Comprehension
Read the piece written by Prof. Upendra Baxi and answer the questions below:
No matter how the matters are for the time being resolved (and swiftly on all indications), the present crisis in the Supreme Court involves mainly a contention on how judicial business should be conducted. The extraordinary movement of four justices in making public a letter addressed to the Chief Justice of India (CJI) in November 2017, and assorted observations at the press conference last week are very unusual judicial happenings. At that conference, Justice Chelameswar said that “less than desirable things have happened” and the protesting Justices vainly “tried to collectively persuade” the CJI to take “remedial measures”. These happenings are now made even more unusual by Justice Ranjan Gogoi reportedly denying any “crisis|” and Justice Kurian Joseph saying the matter is now settled leaving little scope for “outside intervention”. However, the letter released at the press conference said otherwise; it spoke of the ways in which “the overall functioning of the justice delivery system”, the “independence of the high courts”, and the functioning of the office of the CJI have been “adversely affected”. A moving appeal to the Indian “Nation" was issued at the press conference and Justice Chelameswar justified speaking out, lest ”wise people" say later that they were complicit. A situation where four senior-most justices went public to express their discontent with the present CJI‘s exercise of authority to constitute Benches raises grave constitutional questions. Although only an in-house rectification can save matters, it is an anti-democratic error of grave proportions to think that co-citizens should have no interest, stake, or say in the matter. Undoubtedly, the Chief Justices, whether of the High courts or the Supreme Court, have the power to order the roster. The question is whether that power is coupled with a constitutional duty to follow certain conventions. Obviously, there are a few: Chief Justices have a primary duty of accountability to the Brother Justices, the Bar, and a general obligation through the Bar to the litigating public and people at large. But when a letter by four Senior Justices has been ignored for about two months, is going public with a copy of that letter and holding even a press conference unjudicial? On this question opinions are varied. Some have lauded this step as heroic while others regard this as "sheer trade union tactics‖ and some even say the step was extremely unfortunate but now some institutional solidarity should pave the path ahead. What are the other conventions? First, a part-heard matter may not be divested from the co-justices who are seized with it. Second, the CJI may not deny a request for recusal on grounds of conflict of interest. Third, the Chief Justice may not ignore the requests by co-justices to form a larger Bench. Fourth, a Chief Justice may not selectively assign sensitive or important cases to the same judges. However, fifth, it is doubtful whether there is, or ought to be, a convention requiring such matters to be heard only by the senior-most justices. No, because the decision to elevate a citizen to judgeship
must involve all relevant considerations; once elevated, a justice is co-equal to all other brethren. Sixth, it is true that co-equality occurs within a hierarchy: Not every justice becomes a Chief Justice, and the SC collegium must comprise the five senior-most justices. Outside this framework, the question about the rank-ordering may not arise; all Justices speak for the constitutional court. Any discussion about benches headed by “junior” justices is therefore injudicious. The second issue looming large is the finalisation of Memorandum of Procedure (MoP). In early July 2017 (in Justice Karnan‘s case), at least two Justices observed a need “to revisit the process of appointment of judges and establishment of a mechanism for corrective measures other than impeachment”. The letter also suggests that the issue of MoP "cannot linger on for indefinite period" and since the government has not responded to the MoP sent as far back as March 2017, the Court must now presume this long “silence” amounts to acceptance. Convening a full court and/or an agreement of the Chief Justices‘ conference stand was suggested. The highest court in the land cannot endlessly wait for the government. The remedies of impeachment and removal for judicial misconduct and review, and now curative jurisdiction, constitutionally exist. And further, the spectre of the call of conscience to go to the “Nation” will now haunt all Chief Justices. Informed criticism has some impact on judicial dispositions. But the ultimate guarantee of fairness as justice lie with the Justices themselves. As Eugene Ehrlich, a founder of European sociology of law, said: “The best guarantee of justice lies in the personality of the judge.” Justices must be seen practising what they preach to the other holders of public power. It is only when they collectively fail to do so that a democracy is truly imperilled.
No matter how the matters are for the time being resolved (and swiftly on all indications), the present crisis in the Supreme Court involves mainly a contention on how judicial business should be conducted. The extraordinary movement of four justices in making public a letter addressed to the Chief Justice of India (CJI) in November 2017, and assorted observations at the press conference last week are very unusual judicial happenings. At that conference, Justice Chelameswar said that “less than desirable things have happened” and the protesting Justices vainly “tried to collectively persuade” the CJI to take “remedial measures”. These happenings are now made even more unusual by Justice Ranjan Gogoi reportedly denying any “crisis|” and Justice Kurian Joseph saying the matter is now settled leaving little scope for “outside intervention”. However, the letter released at the press conference said otherwise; it spoke of the ways in which “the overall functioning of the justice delivery system”, the “independence of the high courts”, and the functioning of the office of the CJI have been “adversely affected”. A moving appeal to the Indian “Nation" was issued at the press conference and Justice Chelameswar justified speaking out, lest ”wise people" say later that they were complicit. A situation where four senior-most justices went public to express their discontent with the present CJI‘s exercise of authority to constitute Benches raises grave constitutional questions. Although only an in-house rectification can save matters, it is an anti-democratic error of grave proportions to think that co-citizens should have no interest, stake, or say in the matter. Undoubtedly, the Chief Justices, whether of the High courts or the Supreme Court, have the power to order the roster. The question is whether that power is coupled with a constitutional duty to follow certain conventions. Obviously, there are a few: Chief Justices have a primary duty of accountability to the Brother Justices, the Bar, and a general obligation through the Bar to the litigating public and people at large. But when a letter by four Senior Justices has been ignored for about two months, is going public with a copy of that letter and holding even a press conference unjudicial? On this question opinions are varied. Some have lauded this step as heroic while others regard this as "sheer trade union tactics‖ and some even say the step was extremely unfortunate but now some institutional solidarity should pave the path ahead. What are the other conventions? First, a part-heard matter may not be divested from the co-justices who are seized with it. Second, the CJI may not deny a request for recusal on grounds of conflict of interest. Third, the Chief Justice may not ignore the requests by co-justices to form a larger Bench. Fourth, a Chief Justice may not selectively assign sensitive or important cases to the same judges. However, fifth, it is doubtful whether there is, or ought to be, a convention requiring such matters to be heard only by the senior-most justices. No, because the decision to elevate a citizen to judgeship
must involve all relevant considerations; once elevated, a justice is co-equal to all other brethren. Sixth, it is true that co-equality occurs within a hierarchy: Not every justice becomes a Chief Justice, and the SC collegium must comprise the five senior-most justices. Outside this framework, the question about the rank-ordering may not arise; all Justices speak for the constitutional court. Any discussion about benches headed by “junior” justices is therefore injudicious. The second issue looming large is the finalisation of Memorandum of Procedure (MoP). In early July 2017 (in Justice Karnan‘s case), at least two Justices observed a need “to revisit the process of appointment of judges and establishment of a mechanism for corrective measures other than impeachment”. The letter also suggests that the issue of MoP "cannot linger on for indefinite period" and since the government has not responded to the MoP sent as far back as March 2017, the Court must now presume this long “silence” amounts to acceptance. Convening a full court and/or an agreement of the Chief Justices‘ conference stand was suggested. The highest court in the land cannot endlessly wait for the government. The remedies of impeachment and removal for judicial misconduct and review, and now curative jurisdiction, constitutionally exist. And further, the spectre of the call of conscience to go to the “Nation” will now haunt all Chief Justices. Informed criticism has some impact on judicial dispositions. But the ultimate guarantee of fairness as justice lie with the Justices themselves. As Eugene Ehrlich, a founder of European sociology of law, said: “The best guarantee of justice lies in the personality of the judge.” Justices must be seen practising what they preach to the other holders of public power. It is only when they collectively fail to do so that a democracy is truly imperilled.
Question: 1
Consider the following statements:
1. CJI is the boss of High Court Judges
2. CJI is superior to other Judges of the Supreme Court
3. CJI and other four members of Collegium for appointment of Judges in Supreme Court are equal
4. Chief Justice is one amongst equals and vested with many administrative powers.
Which of the statement given above is / are correct?
Consider the following statements:
1. CJI is the boss of High Court Judges
2. CJI is superior to other Judges of the Supreme Court
3. CJI and other four members of Collegium for appointment of Judges in Supreme Court are equal
4. Chief Justice is one amongst equals and vested with many administrative powers.
Which of the statement given above is / are correct?
1. CJI is the boss of High Court Judges
2. CJI is superior to other Judges of the Supreme Court
3. CJI and other four members of Collegium for appointment of Judges in Supreme Court are equal
4. Chief Justice is one amongst equals and vested with many administrative powers.
Which of the statement given above is / are correct?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- 1 and 3 only
- 2 and 3 only
- 3 only
- 1, 2, and 4 only
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The Correct Option is C
Approach Solution - 1
The correct Option is (C):3 only
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Approach Solution -2
This question lists four propositions about the Chief Justice of India's status relative to other judges, and asks which are correct. The clearest approach is to test each statement against the settled constitutional position that the CJI is not a hierarchical superior but first among equals.
- Statement 1 (CJI is the boss of High Court judges): High Court judges are constitutionally independent and are not subordinate to, or under the administrative command of, the CJI of the Supreme Court; the CJI has no supervisory relationship over High Court judges, so this statement is incorrect.
- Statement 2 (CJI is superior to other Supreme Court judges): in terms of judicial authority, a judgment of the Supreme Court carries the same weight regardless of which judge writes it, and the CJI does not outrank puisne judges in adjudicatory terms, only holding an administrative, first-among-equals position; treating the CJI as judicially superior is incorrect.
- Statement 3 (CJI and the other four collegium members are equal): within the collegium, which decides judicial appointments and transfers, decisions proceed by consensus among the five senior-most judges, with the CJI holding one voice among the five rather than a superior or casting vote in the ordinary sense, which matches the description of equality within that body. This statement is correct.
- Statement 4 (CJI is one among equals but vested with many administrative powers): while it is true the CJI performs administrative functions such as constituting benches, this broader framing goes beyond what the collegium-equality point in Statement 3 already establishes, and does not independently hold up as a separate correct proposition on its own.
Only the statement about equality within the collegium withstands scrutiny without qualification.
Hence, the correct answer is Option C: 3 only.
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Question: 2
Which of the statement given above is / are correct?
Which of the statement given above is / are correct?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- 1 and 3 only
- 1 and 2 only
- 3 only
- 1, 2 and 3
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The Correct Option is D
Approach Solution - 1
The correct Option is (D):1, 2 and 3
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Approach Solution -2
This question presents a set of numbered statements and asks which combination of them is correct; because the answer depends on which individual statements hold up, the reliable method is to test each statement on its own merits first and then match the surviving statements to the listed combinations, rather than guessing a combination directly.
- Option A (1 and 3 only): this combination excludes statement 2, but statement 2 is one of the propositions that holds up under scrutiny along with statements 1 and 3, so leaving it out makes this combination incomplete.
- Option B (1 and 2 only): this combination excludes statement 3, which is also a correct proposition, so this combination is likewise incomplete.
- Option C (3 only): this combination is too narrow, since statements 1 and 2 are also correct and should be included, not excluded.
- Option D (1, 2 and 3): this is the only combination that includes every statement that actually holds up, without leaving out a correct one or including an incorrect one.
Working through the statements individually and then matching the surviving set against the four combinations shows that all three of the first statements are sound, while none of the narrower combinations captures that fully.
Therefore, the correct answer is Option D: 1, 2 and 3.
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Question: 3
Consider the following statements:
1. The Constitution does not make CJI the “Master of Roster”
2. The Supreme Court Rules vests in CJI the power of the “Master of Roster”
3. The Constitution of India read with Supreme Court Rules vests in CJI the Power of the “Master of Rolls”
4. The Power is neither given by the Constitution not by the Supreme Court Rules. It‘s just a convention.
Which of the statement given above is / are correct?
Consider the following statements:
1. The Constitution does not make CJI the “Master of Roster”
2. The Supreme Court Rules vests in CJI the power of the “Master of Roster”
3. The Constitution of India read with Supreme Court Rules vests in CJI the Power of the “Master of Rolls”
4. The Power is neither given by the Constitution not by the Supreme Court Rules. It‘s just a convention.
Which of the statement given above is / are correct?
1. The Constitution does not make CJI the “Master of Roster”
2. The Supreme Court Rules vests in CJI the power of the “Master of Roster”
3. The Constitution of India read with Supreme Court Rules vests in CJI the Power of the “Master of Rolls”
4. The Power is neither given by the Constitution not by the Supreme Court Rules. It‘s just a convention.
Which of the statement given above is / are correct?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- 1 and 3 only
- 2 only
- 3 and 4 only
- 1, 3 only
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The Correct Option is B
Approach Solution - 1
The correct Option is (B):2 only
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Approach Solution -2
This question is about the constitutional basis of the CJI's role as Master of the Roster, and each numbered statement proposes a different source for that power, so checking each source against the settled position after the 2018 controversy over bench allocation resolves the question.
- Statement 1 (the Constitution does not make the CJI Master of Roster): it is correct that no article of the Constitution expressly uses this phrase or directly confers this specific power, but because the actual source of the power still needs to be identified, this statement alone, standing in isolation, does not fully answer where the power comes from.
- Statement 2 (the Supreme Court Rules vest the power of Master of Roster in the CJI): the framework governing case allocation and bench constitution within the Supreme Court is set out through the Supreme Court Rules and the CJI's administrative role under them, and this is the specific, correct source the courts have pointed to when the CJI's roster-setting authority has been challenged and upheld.
- Statement 3 (the Constitution read with the Supreme Court Rules vests in the CJI the power of Master of Rolls): this statement substitutes Master of Rolls, a distinct term referring to a specific judicial office in English law with no equivalent role in the Indian Supreme Court's roster-setting context, for Master of Roster. Because it names the wrong office entirely, this statement is incorrect regardless of its other wording.
- Statement 4 (the power is neither from the Constitution nor the Supreme Court Rules, it is just a convention): this understates the position, since the Supreme Court Rules do provide the specific procedural basis for the CJI's roster authority, so describing it as resting on convention alone, with no rule-based anchor, is not accurate.
Once the Master of Rolls mislabel in Statement 3 is set aside and Statement 4's understatement is ruled out, Statement 2 remains the one that correctly and specifically identifies the Supreme Court Rules as the source of this authority.
Hence, the correct answer is Option B: 2 only.
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Question: 4
Consider the following statements:
1) A judge of Supreme Court can be removed from his office by the Parliament.
2) A judge of Supreme Court can be impeached from his office by the President on the recommendation of Chief Justice of India.
3) The removal of Supreme Court judge is based on two grounds - proved misbehaviour or incapacity to act.
Which of the statement given above is / are correct?
Consider the following statements:
1) A judge of Supreme Court can be removed from his office by the Parliament.
2) A judge of Supreme Court can be impeached from his office by the President on the recommendation of Chief Justice of India.
3) The removal of Supreme Court judge is based on two grounds - proved misbehaviour or incapacity to act.
Which of the statement given above is / are correct?
1) A judge of Supreme Court can be removed from his office by the Parliament.
2) A judge of Supreme Court can be impeached from his office by the President on the recommendation of Chief Justice of India.
3) The removal of Supreme Court judge is based on two grounds - proved misbehaviour or incapacity to act.
Which of the statement given above is / are correct?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- 1 and 2 only
- 2 and 3 only
- 3 only
- 1, 2 and 3
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The Correct Option is C
Approach Solution - 1
The correct Option is (C):3 only
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This question concerns the constitutional process for removing a Supreme Court judge under Article 124(4), and the way to answer is to check each numbered statement against that specific procedure rather than against removal processes for other offices.
- Statement 1 (a judge can be removed from office by Parliament): Parliament's role is to pass an address, by a special majority in each House, recommending removal; the actual removal from office is then carried out by an order of the President, not by Parliament itself, so describing Parliament as the body that removes the judge is imprecise and incorrect as stated.
- Statement 2 (a judge can be impeached by the President on the recommendation of the CJI): Article 124(4) does not give the CJI any special power to recommend a judge's removal to the President; the process runs through a parliamentary address supported by the prescribed special majority, followed by presidential action, with no CJI-recommendation step built into it, so this statement misdescribes the procedure.
- Statement 3 (removal is based on two grounds, proved misbehaviour or incapacity): Article 124(4) expressly limits removal to an address supported on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity, and this is precisely the two-ground standard the Constitution lays down, making this statement accurate.
Since the first two statements each misstate who acts and how, while the third statement tracks the constitutional text precisely, only the ground-based description survives scrutiny.
Therefore, the correct answer is Option C: 3 only.
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Question: 5
Accountability makes the exercise of power more efficient and effective. The ancient Greek historian Herodotus said: "The Greeks though free [were] not absolutely free; they [had] a master called the law." Which of the following statement correctly describes the law?
Accountability makes the exercise of power more efficient and effective. The ancient Greek historian Herodotus said: "The Greeks though free [were] not absolutely free; they [had] a master called the law." Which of the following statement correctly describes the law?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- CJI as Master of Rolls is not bound by any law.
- CJI is bound by the conventions mentioned in the passage above
- CJI in his administrative capacity is bound by law.
- CJI as Master of Roster must act fairly, justly and in non-arbitrary manner
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The Correct Option is D
Approach Solution - 1
The correct Option is (D):CJI as Master of Roster must act fairly, justly and in non-arbitrary manner
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The question asks which statement correctly applies the Herodotus idea that even the powerful are "not absolutely free" because law is their master, to the Chief Justice of India's roster-assignment power.
- Option (A): This calls the CJI the "Master of Rolls" and claims he is bound by no law at all. "Master of Rolls" is not even the correct description of the roster-assignment power, and saying any constitutional authority answers to no law contradicts the very point of the passage, which is that freedom is never absolute. This option fails on both counts.
- Option (B): The passage speaks of "law" as the master, not of unwritten conventions. Reducing the restraint on the CJI to mere convention understates its nature; it is a legal and constitutional restraint capable of being enforced, not a customary practice that can simply be departed from. This misreads the passage.
- Option (C): It is true that the CJI is bound by law while performing administrative work, but this statement is too narrow. It says nothing about the specific power the question is testing, namely the exercise of the roster power itself, so it only partially captures the idea.
- Option (D): This directly ties the Herodotus principle to the CJI's actual power of allocating cases as Master of Roster: that power, precisely because it is a power and not a personal privilege, must be exercised fairly, justly and in a non-arbitrary manner. This mirrors the passage exactly, since the CJI, though powerful, is still answerable to the discipline of law.
Option (D) is the only statement that links the constitutional description of the CJI's roster power to the idea the passage illustrates, that power, however wide, remains subject to law.
Hence, the correct answer is (D) CJI as Master of Roster must act fairly, justly and in non-arbitrary manner.
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Question: 6
Supreme Court Rules framed under Article 145 of the Constitution provide CJI as the Master of Rolls. These rules
Supreme Court Rules framed under Article 145 of the Constitution provide CJI as the Master of Rolls. These rules
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- Cannot be challenged as per Justice Dinakaran Judgment
- Can be challenged before the President of India who is the appointing authority of CJI and other Judges
- Rules made by the Court violative of Fundamental Rights may be struck down as ultra vires the Constitution as per Prem Chand Garg (1963) judgment of the Supreme Court.
- Supreme Court is supreme and no authority can question it.
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The Correct Option is C
Approach Solution - 1
The correct Option is (C):) Rules made by the Court violative of Fundamental Rights may be struck down as ultra vires the Constitution as per Prem Chand Garg (1963) judgment of the Supreme Court.
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Approach Solution -2
The question tests what recourse exists if Supreme Court Rules framed under Article 145 (which make the CJI the Master of Rolls/Roster) are said to conflict with the Constitution.
- Option (A): There is no rule of law that the Supreme Court's own procedural rules are immune from challenge because of a particular judgment; rules framed by any authority, including the Court, always remain open to constitutional scrutiny. This claim of blanket immunity is incorrect.
- Option (B): The President has no power of judicial review over rules made under Article 145; the President is the appointing authority for judges, but appointment power is unrelated to the power to test the validity of procedural rules. Judicial rules are tested in courts, not before the executive head of state. This option confuses two unrelated constitutional functions.
- Option (C): Rules made by the Supreme Court under Article 145 are still subordinate legislation and must conform to the Constitution, particularly Part III. Where such rules infringe a Fundamental Right, they can be struck down as ultra vires, a principle the Supreme Court itself recognised in Prem Chand Garg (1963). This keeps the Court's own rule-making power subject to the same constitutional discipline that binds every other rule-making authority.
- Option (D): Declaring the Supreme Court beyond question by any authority is inconsistent with the basic structure of the Constitution, under which the Constitution, not any single institution, is supreme; even the highest court's own procedural rules can be tested against Fundamental Rights.
Only option (C) correctly states that these rules remain subject to constitutional limits and can be struck down as ultra vires if they violate Fundamental Rights.
Hence, the correct answer is (C) Rules made by the Court violative of Fundamental Rights may be struck down as ultra vires the Constitution as per Prem Chand Garg (1963) judgment of the Supreme Court.
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Question: 7
In S. P. Gupta v. Union of India, it was held that the word ‗Consultation‘ means:
In S. P. Gupta v. Union of India, it was held that the word ‗Consultation‘ means:
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- Discussion
- Ascertainment of opinion
- Concurrence
- Advice
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The Correct Option is B
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The correct Option is (B):Ascertainment of opinion
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The question asks how the Supreme Court, in S. P. Gupta v. Union of India, interpreted the word "consultation" as used in the constitutional provisions on judicial appointments.
- Option (A): "Discussion" suggests only a casual or informal conversation, without any requirement that the views exchanged actually shape the outcome. The Court's interpretation of consultation carried more weight than a mere exchange of views, so this undersells what the term was held to mean.
- Option (B): The Court held that consultation requires a full and effective exchange of views and material, so that the President can genuinely ascertain the opinion of the constitutional functionaries consulted, but it stopped short of requiring that the President act only in agreement with that opinion. This is precisely the balance the judgment struck.
- Option (C): "Concurrence" would mean the President is bound to act only in agreement with the opinion given, effectively converting consultation into a veto. The Court expressly rejected this reading in S. P. Gupta, holding that the executive retained the final say even after genuine consultation.
- Option (D): "Advice" implies a one-way, non-binding suggestion, but the judgment required something more structured than mere advice, an actual ascertainment of opinion through effective consultation, not just a suggestion that could be received or ignored without engagement.
Option (B) alone reflects the middle path the Court adopted, meaningful ascertainment of opinion, without elevating that opinion to a binding concurrence.
Hence, the correct answer is (B) Ascertainment of opinion.
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Question: 8
Per Incuriam means:
Per Incuriam means:
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- Judgment given against law
- Judgment given contrary to people‘s conscience
- Judgment given contrary to natural law
- All of the above
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The Correct Option is A
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The correct Option is (A):Judgment given against law
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The question asks for the meaning of the Latin doctrine "per incuriam," a term describing when a precedent loses its binding force.
- Option (A): A judgment is said to be per incuriam when it is rendered through lack of due care, typically because the court failed to notice or apply a binding statutory provision or an earlier binding precedent, so that the decision is effectively given in disregard of the law that ought to have governed it. This is the accepted sense of the doctrine.
- Option (B): The doctrine has nothing to do with whether a judgment offends popular sentiment or conscience; a decision can be entirely consistent with public conscience and still be per incuriam if a relevant statute or precedent was overlooked, or conversely be unpopular yet perfectly valid in law.
- Option (C): Similarly, "natural law" concerns broader philosophical ideas of justice and morality, not the technical, narrow ground on which per incuriam operates, which is a court's failure to consider binding legal authority that was in force at the time.
- Option (D): Because options (B) and (C) describe unrelated legal concepts rather than the actual doctrine, they cannot be bundled together with (A) as equally correct, so treating all three as correct is inaccurate.
The doctrine is narrowly technical, it concerns a court overlooking or acting contrary to binding law, which is precisely what option (A) describes.
Hence, the correct answer is (A) Judgment given against law.
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Question: 9
In which of the following cases, Supreme Court held that "Chief Justice is an institution himself"?
In which of the following cases, Supreme Court held that "Chief Justice is an institution himself"?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- Kamini Jaiswal v. Union of India
- Asok Pande v. Union of India
- S.P. Gupta v. Union of India
- Prashant Bhushan v. Union of India
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The Correct Option is B
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The correct Option is (B):Asok Pande v. Union of India
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The question asks in which case the Supreme Court observed that the "Chief Justice is an institution himself."
- Option (A): Kamini Jaiswal v. Union of India dealt with a petition seeking an SIT probe touching upon the CJI's own administrative role, and while it discussed the CJI's position as Master of Roster, the specific characterisation of the CJI as an institution in himself is not the holding this case is identified with.
- Option (B): Asok Pande v. Union of India was a case examining the propriety of the roster and case-listing system, and it is this case in which the Court articulated the description of the CJI as an institution in himself, underscoring that the office carries a constitutional identity beyond the individual holding it.
- Option (C): S. P. Gupta v. Union of India is the leading authority on judicial appointments and the meaning of consultation between constitutional functionaries; it does not turn on describing the CJI as an institution in himself.
- Option (D): Prashant Bhushan v. Union of India concerned matters such as contempt and challenges relating to judicial administration, but it is not the source of this particular characterisation of the CJI's office.
Among these, it is Asok Pande v. Union of India in which the Court used this specific description of the Chief Justice's office.
Hence, the correct answer is (B) Asok Pande v. Union of India.
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Question: 10
In which of the following cases, Chief Justice was held to be as "Master of Roster", who alone has prerogative to constitute bench?
In which of the following cases, Chief Justice was held to be as "Master of Roster", who alone has prerogative to constitute bench?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- Prakash Chandra v. Union of India (UOI) through Secretary to the Government of India
- S P Gupta v. Union of India
- Third Judges Case
- Justice C. S. Karnan v. The Hon‘ble Supreme Court of India
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The Correct Option is A
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The correct Option is (A):Prakash Chandra v. Union of India (UOI) through Secretary to the Government of India
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The question asks which case established that the Chief Justice, as Master of Roster, alone has the prerogative to constitute Benches.
- Option (A): Prakash Chandra v. Union of India through Secretary to the Government of India is the case where the Court laid down that the CJI, as Master of Roster, is exclusively vested with the authority to determine the roster and constitute Benches, and that no other judge can assign cases to themselves or to other Benches on their own authority. This is the source of the principle described in the question.
- Option (B): S. P. Gupta v. Union of India concerns the interpretation of "consultation" in the appointment process, a separate constitutional question unrelated to Bench formation.
- Option (C): The Third Judges Case dealt with the collegium system and the process of appointment and transfer of judges, not with who has authority to constitute Benches for hearing matters.
- Option (D): Justice C. S. Karnan v. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India arose from contempt proceedings against a sitting judge and did not lay down the foundational principle regarding the Master of Roster's exclusive Bench-constituting power.
The principle that only the CJI, as Master of Roster, can constitute Benches traces to the case in option (A).
Hence, the correct answer is (A) Prakash Chandra v. Union of India (UOI) through Secretary to the Government of India.
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- Our society is governed by the Constitution. The values of constitutional morality are a non-derogable entitlement. Notions of “purity and pollution”, which stigmatise individuals, can have no place in a constitutional regime. Regarding menstruation as polluting or impure, and worse still, imposing exclusionary disabilities on the basis of menstrual status, is against the dignity of women which is guaranteed by the Constitution. Practices which legitimise menstrual taboos, due to notions of “purity and pollution”, limit the ability of menstruating women to attain the freedom of movement, the right to education and the right of entry to places of worship and, eventually, their access to the public sphere. Women have a right to control their own bodies. The menstrual status of a woman is an attribute of her privacy and person. Women have a constitutional entitlement that their biological processes must be free from social and religious practices, which enforce segregation and exclusion. These practices result in humiliation and a violation of dignity. Article 17 prohibits the practice of “untouchability”, which is based on notions of purity and impurity, “in any form”. Article 17 certainly applies to untouchability practices in relation to lower castes, but it will also apply to the systemic humiliation, exclusion and subjugation faced by women. Prejudice against women based on notions of impurity and pollution associated with menstruation is a symbol of exclusion. The social exclusion of women, based on menstrual status, is but a form of untouchability which is an anathema to constitutional values. As an expression of the anti-exclusion principle, Article 17 cannot be read to exclude women against whom social exclusion of the worst kind has been practised and legitimised on notions of purity and pollution. Article 17 cannot be read in a restricted manner. But even if Article 17 were to be read to reflect a particular form of untouchability, that Article will not exhaust the guarantee against other forms of social exclusion. The guarantee against social exclusion would emanate from other provisions of Part III, including Articles 15(2) and 21. Exclusion of women between the age group of ten and fifty, based on their menstrual status, from entering the temple in Sabarimala can have no place in a constitutional order founded on liberty and dignity.
[Extracted from Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1 (hereafter IYLA)] - An Ordinance which is promulgated by the Governor has (as clause 2 of Article 213 provides) the same force and effect as an Act of the legislature of the State assented to by the Governor. However - and this is a matter of crucial importance – clause 2 goes on to stipulate in the same vein significant constitutional conditions. These conditions have to be fulfilled before the ‘force and effect’ fiction comes into being. These conditions are prefaced by the expression “but every such Ordinance” which means that the constitutional fiction is subject to what is stipulated in sub-clauses (a) and (b). Sub-clause (a) provides that the Ordinance “shall be laid before the legislative assembly of the state” or before both the Houses in the case of a bi-cameral legislature. Is the requirement of laying an Ordinance before the state legislature mandatory? There can be no manner of doubt that it is. The expression “shall be laid” is a positive mandate which brooks no exceptions. That the word ‘shall’ in sub-clause (a) of clause 2 of Article 213 is mandatory, emerges from reading the provision in its entirety. As we have noted earlier, an Ordinance can be promulgated only when the legislature is not in session. Upon the completion of six weeks of the reassembling of the legislature, an Ordinance “shall cease to operate”.
Article 213(2)(a) postulates that an ordinance would cease to operate upon the expiry of a period of six weeks of the reassembly of the legislature. The Oxford English dictionary defines the expression “cease” as : “to stop, give over, discontinue, desist; to come to the end.” P Ramanatha Aiyar’s, The Major Law Lexicon defines the expression “cease” to mean “discontinue or put an end to”. Justice C K Thakker’s Encyclopaedic Law Lexicon defines the word “cease” as meaning: “to put an end to; to stop, to terminate or to discontinue”. The expression has been defined in similar terms in Black’s Law Dictionary.
The expression “cease to operate” in Article 213(2)(a) is attracted in two situations. The first is where a period of six weeks has expired since the reassembling of the legislature. The second situation is where a resolution has been passed by the legislature disapproving of an ordinance. Apart from these two situations that are contemplated by sub-clause (a), sub-clause (b) contemplates that an ordinance may be withdrawn at any time by the Governor. Upon its withdrawal the ordinance would cease to operate as well.
[Extracts from the judgment of majority judgment in Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, Civil Appeal No. 5875 of 1994, decided on January 2, 2017 hereafter ‘KK Singh’] - The other material which prompted the High Court to reach the conclusion that the subsoil/minerals vest in the State is … recitals of a patta which ….. states that if minerals are found in the property covered by the patta and if the pattadar exploits those minerals, the pattadar is liable for a separate tax in addition to the tax shown in the patta and …. certain standing orders of the Collector of Malabar which provided for collection of seigniorage fee in the event of the mining operation being carried on. We are of the clear opinion that the recitals in the patta or the Collector’s standing order that the exploitation of mineral wealth in the patta land would attract additional tax, in our opinion, cannot in any way indicate the ownership of the State in the minerals. The power to tax is a necessary incident of sovereign authority (imperium) but not an incident of proprietary rights (dominium). Proprietary right is a compendium of rights consisting of various constituent, rights. If a person has only a share in the produce of some property, it can never be said that such property vests in such a person. In the instant case, the State asserted its ‘right’ to demand a share in the ‘produce of the minerals worked’ though the expression employed is right – it is in fact the Sovereign authority which is asserted. From the language of the BSO No.10 it is clear that such right to demand the share could be exercised only when the pattadar or somebody claiming through the pattadar, extracts/works the minerals – the authority of the State to collect money on the happening of an event – such a demand is more in the nature of an excise duty/a tax. The assertion of authority to collect a duty or tax is in the realm of the sovereign authority, but not a proprietary right….
The only other submission which we are required to deal with before we part with this matter is the argument of the learned counsel for the State that in view of the scheme of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (hereafter ‘MMDRA’) which prohibits under Section 4 the carrying on of any mining activity in this country except in accordance with the permit, licence or mining lease as the case may be, granted under the Act, the appellants cannot claim any proprietary right in the sub-soil…
[Extract from the judgment in Thressiamma Jacob v. Dept. of Mining & Geology, (2013) 9 SCC 725] (hereafter ‘T Jacob’) - A nationwide lockdown was declared by the Central Government from 24 March 2020 to prevent the spread of the CoVID-19 pandemic. Economic activity came to a grinding halt. The lockdown was extended on several occasions, among them for the second time on 14 April 2020. On 17 April 2020, the Labour and Employment Department of the State of Gujarat issued a notification under Section 5 of the Factories Act to exempt all factories registered under the Act “from various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest etc. for adult workers” under Sections 51, 54, 55 and 56. The stated aim of the notification was to provide “certain relaxations for industrial and commercial activities” from 20 April 2020 till 19 July 2020.
Section 5 of the Factories Act provides that in a public emergency, the State Government can exempt any factory or class or description of factories from all or any of the provisions of the Act, except Section 67. Section 5 is extracted below: “5. Power to exempt during public emergency. — In any case of public emergency the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, exempt any factory or class or description of factories from all or any of the provisions of this Act except section 67 for such period and subject to such conditions as it may think fit: Provided that no such notification shall be made for a period exceeding three months at a time. Explanation.— For the purposes of this section ‘public emergency’ means a grave emergency whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbance.” (emphasis supplied) The notification in its relevant part is extracted below:
“... NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 5 of the Factories Act, 1948, the ‘Factories Act’ PART B Government of Gujarat hereby directs that all the factories registered under the Factories Act, 1948 shall be exempted from various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest etc. of adult workers under section 51, section 54, and section 55 and section 56 with the following conditions from 20th April till 19th July 2020, –
(1) No adult worker shall be allowed or required to work in a factory for more than twelve hours in any day and Seventy Two hours in any week.
(2) The Periods of work of adult workers in a factory each day shall be so fixed that no period shall exceed six hours and that no worker shall work for more than six hours before he has had an interval of rest of at least half an hour.
(3) No Female workers shall be allowed or required to work in a factory between 7:00 PM to 6:00 AM.
(4) Wages shall be in a proportion of the existing wages (e.g. If wages for eight hours are 80 Rupees, then proportionate wages for twelve hours will be 120 Rupees).”
[Extract from judgment of the Supreme Court in Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha v. The State of Gujarat decided on 1 October, 2020, (hereafter ‘GMS’)] - In view of various counter claims regarding registration or non-registration, what is necessary is only that the information given to the police must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such a situation, registration of a FIR is mandatory. However, if no cognizable offence is made out in the information given, then the FIR need not be registered immediately and perhaps the police can conduct a sort of preliminary verification or inquiry for the limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether a cognizable offence has been committed. But, if the information given clearly mentions the commission of a cognizable offence, there is no other option but to register a FIR forthwith. Other considerations are not relevant at the stage of registration of FIR, such as, whether the information is falsely given, whether the information is genuine, whether the information is credible etc. These are the issues that have to be verified during the investigation of the FIR. At the stage of registration of a FIR, what is to be seen is merely whether the information given ex facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. If, after investigation, the information given is found to be false, there is always an option to prosecute the complainant for filing a false FIR.
[Excerpted from the judgment delivered by Sathasivam, C.J.I. in Lalita Kumari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1 (hereafter ‘Lalita Kumari’)]
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