kumar, (2006) 2 SCC 578
- Vidyadhari v. Sukharana Bai, (2008) 2 SCC 238
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The Correct Option is A
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The correct option is (A) : Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 761
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Given the excerpt on the international human rights framework for equality and disability, the question asks which cited judgment actually deals with the rights of disabled persons, so each case needs to be checked against its real subject matter.
- Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India: This is a disability rights case where a person with cerebral palsy was deplaned by an airline, and the Supreme Court addressed the dignity, autonomy and equal participation of persons with disabilities, directly matching the excerpt's theme of moving from a paternalistic view of disability to one grounded in equal rights.
- Bharatha Matha v. R. Vijaya Renganathan: This case concerns the legitimacy and succession rights of a child born of a void or voidable marriage, a family law issue unrelated to disability rights.
- Seema v. Ashwani Kumar: This case deals with compulsory registration of marriages, again a family law matter with no connection to disability rights.
- Vidyadhari v. Sukharana Bai: This case concerns succession and nomination rights under the Hindu Succession Act, also unconnected to the rights of persons with disabilities.
Only the Jeeja Ghosh case actually concerns the equal participation and dignity of a person with a disability, which is the subject the excerpt is building toward.
Therefore, the correct answer is Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 761.
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Question: 4
Which of the following is not correct as per the Supreme Court judgment in Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission, [2020 SCC OnLine SC 1119]?
Which of the following is not correct as per the Supreme Court judgment in Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission, [2020 SCC OnLine SC 1119]?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- In India, as reflected by the policy disconnect in this case, there is often a lack of involvement of the disabled in such decision making processes, leading to their voice not being heard and their grievances remaining unaddressed.
- Consultation with persons with disabilities and their involvement in decision making about matters affecting their lives is necessary to bring about any meaningful change in the realization of their rights
- Broader directions were provided to the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment of the Union Government to ensure the framing of proper guidelines which would regulate and facilitate the grant of a facility of a scribe to persons with disability.
- Persons with disability are required to bear the costs of the accommodation
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The Correct Option is D
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The correct option is (D) : Persons with disability are required to bear the costs of the accommodation
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Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission dealt with the right of a candidate with a disability to be provided a scribe for an examination, and the question asks which of the four statements does NOT correctly reflect what the Court held.
- Option A: This correctly reflects the Court's observation that disabled persons are often left out of decision-making processes that affect them, so their concerns go unheard and unaddressed, which was part of its broader critique of the policy gap in this case.
- Option B: This is also correct, the Court emphasised that meaningfully realising the rights of persons with disabilities requires consulting and involving them in decisions about their own lives, rather than deciding matters for them.
- Option C: This too is accurate, the Court did issue broader directions to the concerned Ministry to frame proper guidelines regulating and facilitating the scribe facility for persons with disabilities appearing in examinations.
- Option D: This is the incorrect statement. The Court's reasoning on reasonable accommodation runs the opposite way, it treated providing accommodations like a scribe as an obligation flowing from the right to equal opportunity, not as a cost that the disabled person themselves must bear, so casting the cost as one the disabled candidate must shoulder misstates the judgment.
Since A, B, and C accurately track the Court's reasoning and directions, the statement that wrongly shifts the burden of accommodation costs onto persons with disabilities is the one that does not correctly represent the judgment.
Therefore, the correct answer is Persons with disability are required to bear the costs of the accommodation.
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Question: 5
Which of the following issues was raised in Union of India v. M. Selvakumar, [(2017) 3 SCC 504]?
Which of the following issues was raised in Union of India v. M. Selvakumar, [(2017) 3 SCC 504]?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- Special reservation in favour of persons suffering from heart ailments.
- Special reservation in favour of physically handicapped persons.
- Special reservation in favour of mentally challenged persons.
- Special reservation in favour of physically handicapped and mentally challenged persons.
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The Correct Option is B
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The correct option is (B) : Special reservation in favour of physically handicapped persons.
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The question asks what issue was actually raised in Union of India v. M. Selvakumar, [(2017) 3 SCC 504]. Since the four options each describe a different reservation category, matching the case to its real subject settles the answer.
- Special reservation for persons suffering from heart ailments: Reservation policy for disabled persons under the relevant framework does not carve out a distinct category for heart ailments in the manner this option suggests, so this does not match the case.
- Special reservation in favour of physically handicapped persons: This matches the case, which concerned the entitlement of physically handicapped candidates to reserved posts and the framework governing that reservation.
- Special reservation in favour of mentally challenged persons: The dispute in this case centred on physical disability reservation, not a separate claim specific to mentally challenged persons.
- Special reservation in favour of physically handicapped and mentally challenged persons: This combines two categories where only the physically handicapped reservation was actually the subject of the dispute, making the combined description inaccurate.
The case is specifically about reservation for physically handicapped persons, not the other disability categories offered as options.
Therefore, the correct answer is Special reservation in favour of physically handicapped persons.
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Question: 6
A ‘person with benchmark disability’ as per the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 means a person with not less than ______ per cent of a specified disability where specified disability has not been defined in measurable terms and includes a person with disability where specified disability has been defined in measurable terms, as certified by the certifying authority.
A ‘person with benchmark disability’ as per the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 means a person with not less than ______ per cent of a specified disability where specified disability has not been defined in measurable terms and includes a person with disability where specified disability has been defined in measurable terms, as certified by the certifying authority.
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- Ten
- Twenty
- Thirty
- Forty
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The Correct Option is D
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The correct option is (D) : Forty
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The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 defines "person with benchmark disability" in Section 2(r) by reference to a minimum percentage threshold of a specified disability. The question asks what that threshold percentage is, so checking each option against the statutory figure resolves it.
- Ten: A ten per cent threshold would be far too low to mark out a benchmark level of disability meant to trigger enhanced statutory entitlements such as reservation and specific benefits, and this is not the figure the Act sets.
- Twenty: Twenty per cent is likewise below the threshold the Act actually fixes for benchmark disability status.
- Thirty: Thirty per cent, too, falls short of the statutory figure and is not the percentage used in the definition.
- Forty: The Act defines a person with benchmark disability as one certified as having not less than forty per cent of a specified disability, where that disability has not been defined in measurable terms, and this matches the actual statutory threshold.
Since Section 2(r) fixes the qualifying threshold at not less than forty per cent, that is the figure the definition uses.
Therefore, the correct answer is Forty.
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Top CLAT PG Questions
- Our society is governed by the Constitution. The values of constitutional morality are a non-derogable entitlement. Notions of “purity and pollution”, which stigmatise individuals, can have no place in a constitutional regime. Regarding menstruation as polluting or impure, and worse still, imposing exclusionary disabilities on the basis of menstrual status, is against the dignity of women which is guaranteed by the Constitution. Practices which legitimise menstrual taboos, due to notions of “purity and pollution”, limit the ability of menstruating women to attain the freedom of movement, the right to education and the right of entry to places of worship and, eventually, their access to the public sphere. Women have a right to control their own bodies. The menstrual status of a woman is an attribute of her privacy and person. Women have a constitutional entitlement that their biological processes must be free from social and religious practices, which enforce segregation and exclusion. These practices result in humiliation and a violation of dignity. Article 17 prohibits the practice of “untouchability”, which is based on notions of purity and impurity, “in any form”. Article 17 certainly applies to untouchability practices in relation to lower castes, but it will also apply to the systemic humiliation, exclusion and subjugation faced by women. Prejudice against women based on notions of impurity and pollution associated with menstruation is a symbol of exclusion. The social exclusion of women, based on menstrual status, is but a form of untouchability which is an anathema to constitutional values. As an expression of the anti-exclusion principle, Article 17 cannot be read to exclude women against whom social exclusion of the worst kind has been practised and legitimised on notions of purity and pollution. Article 17 cannot be read in a restricted manner. But even if Article 17 were to be read to reflect a particular form of untouchability, that Article will not exhaust the guarantee against other forms of social exclusion. The guarantee against social exclusion would emanate from other provisions of Part III, including Articles 15(2) and 21. Exclusion of women between the age group of ten and fifty, based on their menstrual status, from entering the temple in Sabarimala can have no place in a constitutional order founded on liberty and dignity.
[Extracted from Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1 (hereafter IYLA)] - An Ordinance which is promulgated by the Governor has (as clause 2 of Article 213 provides) the same force and effect as an Act of the legislature of the State assented to by the Governor. However - and this is a matter of crucial importance – clause 2 goes on to stipulate in the same vein significant constitutional conditions. These conditions have to be fulfilled before the ‘force and effect’ fiction comes into being. These conditions are prefaced by the expression “but every such Ordinance” which means that the constitutional fiction is subject to what is stipulated in sub-clauses (a) and (b). Sub-clause (a) provides that the Ordinance “shall be laid before the legislative assembly of the state” or before both the Houses in the case of a bi-cameral legislature. Is the requirement of laying an Ordinance before the state legislature mandatory? There can be no manner of doubt that it is. The expression “shall be laid” is a positive mandate which brooks no exceptions. That the word ‘shall’ in sub-clause (a) of clause 2 of Article 213 is mandatory, emerges from reading the provision in its entirety. As we have noted earlier, an Ordinance can be promulgated only when the legislature is not in session. Upon the completion of six weeks of the reassembling of the legislature, an Ordinance “shall cease to operate”.
Article 213(2)(a) postulates that an ordinance would cease to operate upon the expiry of a period of six weeks of the reassembly of the legislature. The Oxford English dictionary defines the expression “cease” as : “to stop, give over, discontinue, desist; to come to the end.” P Ramanatha Aiyar’s, The Major Law Lexicon defines the expression “cease” to mean “discontinue or put an end to”. Justice C K Thakker’s Encyclopaedic Law Lexicon defines the word “cease” as meaning: “to put an end to; to stop, to terminate or to discontinue”. The expression has been defined in similar terms in Black’s Law Dictionary.
The expression “cease to operate” in Article 213(2)(a) is attracted in two situations. The first is where a period of six weeks has expired since the reassembling of the legislature. The second situation is where a resolution has been passed by the legislature disapproving of an ordinance. Apart from these two situations that are contemplated by sub-clause (a), sub-clause (b) contemplates that an ordinance may be withdrawn at any time by the Governor. Upon its withdrawal the ordinance would cease to operate as well.
[Extracts from the judgment of majority judgment in Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, Civil Appeal No. 5875 of 1994, decided on January 2, 2017 hereafter ‘KK Singh’] - The other material which prompted the High Court to reach the conclusion that the subsoil/minerals vest in the State is … recitals of a patta which ….. states that if minerals are found in the property covered by the patta and if the pattadar exploits those minerals, the pattadar is liable for a separate tax in addition to the tax shown in the patta and …. certain standing orders of the Collector of Malabar which provided for collection of seigniorage fee in the event of the mining operation being carried on. We are of the clear opinion that the recitals in the patta or the Collector’s standing order that the exploitation of mineral wealth in the patta land would attract additional tax, in our opinion, cannot in any way indicate the ownership of the State in the minerals. The power to tax is a necessary incident of sovereign authority (imperium) but not an incident of proprietary rights (dominium). Proprietary right is a compendium of rights consisting of various constituent, rights. If a person has only a share in the produce of some property, it can never be said that such property vests in such a person. In the instant case, the State asserted its ‘right’ to demand a share in the ‘produce of the minerals worked’ though the expression employed is right – it is in fact the Sovereign authority which is asserted. From the language of the BSO No.10 it is clear that such right to demand the share could be exercised only when the pattadar or somebody claiming through the pattadar, extracts/works the minerals – the authority of the State to collect money on the happening of an event – such a demand is more in the nature of an excise duty/a tax. The assertion of authority to collect a duty or tax is in the realm of the sovereign authority, but not a proprietary right….
The only other submission which we are required to deal with before we part with this matter is the argument of the learned counsel for the State that in view of the scheme of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (hereafter ‘MMDRA’) which prohibits under Section 4 the carrying on of any mining activity in this country except in accordance with the permit, licence or mining lease as the case may be, granted under the Act, the appellants cannot claim any proprietary right in the sub-soil…
[Extract from the judgment in Thressiamma Jacob v. Dept. of Mining & Geology, (2013) 9 SCC 725] (hereafter ‘T Jacob’) - A nationwide lockdown was declared by the Central Government from 24 March 2020 to prevent the spread of the CoVID-19 pandemic. Economic activity came to a grinding halt. The lockdown was extended on several occasions, among them for the second time on 14 April 2020. On 17 April 2020, the Labour and Employment Department of the State of Gujarat issued a notification under Section 5 of the Factories Act to exempt all factories registered under the Act “from various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest etc. for adult workers” under Sections 51, 54, 55 and 56. The stated aim of the notification was to provide “certain relaxations for industrial and commercial activities” from 20 April 2020 till 19 July 2020.
Section 5 of the Factories Act provides that in a public emergency, the State Government can exempt any factory or class or description of factories from all or any of the provisions of the Act, except Section 67. Section 5 is extracted below: “5. Power to exempt during public emergency. — In any case of public emergency the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, exempt any factory or class or description of factories from all or any of the provisions of this Act except section 67 for such period and subject to such conditions as it may think fit: Provided that no such notification shall be made for a period exceeding three months at a time. Explanation.— For the purposes of this section ‘public emergency’ means a grave emergency whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbance.” (emphasis supplied) The notification in its relevant part is extracted below:
“... NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 5 of the Factories Act, 1948, the ‘Factories Act’ PART B Government of Gujarat hereby directs that all the factories registered under the Factories Act, 1948 shall be exempted from various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest etc. of adult workers under section 51, section 54, and section 55 and section 56 with the following conditions from 20th April till 19th July 2020, –
(1) No adult worker shall be allowed or required to work in a factory for more than twelve hours in any day and Seventy Two hours in any week.
(2) The Periods of work of adult workers in a factory each day shall be so fixed that no period shall exceed six hours and that no worker shall work for more than six hours before he has had an interval of rest of at least half an hour.
(3) No Female workers shall be allowed or required to work in a factory between 7:00 PM to 6:00 AM.
(4) Wages shall be in a proportion of the existing wages (e.g. If wages for eight hours are 80 Rupees, then proportionate wages for twelve hours will be 120 Rupees).”
[Extract from judgment of the Supreme Court in Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha v. The State of Gujarat decided on 1 October, 2020, (hereafter ‘GMS’)] - In view of various counter claims regarding registration or non-registration, what is necessary is only that the information given to the police must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such a situation, registration of a FIR is mandatory. However, if no cognizable offence is made out in the information given, then the FIR need not be registered immediately and perhaps the police can conduct a sort of preliminary verification or inquiry for the limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether a cognizable offence has been committed. But, if the information given clearly mentions the commission of a cognizable offence, there is no other option but to register a FIR forthwith. Other considerations are not relevant at the stage of registration of FIR, such as, whether the information is falsely given, whether the information is genuine, whether the information is credible etc. These are the issues that have to be verified during the investigation of the FIR. At the stage of registration of a FIR, what is to be seen is merely whether the information given ex facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. If, after investigation, the information given is found to be false, there is always an option to prosecute the complainant for filing a false FIR.
[Excerpted from the judgment delivered by Sathasivam, C.J.I. in Lalita Kumari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1 (hereafter ‘Lalita Kumari’)]
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