Question

In IYLA, the Supreme Court held that the worshippers of Lord Ayyappa:

• A. are not a religious denomination because they have not registered themselves as such
• B. are not a religious denomination because they do not have a distinct name, a common set of beliefs, and a common organisational structure
• C. are a religious denomination because they have been recognised as such by the state
• D. are a religious denomination because they have consistently been treated as such by themselves as well as by society in general
• A. Essential Religious Practice Test
• B. Sincerity of Belief Test
• C. Proportionality Test
• D. Constitutional Morality Test
• A. The Abolition of Untouchability Act, 1951
• B. The Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955
• C. The Constitutional Offences Act, 1951
• D. The Untouchability Offences (Prohibition, Protection, and Remedies) Act, 1950
• A. Living Constitutionalism
• B. Originalism
• C. Structuralism
• D. Textualism
• A. Vertical application
• B. Horizontal application
• C. Indirect horizontal application
• D. None of the above
• A. Scope of “public order, morality and health” in Article 25(1)
• B. Scope of expression “section of Hindus” in Article 25(2)(b)
• C. Scope of “judicial recognition” to PILs filed by people not belonging to a religious denomination to contest a religious practice
• D. All the above
• A. Justice R.F. Nariman
• B. Justice Dipak Misra
• C. Justice Indu Malhotra
• D. None of the above
• A. Coming out as Dalit
• B. Goolami
• C. Annihilation of Caste
• D. All the above
• A. Cannot be extracted under any circumstances
• B. Cannot be precisely determined
• C. Cannot be infringed under any circumstances
• D. None of the above
• A. Special Leave Petition from the decision of the Kerala High Court
• B. Public Interest Litigation
• C. Writ Appeal from a petition filed under Article 226
• D. None of the above

Answer 1

The Correct Option is B

Step 1: Understanding the legal context.
The question is based on the case Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2019), in which the Supreme Court examined whether the devotees of Lord Ayyappa at Sabarimala qualified as a “religious denomination” under Article 26 of the Indian Constitution. Step 2: Criteria for a religious denomination.
The Supreme Court, relying on prior jurisprudence, has clarified that to qualify as a religious denomination, a group must have: A distinct name,
A common set of beliefs, and
A common organisational structure.
Step 3: Application to the worshippers of Lord Ayyappa.
While Lord Ayyappa’s devotees share the Hindu faith and follow certain traditions, they do not form an entirely separate sect or denomination with an independent organisational structure or a distinctly recognised name. Their practices are part of a larger Hindu tradition and not a distinct, self-contained religious denomination. Step 4: Elimination of incorrect options.
(A) Incorrect — Registration is not a constitutional requirement for being a denomination.
(C) Incorrect — Recognition by the state is not the sole criterion; the group must independently satisfy the three essential features.
(D) Incorrect — Being treated as such by society is insufficient without meeting the definitional requirements.
Thus, option (B) is correct. \[ \boxed{\text{Not a religious denomination — no distinct name, beliefs, organisation}} \]

Answer 2

The Supreme Court in Indian Young Lawyers Association examined whether the worshippers of Lord Ayyappa qualify as a "religious denomination" under Article 26 of the Constitution, since that status would let them claim a stronger constitutional protection for excluding women from the temple. Testing each option against the settled definition of a religious denomination answers the question.

1. Are not a religious denomination because they have not registered themselves as such: registration with any authority has never been part of the legal test for a religious denomination, so this reasoning does not match how courts actually decide the issue.
2. Are not a religious denomination because they do not have a distinct name, a common set of beliefs, and a common organisational structure: courts have long required all three of these features together, a distinct name, shared doctrine, and an organisational structure, before treating a group as a religious denomination. The Sabarimala worshippers follow mainstream Hindu practice without a separate name, a distinct doctrine, or an independent organisation setting them apart, so the Court held they fall short of this test.
3. Are a religious denomination because they have been recognised as such by the state: state recognition, on its own, has never been treated as sufficient to create a religious denomination; the three-part test still has to be independently satisfied.
4. Are a religious denomination because they have consistently been treated as such by themselves and society: social or self-perception, without the distinct name, doctrine, and organisational structure actually being present, is not enough under the settled test.

The Court's reasoning tracked the settled three-part test for a religious denomination, and it found the Ayyappa worshippers did not meet it.

Therefore, the correct answer is they do not have a distinct name, a common set of beliefs, and a common organisational structure.

Answer 3

Step 1: Context of Article 25.
Article 25 of the Indian Constitution guarantees the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice, and propagate religion — subject to public order, morality, health, and other provisions of Part III. Step 2: The test used by courts.
To decide whether a practice is constitutionally protected as part of a religion, the judiciary applies the Essential Religious Practice (ERP) Test. This test asks: “Is the practice in question fundamental to the religion itself, without which the religion’s identity would be altered?”
Step 3: Elimination of wrong options.
(B) Sincerity of Belief Test — This is used in some jurisdictions like the USA to examine if an individual genuinely holds a belief, but in India, ERP is the established test for Article 25 scope.
(C) Proportionality Test — Applied in balancing rights against restrictions (e.g., privacy cases), not specifically for identifying essential religious practices.
(D) Constitutional Morality Test — Used for judging the constitutional validity of practices vis-à-vis principles like equality, not for determining if a practice qualifies under Article 25.
\[ \boxed{\text{Essential Religious Practice Test}} \]

Answer 4

Indian courts use a specific, named test to decide whether a practice is protected as part of a religion under Article 25. Checking each option against how Indian constitutional law actually approaches this question gives the answer.

1. Essential Religious Practice Test: this test asks whether a practice is so fundamental to a religion that the religion's very character would change without it. Indian courts, including the majority in the Sabarimala case, use this test to decide what falls inside the protection of Article 25.
2. Sincerity of Belief Test: this approach, which asks only whether an individual sincerely holds a belief, is associated with some other legal systems, notably parts of United States constitutional law, rather than the settled Indian approach under Article 25.
3. Proportionality Test: this test is used to weigh a right against a restriction on it, for instance in privacy or free speech cases, not to decide whether a practice qualifies as essential to a religion in the first place.
4. Constitutional Morality Test: this idea is used to judge whether a practice can survive scrutiny against constitutional values such as equality and dignity once it is already found to be a religious practice, not to identify which practices count as religious in the first place.

The Essential Religious Practice Test is the one actually used by Indian courts to draw the line around what Article 25 protects.

Therefore, the correct answer is Essential Religious Practice Test.

Answer 5

Step 1: Understanding Article 17.
Article 17 abolishes “untouchability” and forbids its practice in any form. Parliament is empowered to enact a law to give effect to this abolition. Step 2: Legislative implementation.
Initially, the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955 was passed to penalise acts of untouchability. In 1976, it was renamed the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 with amendments to make it more effective. Step 3: Elimination of wrong options.
(A) — There is no legislation called “Abolition of Untouchability Act, 1951.”
(C) — “Constitutional Offences Act, 1951” does not exist.
(D) — “Untouchability Offences…” is a misstatement of the 1955 Act’s old name.
\[ \boxed{\text{The Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955}} \]

Answer 6

Article 17 of the Constitution abolishes untouchability and lets Parliament punish its practice by law. Checking each option against the real legislative history behind Article 17 answers this.

1. The Abolition of Untouchability Act, 1951: no statute by this name exists in Indian law, so this option is simply incorrect on its face.
2. The Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955: Parliament first passed the Untouchability (Offences) Act in 1955 to give teeth to Article 17, and in 1976 that Act was renamed and strengthened as the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955, which remains the operative law today.
3. The Constitutional Offences Act, 1951: also not a real piece of legislation; no such Act exists.
4. The Untouchability Offences (Prohibition, Protection, and Remedies) Act, 1950: this misstates both the year and the exact title of the real 1955 Act, and no Act by this name was passed in 1950.

The real statute giving effect to Article 17 is the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955, the renamed and amended version of the original 1955 Untouchability (Offences) Act.

Therefore, the correct answer is The Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955.

Answer 7

Step 1: What is Originalism?
Originalism interprets constitutional provisions in light of the original intent or understanding of the framers at the time the Constitution was adopted. Step 2: Why it applies here.
Justice Chandrachud examined the Constituent Assembly Debates to determine what the framers intended for Article 17’s scope — a hallmark of Originalism. Step 3: Elimination of wrong options.
(A) Living Constitutionalism — Interprets provisions as evolving with time, not primarily based on framers’ original intent.
(C) Structuralism — Deduces meaning from the structure of the Constitution as a whole, not specific historical debates.
(D) Textualism — Focuses strictly on the text’s plain meaning without delving into historical intent.
\[ \boxed{\text{Originalism}} \]

Answer 8

Constitutional interpretation methods each look to a different source for meaning, whether the plain text, the framers' original intent, the document's structure, or how society has changed since. Placing "reliance on Constituent Assembly Debates" against each method answers this question.

1. Living Constitutionalism: this approach reads the Constitution as evolving with changing social values over time, and it typically looks forward to present day circumstances rather than backward to what the framers intended, so it does not match the use of Constituent Assembly Debates.
2. Originalism: this approach reads a constitutional provision according to what the framers understood and intended it to mean at the time it was adopted. Examining the Constituent Assembly Debates, the actual record of what the framers discussed and intended, is a direct application of this method.
3. Structuralism: this approach draws meaning from how different parts and provisions of the Constitution relate to each other as a whole, not from historical debates about a single provision.
4. Textualism: this approach sticks to the plain, ordinary meaning of the words used in the provision itself and does not look outside the text to historical debates.

Relying on the Constituent Assembly Debates to recover the framers' intent is the hallmark of Originalism, distinct from each of the other three approaches.

Therefore, the correct answer is Originalism.

Answer 9

Step 1: Meaning of horizontal vs vertical application.
Vertical application — applies only between individuals and the state. Horizontal application — applies between private parties as well. Step 2: Justice Chandrachud’s interpretation.
He held that Article 17’s guarantee against untouchability applies horizontally, meaning it binds not just the state but also private individuals, social groups, and institutions. Step 3: Elimination of wrong options.
(A) — This would limit Article 17 to state action, contrary to the judgment.
(C) — Indirect horizontal application is not what Chandrachud J. stated; it was a direct horizontal effect.
(D) — Not correct since a specific answer exists.
\[ \boxed{\text{Horizontal application}} \]

Answer 10

Fundamental rights ordinarily bind only the state, which is called vertical application, but some provisions are read to bind private parties too, which is horizontal application. Checking each option against Justice Chandrachud's actual reasoning on Article 17 answers this.

1. Vertical application: this would mean Article 17 binds only the state and government bodies, leaving private individuals and social groups free to practise untouchability among themselves. This runs directly against the reasoning in the judgment, since untouchability is overwhelmingly practised by private individuals and communities, not by the state.
2. Horizontal application: Justice Chandrachud held that Article 17 binds private individuals and social groups directly, not just the state, because the abolition of untouchability would be meaningless if it only bound government bodies.
3. Indirect horizontal application: this would mean Article 17 only affects private parties indirectly, for instance through ordinary legislation or court interpretation of other laws, rather than binding them on its own force. Justice Chandrachud's reasoning went further than this, treating Article 17 as directly binding on private conduct.
4. None of the above: incorrect, since Justice Chandrachud did take a clear position on the question.

Because untouchability is a private, social practice, treating Article 17 as binding directly on private individuals and groups was necessary to give the provision any real force, and that is horizontal application.

Therefore, the correct answer is Horizontal application.

Answer 11

The 9-judge bench in the Sabarimala review framed broad questions touching multiple constitutional issues, including: The meaning of “public order, morality and health” in Art. 25(1).
Who qualifies as a “section of Hindus” under Art. 25(2)(b).
Whether non-members of a religious denomination can maintain PILs challenging religious practices.
Since all three were included, the correct answer is (D). \[ \boxed{\text{All the above}} \]

Answer 12

When the Sabarimala review petitions were referred to a larger bench, the Court did not frame just one narrow question; it framed a set of broad constitutional questions meant to be answered together, since they were all connected to how religious freedom provisions interact with equality and standing to sue.

1. Scope of "public order, morality and health" in Article 25(1): this phrase limits the freedom of religion guarantee, and its precise meaning was one of the questions referred, since it decides how far religious practices can be restricted.
2. Scope of the expression "section of Hindus" in Article 25(2)(b): this phrase controls how far the state can throw open Hindu religious institutions to all classes of Hindus, and its meaning was also referred, since it affects several religious practice disputes beyond Sabarimala.
3. Scope of judicial recognition of PILs filed by people outside a religious denomination challenging its practices: this question, about who has standing to challenge a religious practice in court, was referred too, since it affects whether such disputes can even be brought before this level of scrutiny.
4. All the above: since each of the first three questions was genuinely part of the reference to the larger bench, this option correctly captures the full scope of what was referred.

The reference order was deliberately framed to cover all three issues together, since they are interconnected aspects of how religious freedom, equality, and standing operate across religious practice disputes generally, not just the Sabarimala dispute alone.

Therefore, the correct answer is All the above.

Answer 13

In the Indian Young Lawyers Association (IYLA) case, the constitutional bench deliberated on the application of Article 17 regarding untouchability and its possibly broader implications beyond caste discrimination, incorporating menstrual discrimination as well. Justice Chandrachud propounded that Article 17 should encompass practices excluding women based on menstruation, equating these actions with untouchability. Justice Indu Malhotra, however, disagreed with this proposition, becoming the dissenting voice on the bench. She argued for a more restricted interpretation of Article 17, contending that it traditionally related to caste-based discrimination and should not be extended to encompass menstrual discrimination. Therefore, the judge who disagreed with Justice Chandrachud on the application of Article 17 was Justice Indu Malhotra.

Answer 14

The Sabarimala bench was not unanimous, and identifying the dissenting voice among the options means checking who actually joined the majority reasoning on Article 17 and who broke from it.

1. Justice R.F. Nariman: was part of the bench and wrote a concurring opinion agreeing with the majority's approach striking down the exclusionary practice, so he did not disagree with Justice Chandrachud on this point.
2. Justice Dipak Misra: as the then Chief Justice, wrote the lead opinion alongside Justice Khanwilkar and was aligned with the majority view, not a dissenting voice.
3. Justice Indu Malhotra: was the sole dissenting judge on the bench. She took the view that the traditional understanding of untouchability under Article 17 was tied to caste based discrimination and cautioned against extending it to the exclusion of women from the temple in the way the majority did, placing her at odds with Justice Chandrachud's broader reading.
4. None of the above: incorrect, since a specific judge did dissent.

Among the five judges on the bench, Justice Indu Malhotra alone dissented, making her the judge who disagreed with Justice Chandrachud on how far Article 17 should extend.

Therefore, the correct answer is Justice Indu Malhotra.

Answer 15

In reaching his conclusion on the scope of Article 17, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud cited "Annihilation of Caste" by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar.

Article 17 of the Indian Constitution explicitly prohibits the practice of "untouchability" in any form. This article has been interpreted to extend not only to caste-based discrimination but also to systemic forms of social exclusion, such as those faced by women. In the judgement of the Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, it was emphasized that practices stigmatizing individuals on notions of "purity and pollution" are unconstitutional, as they violate the dignity and liberty protected by the Constitution.

Dr. B.R. Ambedkar's "Annihilation of Caste" is a seminal work that critiques the caste system and advocates for the eradication of caste-based discrimination. This work is relevant in understanding the broad intent behind Article 17, as it aligns with the principles of equality and non-discrimination enshrined in the Constitution.

The judgement further states that even if Article 17 were interpreted narrowly, other constitutional provisions such as Articles 15(2) and 21 would provide protection against social exclusion. Therefore, practices based on menstrual status that exclude women are a form of untouchability, which contradicts constitutional values.

Answer 16

The question asks which work of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Justice D.Y. Chandrachud relied on while explaining the scope of Article 17 in the Sabarimala judgment. Let's look at each title on its own merits.

1. Coming out as Dalit: This is a memoir written by Yashica Dutt, published in 2019, about growing up while concealing a Dalit identity. It is not a work by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, so it could not have been cited as an Ambedkar work in the judgment.
2. Goolami: This title is close to "Gulamgiri" (Slavery), a book written by Jyotirao Phule and dedicated to the cause of ending caste oppression. It was authored by Phule, not by Ambedkar, so it does not fit the description either.
3. Annihilation of Caste: This is the well-known 1936 text written by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, originally prepared as an undelivered speech, arguing that caste cannot be reformed and must be abolished at its root because it rests on notions of purity and pollution. Justice Chandrachud drew on this text to explain why practices built on purity/pollution reasoning, including the exclusion the Sabarimala case dealt with, amount to a form of untouchability falling within the wide reading of Article 17.
4. All the above: This can only be correct if all three titles were genuinely works of Ambedkar cited in the judgment. Since two of the three titles are not Ambedkar's own writing, this option cannot be correct.

Only "Annihilation of Caste" is both an actual work of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and the text Justice Chandrachud actually drew upon while reasoning on Article 17.

Therefore, the correct answer is Annihilation of Caste.

Answer 17

In the passage, the term "non-derogable" refers to rights or values that cannot be overridden or dismissed under any circumstances. These are fundamental entitlements guaranteed by the Constitution that must always be upheld. The passage emphasizes the non-derogable nature of constitutional morality, which prohibits discrimination based on concepts of purity and pollution, ensuring dignity and equality for all individuals. The correct definition of "non-derogable" in this context is "Cannot be infringed under any circumstances." This aligns with the explanation given in the passage, where certain rights related to dignity and freedom are described as inviolable and protected by constitutional provisions such as Article 17. Therefore, the correct answer is: "Cannot be infringed under any circumstances."

Answer 18

The question is about the correct plain meaning of "non-derogable" as it is used for constitutional rights. Let's test each option against how the word is actually built and used.

1. Cannot be extracted under any circumstances: "Derogate" has nothing to do with extraction or removal of a physical thing; it is a term about lowering, weakening, or setting aside a rule or right. This option confuses the word with an unrelated idea of extraction.
2. Cannot be precisely determined: This describes vagueness or uncertainty, which is a different concept from derogation. A right can be perfectly clear in its content and still be non-derogable; the two ideas are unrelated.
3. Cannot be infringed under any circumstances: "Derogation" in legal usage means partially repealing, weakening, or making an exception to a rule. Calling a right non-derogable means no exception can be carved out of it and it cannot be set aside or infringed, even in an emergency or special situation. This matches the standard legal sense of the word exactly.
4. None of the above: This would only be correct if none of the first three options captured the meaning. Since option 3 correctly captures it, this option cannot be the answer.

Testing the word against its legal usage shows that non-derogable means a right that admits no exception and cannot be infringed under any circumstances.

Therefore, the correct answer is Cannot be infringed under any circumstances.

Answer 19

Step 1: Identify the procedural posture.
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala was initiated directly before the Supreme Court as a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) under Article 32, seeking enforcement of fundamental rights (women’s entry into Sabarimala temple). 
Step 2: Distinguish each option.
SLP (Option A): A Special Leave Petition (Art. 136) challenges a decision of a lower court/tribunal. Here, the matter was not an appeal from the Kerala High Court; it was a direct petition.
Writ Appeal (Option C): This is an intra-court appeal in High Courts against a Single Judge’s writ order under Art. 226. Not applicable because proceedings began in the Supreme Court.
PIL (Option B): Suits filed for broader public interest, especially to vindicate fundamental rights under Arts. 32/226. IYLA fits this description.
Step 3: Conclude.
Therefore, the correct characterisation is PIL. \[ \boxed{\text{Public Interest Litigation (filed under Article 32)}} \]

Answer 20

The question asks how the Indian Young Lawyers Association's case reached the Supreme Court. Let's check each option against the actual procedural route the case took.

1. Special Leave Petition from the decision of the Kerala High Court: An SLP under Article 136 is used to challenge a judgment already delivered by a lower court or tribunal. The Sabarimala case did not begin as a Kerala High Court judgment being appealed to the Supreme Court; it was filed directly in the Supreme Court, so this route does not describe it.
2. Public Interest Litigation: A PIL is a petition brought not to vindicate a purely private grievance but to enforce fundamental rights on behalf of a class of persons, filed directly before a constitutional court under Article 32 (or Article 226 in a High Court). The Indian Young Lawyers Association filed the case directly before the Supreme Court under Article 32 to challenge the exclusion of women from the Sabarimala temple, which is a textbook example of a PIL.
3. Writ Appeal from a petition filed under Article 226: A writ appeal is an intra-court appeal within a High Court against a Single Judge's order passed on a writ petition. Since the case was never first filed and decided under Article 226 in a High Court, there is no writ appeal in this chain at all.
4. None of the above: This is ruled out because the case fits squarely within the description of a PIL.

Tracing the actual filing route confirms the petition was brought directly before the Supreme Court to vindicate the fundamental rights of a class of women, which is the defining feature of a Public Interest Litigation.

Therefore, the correct answer is Public Interest Litigation.