Comprehension
Live-in relationship, as such, as already indicated, is a relationship which has not been socially accepted in India, unlike many other countries. In Lata Singh v. State of U.P. [(2006) 5 SCC 475: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 478] it was observed that a live-in relationship between two consenting adults of heterosexual sex does not amount to any offence even though it may be perceived as immoral. However, in order to provide a remedy in civil law for protection of women, from being victims of such relationship, and to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the society, first time in India, the DV Act has been enacted to cover the couple having relationship in the nature of marriage, persons related by consanguinity, marriages, etc. We have few other legislations also where reliefs have been provided to woman placed in certain vulnerable situations. Section 125 Cr.P.C. of course, provides for maintenance of a destitute wife and Section 498-A IPC is related to mental cruelty inflicted on women by her husband and in-laws. Section 304-B IPC deals with the cases relating to dowry death. The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 was enacted to deal with the cases of dowry demands by the husband and family members. The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 provides for grant of maintenance to a legally wedded Hindu wife, and also deals with rules for adoption. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 refers to the provisions dealing with solemnisation of marriage also deals with the provisions for divorce. For the first time, though, the DV Act, Parliament has recognised a “relationship in the nature of marriage” and not a live-in relationship simpliciter. We have already stated, when we examine whether a relationship will fall within the expression “relationship in the nature of marriage” within the meaning of Section 2(f ) of the DV Act, we should have a close analysis of the entire relationship invariably, it may be a question of fact and degree, whether a relationship between two unrelated persons of the opposite sex meets the tests judicially evolved.
(This extract is taken from Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755)
(This extract is taken from Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755)
Question: 1
What is the scope of analysis required to determine if a relationship falls within the expression “relationship in the nature of marriage” under Section 2(f) of the DV Act?
What is the scope of analysis required to determine if a relationship falls within the expression “relationship in the nature of marriage” under Section 2(f) of the DV Act?
Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
- Considering the number of children born in a live in relationship
- Considering only the cohabitation period of the relationship and there emotional connectivity
- Conducting a close analysis of the entire interpersonal relationship, taking into account all facets
- Evaluating only the financial aspects and mutual agreements of the relationship, and if there is any written agreement between the partner
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The Correct Option is C
Solution and Explanation
The scope of analysis required to determine if a relationship is categorized as a "relationship in the nature of marriage" under Section 2(f) of the DV Act involves conducting a comprehensive examination of the entire interpersonal relationship, considering all relevant aspects. This determination requires going beyond just the cohabitation period or financial elements and extends to a thorough evaluation of various facets of the relationship. Factors such as emotional depth, mutual care, social recognition, shared responsibilities, and the intention of permanence typically inform this analysis. It is a nuanced question of fact and degree, often necessitating judicial review to ensure the relationship aligns with the judicially evolved tests for such a classification.
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Question: 2
In which of the following case, the Supreme Court read down the word “adult male” in Section 2(q) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005?
In which of the following case, the Supreme Court read down the word “adult male” in Section 2(q) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005?
Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
- Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma
- Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Harsora
- Uma Narayan v. Priya Krishna Prasad
- All of the above
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The Correct Option is B
Solution and Explanation
The correct answer to the question "In which of the following case, the Supreme Court read down the word 'adult male' in Section 2(q) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005?" is Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Harsora.
The explanation for this decision relies on understanding the context in which the law was evaluated and interpreted. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 was enacted to provide a remedy for women as victims of domestic violence, promoting civil protection and addressing vulnerable situations for women.
Initially, the Act used the term "adult male" as part of the description of who could be the respondent. However, the Supreme Court, in the Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Harsora case, found that limiting the term to "adult male" was unconstitutional as it discriminated based on gender and was not reflective of the full scope of domestic situations where violence may occur. This reading down allows the inclusion of any person in a domestic relationship, regardless of gender, as a potential respondent, enhancing the Act's protective measures for women.
This decision represents a significant shift in interpreting women's protective laws in India, aligning the legal framework with modern notions of equality and gender-neutral application.
Initially, the Act used the term "adult male" as part of the description of who could be the respondent. However, the Supreme Court, in the Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Harsora case, found that limiting the term to "adult male" was unconstitutional as it discriminated based on gender and was not reflective of the full scope of domestic situations where violence may occur. This reading down allows the inclusion of any person in a domestic relationship, regardless of gender, as a potential respondent, enhancing the Act's protective measures for women.
This decision represents a significant shift in interpreting women's protective laws in India, aligning the legal framework with modern notions of equality and gender-neutral application.
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Question: 3
As per Section 20 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, while disposing of an application under Section 12(1), the Magistrate may direct the respondent to pay monetary relief to the aggrieved person so that the aggrieved person can:
As per Section 20 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, while disposing of an application under Section 12(1), the Magistrate may direct the respondent to pay monetary relief to the aggrieved person so that the aggrieved person can:
Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
- Live a life that meets at least the bare minimum needs for survival and basic well-being
- Live a life that is consistent with her standard of living which she is accustomed
- Live a life that is consistent with her parent’s standard of living
- Live a life which can cover her medical expenses and expenses incurred due to litigation of domestic violence
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The Correct Option is B
Solution and Explanation
To solve the question regarding Section 20 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, it's essential to understand the context of the Act and its specific section:
- Section 20 of the Act allows the Magistrate to provide monetary relief to an aggrieved person.
- The purpose of the monetary relief is to enable the aggrieved person to maintain a standard of living that she was accustomed to before the domestic violence incident.
Among the options given, the correct option is:
- Live a life that is consistent with her standard of living which she is accustomed
This aligns with the intention of the Act to ensure that the aggrieved person can continue to live with dignity and security, resembling her prior lifestyle before the disruption caused by domestic violence.
The other options primarily reference basic survival needs or external standards of living, which do not fully satisfy the statute's aim of restoring the aggrieved person to her accustomed standard.
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Question: 4
In which case, the three-judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has recently interpreted the term “shared household” and has held that “...lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship...” have to be given its normal and purposeful meaning. The living of woman in a household has to refer to a living which has some permanency. Mere fleeting or casual living at different places shall not make a shared household?
In which case, the three-judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has recently interpreted the term “shared household” and has held that “...lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship...” have to be given its normal and purposeful meaning. The living of woman in a household has to refer to a living which has some permanency. Mere fleeting or casual living at different places shall not make a shared household?
Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
- Rupa Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja
- Satish Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra
- S.R. Batra v. Tarin Batra
- B.R. Mehta v. Atma Devi
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The Correct Option is A
Solution and Explanation
The recent interpretation of the term "shared household" by a three-judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court was decided in the case of Rupa Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja. This case emphasizes that the phrase “lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship” should be understood in the context of permanency. The court clarified that mere transient or casual living experiences in different places do not constitute a "shared household."
The concept of a "shared household" is crucial to understanding the provisions under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005. This act introduces protections for women from domestic violence and includes relationships in the nature of marriage which were not traditionally recognized as matrimonial. As highlighted in the comprehensive analysis provided in the case of Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, the Act covers arrangements like live-in relationships as long as they resemble marriage to some degree of permanency.
Several other legal provisions provide relief to women in vulnerable situations. These include:
- Section 125 Cr.P.C.: Maintenance for a destitute wife.
- Section 498-A IPC: Addresses mental cruelty by a husband and his family.
- Section 304-B IPC: Deals with dowry-related deaths.
- The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961: Addresses dowry demands.
- The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956: Provides maintenance for legally wedded Hindu wives.
- The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955: Covers marriage solemnization and divorce.
Through these legal frameworks, the Indian judiciary and legislature aim to provide necessary safeguards and rights to women in domestic relationships.
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Question: 5
Under Indian Law, can a woman in a live in relationship claim maintenance under S. 125, Cr.P.C. despite not being a legally wedded wife?
Under Indian Law, can a woman in a live in relationship claim maintenance under S. 125, Cr.P.C. despite not being a legally wedded wife?
Updated On: Jan 13, 2026
- No, as per the interpretation of statute “wife” means legally wedded wife and includes who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from her husband
- Yes, a woman in a live in relationship can claim maintenance u/s 125, Cr.P.C. as strict proof of marriage is not necessary and maintenance cannot be denied if evidence suggests cohabitation
- A woman in live in relationship can only claim maintenance if she has been cohabiting for more than five years and dependent children from the relationship
- A woman in live in relationship can claim maintenance only through a civil suit as the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (PWDVA) does not apply to live in relationships
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The Correct Option is B
Solution and Explanation
Under Indian Law, the question of whether a woman in a live-in relationship can claim maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C. despite not being a legally wedded wife requires a nuanced understanding of recent legal developments and judicial interpretations. Let's break down the relevant aspects:
- Section 125, Cr.P.C. is a provision aimed at providing maintenance to neglected wives, children, and parents who are unable to maintain themselves. The term "wife" has traditionally been interpreted to mean a legally wedded wife. However, recent legal precedents have evolved to include women in vulnerable situations who may not have been formally married.
- The concept of live-in relationships in India, while not yet widely accepted socially, has gained legal recognition for purposes of protection under certain laws. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (PWDVA), for example, covers couples that have a "relationship in the nature of marriage."
- In the landmark case of Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma (2013), the Supreme Court of India acknowledged that live-in relationships resembling marriage could warrant protection against domestic violence, thereby providing scope for such women to claim maintenance, even in the absence of a formal marriage.
- The core argument is that if evidence suggests a stable, monogamous, and long-term cohabitation akin to marriage, denying maintenance solely on the grounds of legal marriage formality could lead to injustice. The judiciary has, therefore, interpreted the law in a manner that seeks to prevent exploitation and provide necessary financial support to women in such relationships.
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Top CLAT PG Questions
- Our society is governed by the Constitution. The values of constitutional morality are a non-derogable entitlement. Notions of “purity and pollution”, which stigmatise individuals, can have no place in a constitutional regime. Regarding menstruation as polluting or impure, and worse still, imposing exclusionary disabilities on the basis of menstrual status, is against the dignity of women which is guaranteed by the Constitution. Practices which legitimise menstrual taboos, due to notions of “purity and pollution”, limit the ability of menstruating women to attain the freedom of movement, the right to education and the right of entry to places of worship and, eventually, their access to the public sphere. Women have a right to control their own bodies. The menstrual status of a woman is an attribute of her privacy and person. Women have a constitutional entitlement that their biological processes must be free from social and religious practices, which enforce segregation and exclusion. These practices result in humiliation and a violation of dignity. Article 17 prohibits the practice of “untouchability”, which is based on notions of purity and impurity, “in any form”. Article 17 certainly applies to untouchability practices in relation to lower castes, but it will also apply to the systemic humiliation, exclusion and subjugation faced by women. Prejudice against women based on notions of impurity and pollution associated with menstruation is a symbol of exclusion. The social exclusion of women, based on menstrual status, is but a form of untouchability which is an anathema to constitutional values. As an expression of the anti-exclusion principle, Article 17 cannot be read to exclude women against whom social exclusion of the worst kind has been practised and legitimised on notions of purity and pollution. Article 17 cannot be read in a restricted manner. But even if Article 17 were to be read to reflect a particular form of untouchability, that Article will not exhaust the guarantee against other forms of social exclusion. The guarantee against social exclusion would emanate from other provisions of Part III, including Articles 15(2) and 21. Exclusion of women between the age group of ten and fifty, based on their menstrual status, from entering the temple in Sabarimala can have no place in a constitutional order founded on liberty and dignity.
[Extracted from Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1 (hereafter IYLA)] - An Ordinance which is promulgated by the Governor has (as clause 2 of Article 213 provides) the same force and effect as an Act of the legislature of the State assented to by the Governor. However - and this is a matter of crucial importance – clause 2 goes on to stipulate in the same vein significant constitutional conditions. These conditions have to be fulfilled before the ‘force and effect’ fiction comes into being. These conditions are prefaced by the expression “but every such Ordinance” which means that the constitutional fiction is subject to what is stipulated in sub-clauses (a) and (b). Sub-clause (a) provides that the Ordinance “shall be laid before the legislative assembly of the state” or before both the Houses in the case of a bi-cameral legislature. Is the requirement of laying an Ordinance before the state legislature mandatory? There can be no manner of doubt that it is. The expression “shall be laid” is a positive mandate which brooks no exceptions. That the word ‘shall’ in sub-clause (a) of clause 2 of Article 213 is mandatory, emerges from reading the provision in its entirety. As we have noted earlier, an Ordinance can be promulgated only when the legislature is not in session. Upon the completion of six weeks of the reassembling of the legislature, an Ordinance “shall cease to operate”.
Article 213(2)(a) postulates that an ordinance would cease to operate upon the expiry of a period of six weeks of the reassembly of the legislature. The Oxford English dictionary defines the expression “cease” as : “to stop, give over, discontinue, desist; to come to the end.” P Ramanatha Aiyar’s, The Major Law Lexicon defines the expression “cease” to mean “discontinue or put an end to”. Justice C K Thakker’s Encyclopaedic Law Lexicon defines the word “cease” as meaning: “to put an end to; to stop, to terminate or to discontinue”. The expression has been defined in similar terms in Black’s Law Dictionary.
The expression “cease to operate” in Article 213(2)(a) is attracted in two situations. The first is where a period of six weeks has expired since the reassembling of the legislature. The second situation is where a resolution has been passed by the legislature disapproving of an ordinance. Apart from these two situations that are contemplated by sub-clause (a), sub-clause (b) contemplates that an ordinance may be withdrawn at any time by the Governor. Upon its withdrawal the ordinance would cease to operate as well.
[Extracts from the judgment of majority judgment in Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, Civil Appeal No. 5875 of 1994, decided on January 2, 2017 hereafter ‘KK Singh’] - The other material which prompted the High Court to reach the conclusion that the subsoil/minerals vest in the State is … recitals of a patta which ….. states that if minerals are found in the property covered by the patta and if the pattadar exploits those minerals, the pattadar is liable for a separate tax in addition to the tax shown in the patta and …. certain standing orders of the Collector of Malabar which provided for collection of seigniorage fee in the event of the mining operation being carried on. We are of the clear opinion that the recitals in the patta or the Collector’s standing order that the exploitation of mineral wealth in the patta land would attract additional tax, in our opinion, cannot in any way indicate the ownership of the State in the minerals. The power to tax is a necessary incident of sovereign authority (imperium) but not an incident of proprietary rights (dominium). Proprietary right is a compendium of rights consisting of various constituent, rights. If a person has only a share in the produce of some property, it can never be said that such property vests in such a person. In the instant case, the State asserted its ‘right’ to demand a share in the ‘produce of the minerals worked’ though the expression employed is right – it is in fact the Sovereign authority which is asserted. From the language of the BSO No.10 it is clear that such right to demand the share could be exercised only when the pattadar or somebody claiming through the pattadar, extracts/works the minerals – the authority of the State to collect money on the happening of an event – such a demand is more in the nature of an excise duty/a tax. The assertion of authority to collect a duty or tax is in the realm of the sovereign authority, but not a proprietary right….
The only other submission which we are required to deal with before we part with this matter is the argument of the learned counsel for the State that in view of the scheme of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (hereafter ‘MMDRA’) which prohibits under Section 4 the carrying on of any mining activity in this country except in accordance with the permit, licence or mining lease as the case may be, granted under the Act, the appellants cannot claim any proprietary right in the sub-soil…
[Extract from the judgment in Thressiamma Jacob v. Dept. of Mining & Geology, (2013) 9 SCC 725] (hereafter ‘T Jacob’) - A nationwide lockdown was declared by the Central Government from 24 March 2020 to prevent the spread of the CoVID-19 pandemic. Economic activity came to a grinding halt. The lockdown was extended on several occasions, among them for the second time on 14 April 2020. On 17 April 2020, the Labour and Employment Department of the State of Gujarat issued a notification under Section 5 of the Factories Act to exempt all factories registered under the Act “from various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest etc. for adult workers” under Sections 51, 54, 55 and 56. The stated aim of the notification was to provide “certain relaxations for industrial and commercial activities” from 20 April 2020 till 19 July 2020.
Section 5 of the Factories Act provides that in a public emergency, the State Government can exempt any factory or class or description of factories from all or any of the provisions of the Act, except Section 67. Section 5 is extracted below: “5. Power to exempt during public emergency. — In any case of public emergency the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, exempt any factory or class or description of factories from all or any of the provisions of this Act except section 67 for such period and subject to such conditions as it may think fit: Provided that no such notification shall be made for a period exceeding three months at a time. Explanation.— For the purposes of this section ‘public emergency’ means a grave emergency whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbance.” (emphasis supplied) The notification in its relevant part is extracted below:
“... NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 5 of the Factories Act, 1948, the ‘Factories Act’ PART B Government of Gujarat hereby directs that all the factories registered under the Factories Act, 1948 shall be exempted from various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest etc. of adult workers under section 51, section 54, and section 55 and section 56 with the following conditions from 20th April till 19th July 2020, –
(1) No adult worker shall be allowed or required to work in a factory for more than twelve hours in any day and Seventy Two hours in any week.
(2) The Periods of work of adult workers in a factory each day shall be so fixed that no period shall exceed six hours and that no worker shall work for more than six hours before he has had an interval of rest of at least half an hour.
(3) No Female workers shall be allowed or required to work in a factory between 7:00 PM to 6:00 AM.
(4) Wages shall be in a proportion of the existing wages (e.g. If wages for eight hours are 80 Rupees, then proportionate wages for twelve hours will be 120 Rupees).”
[Extract from judgment of the Supreme Court in Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha v. The State of Gujarat decided on 1 October, 2020, (hereafter ‘GMS’)] - In view of various counter claims regarding registration or non-registration, what is necessary is only that the information given to the police must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such a situation, registration of a FIR is mandatory. However, if no cognizable offence is made out in the information given, then the FIR need not be registered immediately and perhaps the police can conduct a sort of preliminary verification or inquiry for the limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether a cognizable offence has been committed. But, if the information given clearly mentions the commission of a cognizable offence, there is no other option but to register a FIR forthwith. Other considerations are not relevant at the stage of registration of FIR, such as, whether the information is falsely given, whether the information is genuine, whether the information is credible etc. These are the issues that have to be verified during the investigation of the FIR. At the stage of registration of a FIR, what is to be seen is merely whether the information given ex facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. If, after investigation, the information given is found to be false, there is always an option to prosecute the complainant for filing a false FIR.
[Excerpted from the judgment delivered by Sathasivam, C.J.I. in Lalita Kumari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1 (hereafter ‘Lalita Kumari’)]
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