Question

The above passage has been taken from which of the following recent cases relating to the Criminal Contempt of Court?

• A. In Re: Prashant Bhushan & Anr.
• B. The Registrar General, Supreme Court of India v. Prashant Bhushan & Anr.
• C. Amicus Curiae v. Prashant Bhushan
• D. Union of India v. Prashant Bhushan & Anr.
• A. Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
• B. Article 129 r/w Section 13 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
• C. Article 129
• D. Article 129 r/w Article 141.
• A. Statements are bona-fide fair criticism without attributing motives to the judges.
• B. Statements are the personal opinion of the person and do not have the capacity to influence the thinking of public at large
• C. Statements are based on the quotes from retired judges of the Supreme Court.
• D. Statements are mere opinions which does not fall under the category of the term "scandalising the court."
• A. Amicus Curiae v. Prashant Bhushan
• B. P.N. Duda v. V. P. Shivshankar
• C. A.K. Gopalan v. Noordeen
• D. Hari Singh Nagra v. Kapil Sibal
• A. He believes in the dignity and independence of judiciary and his act, further strengthens his belief.
• B. His statements hold the sanctity of the institution to be of utmost importance and his actions will uphold the same.
• C. He compares himself with the father of the nation Mahatma Gandhi and puts himself at the same pedestal.
• D. His statements are criticism of an individual and not the institution itself and such criticism is quintessential for a healthy democracy.
• A. The U.S. Constitution expressly mentions about the Freedom of Press but does not mention about the Freedom of Expression.
• B. The Freedom of Press though not expressly mentioned under Article 19 (1) (a), it is implicit under the Freedom of Speech
• C. The idea of Freedom of Speech and Expression is much broader in India as compared to that in the U.S. Constitution
• D. The Freedom of Speech and Expression under both the constitutions is identical in terms of its extent.
• A. In Re Arundhati Roy, (2002) 3 SCC 343
• B. Hari Singh Nagra v. Kapil Sibal, AIR 2010 SC 55.
• C. In Re Harijai Singh, (1996) 6 SCC 466.
• D. Subramaniam Swamy v. UOI, (2016) 7 SCC 221.
• A. Hiralal Dixit v. Union of India
• B. J.R. Parashar v. Prashant Bhushan
• C. Tarun Bharat Singh v. Union of India
• D. P. N. Duda v. V. P. Shivshankar
• A. (1) S. Mulgaokar, (2) hypersensitive
• B. (1) Shamsher Singh, (2) provocative
• C. (1) Hira Lal, (2) emotional
• D. (1) Ediga Annama, (2) sensitive
• A. Yes, because MPs are also bound by Contempt law
• B. No, because MPs are exempted from Contempt law.
• C. Jaitely can‘t be punished as he is no more but the other member can be held liable.
• D. No, because the statements made in Parliament are protected.

Answer 1

The Correct Option is C

The correct Option is (C):Amicus Curiae v. Prashant Bhushan

Answer 2

The passage reproduces the contemnor's own statement, read out before the Court on 20 August 2020, in the proceedings arising from two tweets criticising the judiciary, and the bench recorded at the foot of the extract is Arun Mishra, B.R. Gavai and Krishna Murari, JJ.

1. Option A: The suo motu contempt proceedings against the tweets were initiated and reported under a cause title beginning “In Re”, since the Court itself took cognizance rather than any private party filing a petition; the reported ruling carries exactly the bench of Arun Mishra, B.R. Gavai and Krishna Murari, JJ., matching the extract precisely.
2. Option B: The matter was placed before the Court through the Registrar General for administrative reasons connected to the suo motu petition, but the case is not reported or cited under a cause title naming the Registrar General as a party, so this phrasing does not correspond to the actual reported citation.
3. Option C: While senior counsel appeared to assist the Court as amicus curiae in the matter, an amicus assists the Court and is not styled as a party in the cause title of a suo motu proceeding, so this option does not correspond to any actual reported title.
4. Option D: The Union of India was not the initiating party in these suo motu proceedings, so a cause title naming the Union as petitioner does not match how this ruling is actually reported.

Because the proceedings were commenced by the Court on its own motion and the extract's bench composition lines up exactly with the reported ruling, the passage is drawn from the suo motu contempt case against the tweets.

Hence, the correct answer is In Re: Prashant Bhushan & Anr.

Answer 3

The correct Option is (C):Article 129

Answer 4

This question asks for the constitutional source of the Supreme Court's power to take suo motu cognizance of contempt of itself, as distinct from any statutory procedure that regulates how that power is exercised.

1. Option A: Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 lays down the procedure for taking cognizance of criminal contempt, principally in relation to High Courts and cases initiated otherwise than on the Court's own motion; treating a statutory procedural provision as the source of the Supreme Court's own power inverts the actual constitutional hierarchy.
2. Option B: Coupling Article 129 with a section of the 1971 Act suggests the Supreme Court's power depends on, or is limited by, the statute. Courts have consistently held that the Supreme Court's contempt power under Article 129 is a plenary, inherent power of a court of record, not one derived from or confined by the Act.
3. Option C: Article 129 declares the Supreme Court “a court of record” and expressly gives it all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. This is a self-contained constitutional grant that includes the power to act on the Court's own motion, without needing any statutory trigger.
4. Option D: Article 141 makes the law declared by the Supreme Court binding on all other courts; it concerns precedent, not the Court's contempt jurisdiction, so linking it here is unrelated to the actual source of the power.

Because the Supreme Court's authority to punish for contempt of itself flows directly from its constitutional status as a court of record, independent of the 1971 Act's machinery, the power's source is the constitutional provision alone.

Hence, the correct answer is Article 129.

Answer 5

The correct Option is (A):

Answer 6

Indian contempt law recognises specific, settled defences to a charge of scandalising the court, and this question asks which of the four options actually qualifies as one.

1. Option A: Fair and reasonable criticism of a judicial act, made honestly and without imputing improper motives to a judge, is expressly protected; this is the recognised defence built into the law of contempt, since the objection is never to criticism as such but to criticism that attributes dishonest or corrupt motives.
2. Option B: Claiming a statement is merely a personal opinion incapable of influencing the public does not track any recognised legal standard; contempt liability does not turn on whether the statement actually swayed public opinion, but on whether it tends to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.
3. Option C: Merely sourcing critical remarks from retired judges does not immunise a statement; the identity of who originally said something is irrelevant to whether repeating or endorsing it, in context, amounts to contempt.
4. Option D: A blanket claim that “mere opinions” can never amount to scandalising the court is too broad; an opinion that attributes corrupt motives or is calculated to lower the court's authority can still be contemptuous, so opinion status alone is not a defence.

The defence that survives scrutiny is the one qualified by good faith and by the absence of any imputation of motive, which is exactly what fair, bona fide criticism requires.

Hence, the correct answer is Statements are bona-fide fair criticism without attributing motives to the judges.

Answer 7

The correct Option is (D):Hari Singh Nagra v. Kapil Sibal

Answer 8

The quoted proposition holds that contempt jurisdiction exists to protect the administration of justice, not to shield judges' personal dignity, and that criticism should be tolerated within a free market-place of ideas so long as it does not impair the functioning of justice.

1. Option A: There is no reported ruling styled “Amicus Curiae v. Prashant Bhushan”; an amicus assists the Court and is not named as a party in a cause title, so this option does not correspond to any actual precedent carrying this proposition.
2. Option B: P.N. Duda v. V.P. Shivshankar concerned a public speech by a sitting Law Minister criticising a Supreme Court land-ceiling judgment, and also discusses judicial tolerance of criticism, but the specific proposition here is tied to a dispute involving lawyers protesting near the Court, pointing to a different ruling.
3. Option C: A.K. Gopalan v. Noordeen dealt with defamatory allegations against a judge personally, drawing a distinction between contempt of the institution and a personal grievance of a judge; while related in theme, it is not the source of this specific formulation.
4. Option D: Hari Singh Nagra v. Kapil Sibal arose from a symbolic protest by members of the Bar and squarely addresses the proposition that contempt jurisdiction should not be wielded to protect judges' personal dignity, favouring tolerance of open criticism provided the administration of justice is not obstructed.

The proposition, framed around tolerance for institutional criticism as opposed to protecting individual dignity, matches the ruling arising from the Bar's protest before the Court.

Hence, the correct answer is Hari Singh Nagra v. Kapil Sibal.

Answer 9

The correct Option is (C):He compares himself with the father of the nation Mahatma Gandhi and puts himself at the same pedestal.

Answer 10

The question asks which statement misdescribes the contemnor's own stated intent, so each option has to be checked against his actual words in the passage.

1. Option A: The contemnor describes himself as having tried to uphold the majesty of the court “as a humble guard... for over three decades,” and frames his tweets as an attempt to discharge his highest duty; this is consistent with a stated belief in judicial dignity and independence.
2. Option B: He states that public scrutiny is desirable for healthy functioning of the judiciary itself and that open criticism is necessary to safeguard the constitutional order, language that treats institutional sanctity as something his actions are meant to preserve.
3. Option C: He invokes Mahatma Gandhi's trial statement, but does so explicitly to “humbly paraphrase” it, submitting cheerfully to any lawful penalty rather than asking for mercy; the word “humbly” signals he is drawing on Gandhi's example of civil, dutiful submission, not claiming personal equivalence with or placing himself on the same pedestal as Gandhi. Describing his intent as self-comparison to Gandhi's stature mischaracterises the passage.
4. Option D: His statement frames his criticism as directed at institutional functioning and treats open criticism of any institution as necessary for democracy, consistent with what the passage conveys about his intent.

Of the four descriptions, only the claim that he equates himself with Gandhi in stature misreads his own qualifying word “humbly,” making it the one statement that is not true to the passage.

Hence, the correct answer is He compares himself with the father of the nation Mahatma Gandhi and puts himself at the same pedestal.

Answer 11

The correct Option is (C):The idea of Freedom of Speech and Expression is much broader in India as compared to that in the U.S. Constitution

Answer 12

This question asks which statement is not a sound conclusion from comparing the text of the First Amendment with Article 19(1)(a).

1. Option A: The First Amendment's text protects “the freedom of speech, or of the press,” naming the press expressly, while it does not use the specific composite phrase “freedom of expression”; this textual observation is accurate.
2. Option B: Article 19(1)(a) names only “freedom of speech and expression” without expressly mentioning the press, yet Indian courts have consistently read press freedom into that phrase as an implicit facet of it; this too is an accurate conclusion.
3. Option C: Article 19(1)(a) is expressly subject to eight specified grounds of reasonable restriction listed in Article 19(2), covering matters like public order, decency, contempt of court and defamation, whereas the First Amendment's text carries no equivalent express restriction clause and has instead been read by American courts as protecting speech quite broadly subject only to narrow, judicially carved exceptions. On this comparison, Indian free speech doctrine is the more textually qualified of the two, not the broader one, so claiming the Indian right is “much broader” than the American right inverts the accepted comparison.
4. Option D: Both texts centre on the same core value of protecting speech as a fundamental right, and it is fair to say the underlying right recognised is broadly comparable in kind even though the restriction mechanisms differ in form.

Since the American position is generally regarded as textually and doctrinally less qualified than the Indian one, describing India's protection as “much broader” reverses the accepted comparison and does not follow from the text.

Hence, the correct answer is The idea of Freedom of Speech and Expression is much broader in India as compared to that in the U.S. Constitution, as this claim does not hold up and is therefore the option that is not a valid conclusion.

Answer 13

The correct Option is (D):Subramaniam Swamy v. UOI, (2016) 7 SCC 221

Answer 14

Three of the four cases listed deal directly with contempt of court as a restriction on free speech; one deals with an entirely different restriction altogether, and identifying that one answers the question.

1. Option A: In Re Arundhati Roy, (2002) 3 SCC 343, is a contempt ruling arising from her remarks about the Supreme Court in connection with the Narmada dam litigation, squarely a contempt-of-court matter.
2. Option B: Hari Singh Nagra v. Kapil Sibal, AIR 2010 SC 55, is a contempt ruling arising from a Bar protest, again squarely on point.
3. Option C: In Re Harijai Singh, (1996) 6 SCC 466, examines a journalist's conduct through the lens of contempt of court and press freedom, another direct contempt ruling.
4. Option D: Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 221, upholds the constitutional validity of criminal defamation under Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code as a reasonable restriction on free speech under Article 19(2). Its subject is defamation, not contempt of court, making it the outlier among these four rulings.

Since Subramanian Swamy addresses defamation rather than contempt, it is the one case in the list not concerned with contempt of court as a restriction on Article 19(1)(a).

Hence, the correct answer is Subramaniam Swamy v. UOI, (2016) 7 SCC 221.

Answer 15

The correct Option is (A):Hiralal Dixit v. Union of India

Answer 16

The question asks which ruling addressed a peaceful dharna held outside the Supreme Court, including participation by lawyers, and confirmed that such a protest is not, by itself, contempt so long as it does not obstruct access to the court.

1. Option A: This ruling considered a demonstration conducted outside the Court premises and held that participation in a peaceful protest, including by members of the Bar, does not by itself amount to contempt of court, so long as the protest does not physically or functionally hinder litigants, lawyers or the Court from accessing or carrying on its work; that is exactly the proposition the question describes.
2. Option B: This case concerns disputes over pleadings and procedural questions in contempt proceedings generally, rather than laying down the specific proposition that a dharna outside the Court is not per se contempt.
3. Option C: This ruling does not deal with a demonstration outside the Supreme Court premises at all, and so does not support the specific proposition in the question.
4. Option D: This case concerns a public speech critical of a Supreme Court judgment made by a Minister, an entirely different factual setting from a physical demonstration outside the Court, so it does not match either.

The proposition that a peaceful dharna, even one lawyers take part in, is not contempt unless it hinders access to the Court is the specific holding tied to the first case listed.

Hence, the correct answer is Hiralal Dixit v. Union of India.

Answer 17

The correct Option is (A):(1) S. Mulgaokar, (2) hypersensitive

Answer 18

This question tests recall of the guidelines Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer laid down for exercising the contempt power against media criticism, and asks which case and which word complete the sentence correctly.

1. Option (A): This pairs the case In Re: S. Mulgaokar with the word "hypersensitive". In that matter, Krishna Iyer J. cautioned that a Judge wielding contempt jurisdiction must not be thin-skinned about criticism of the court, and should tolerate robust and even excessive comment so long as it does not obstruct the administration of justice. "Hypersensitive" is precisely the failing he warned judges against.
2. Option (B): Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab is a constitutional law decision on the discretionary powers of the President and Governor under Articles 74 and 163; it has no connection to contempt jurisdiction or press criticism, so pairing it with "provocative" does not fit the sentence at all.
3. Option (C): Hira Lal is not the case associated with this guideline, and "emotional" describes a state of mind rather than the specific judicial restraint Krishna Iyer J. was describing; the word does not match the settled formulation of the principle.
4. Option (D): Ediga Annama concerns the death penalty and sentencing policy, not contempt of court, and "sensitive" reverses the sense the sentence needs, since the guideline tells judges not to be oversensitive, not to lack sensitivity.

Working through each pairing by testing both the case name and the missing word against the actual holding leaves only the S. Mulgaokar pairing intact, since it alone matches both the subject matter (contempt jurisdiction against press criticism) and the exact caution Krishna Iyer J. issued.

Hence, the correct answer is Option (A): (1) S. Mulgaokar, (2) hypersensitive.

Answer 19

The correct Option is (D):No, because the statements made in Parliament are protected.

Answer 20

The question asks whether remarks made by Members of Parliament inside the House about the judiciary amount to contempt of court after the Supreme Court's 2020 order in the Prashant Bhushan matter, and each option must be tested against the constitutional protection given to parliamentary speech.

1. Option (A): This claims MPs are equally bound by contempt law with no special protection. That ignores Article 105(2) of the Constitution, which shields anything said by a member in Parliament or its committees from proceedings in any court, including contempt proceedings.
2. Option (B): This says MPs are "exempted from Contempt law" generally, which overstates the position. The immunity under Article 105(2) is confined to statements made within the House; the same MP can still be liable for the same words if repeated outside Parliament. Calling it a blanket exemption is inaccurate.
3. Option (C): This turns on whether a deceased person can be punished, which is a red herring; criminal and quasi-criminal liability abates on death for the individual, but that is not why these particular statements escape contempt, and the option wrongly implies the surviving member would be liable.
4. Option (D): This correctly identifies that the constitutional immunity attaches to the fact that the words were spoken on the floor of Parliament, which is the actual legal reason neither speaker can be proceeded against for contempt on this basis.

Article 105(2) is a specific and absolute textual protection for parliamentary speech, and it is this feature, not the general availability or unavailability of contempt law, or the death of a speaker, that decides the question.

Therefore, the correct answer is Option (D): No, because the statements made in Parliament are protected.