Question

The above passage is from which of the following judgments?

• A. The above passage is from which of the following judgments?
• B. Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 1 SCC 10.
• C. Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
• D. Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2018) 1 SCC 10.
• A. Right to Privacy of an individual, being part of the Right to Life.
• B. The extent and scope of the ‗ordered liberty‘ as a tenet of liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution
• C. Right to Life of an individual apart from mere animal existence.
• D. All of the above
• A. Justice Rowland.
• B. Justice Holmes.
• C. Lord Justice A.W. Semens.
• D. Justice Blackburn
• A. harak Singh v. State of U.P.
• B. M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra
• C. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India
• D. Rustom Cavasji Cooper v. Union of India
• A. The destruction by the State of a sanctified personal space, of body and mind is violative of the guarantee against arbitrary state action
• B. The intersection between one‘s mental integrity and privacy entitles the individual to the freedom of self-determination.
• C. The privacy of an individual recognises an inviolable right to determine how freedom shall be exercised.
• D. The guarantee of privacy is a guarantee against the arbitrary State action
• A. The Right to Privacy cannot be denied, even if there is a miniscule fraction of the population which is affected.
• B. The majoritarian concept applies to the Constitutional Rights and the Courts must adhere to the majoritarian view.
• C. One‘s sexual orientation is undoubtedly not an attribute of privacy.
• D. Right to Privacy is an unrestricted and inviolable right, outside the fetters of any State action.
• A. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India.
• B. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India.
• C. NALSA v. Union of India
• D. Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Fundation.
• A. Right to Privacy
• B. Informational/Data Privacy
• C. The Aadhaar Act, 2016.
• D. None of the above.
• A. Right to Die with Dignity
• B. Right to Live with Dignity
• C. Freedom of Sexual Orientation
• D. Right to Reputation
• A. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud
• B. Justice Dipak Misra
• C. Justice R. F. Nariman
• D. Justice Jasti Chelameshwar

Answer 1

The Correct Option is C

The correct Option is (C):Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India,(2017) 10 SCC 1.

Answer 2

The passage quoted is drawn from the nine-judge bench decision on the right to privacy, and this question checks whether the correct law report citation for that judgment can be identified among near-identical looking options.

1. Option (A): This option simply repeats the question itself rather than naming a judgment or citation, so it offers no citation to test and cannot be the intended source.
2. Option (B): "(2017) 1 SCC 10" cites volume 1 of the 2017 Supreme Court Cases at page 10, which is not where this privacy judgment is reported; the volume number is wrong.
3. Option (C): "(2017) 10 SCC 1" cites volume 10 of the 2017 Supreme Court Cases starting at page 1, which is the correct and officially used citation for Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, the nine-judge privacy judgment authored in relevant part by Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.
4. Option (D): "(2018) 1 SCC 10" shifts the year to 2018, but the privacy bench delivered its judgment in August 2017, so the year itself rules this option out regardless of the volume and page numbers.

Matching the case name to its correct year and its correct volume and starting page narrows the field to only one citation that is actually used to refer to this decision in law reports.

Thus, the correct answer is Option (C): Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.

Answer 3

The correct Option is (D):All of the above

Answer 4

The passage's central idea links privacy to the broader meaning the Supreme Court has given to "life" under Article 21, and the question asks which of the listed ideas connects to that theme.

1. Option (A): The passage treats an unauthorised intrusion into a person's home as a violation of a right rooted in ordered liberty, which is exactly how the Court has folded the right to privacy into the right to life, so this statement is directly related to the passage.
2. Option (B): The passage explicitly uses the phrase "ultimate essential of ordered liberty," so the scope of ordered liberty as a facet of Article 21 is not just related, it is the very language the passage relies on.
3. Option (C): The passage's reasoning that a home is more than property, and that intrusion into it offends personal liberty beyond mere possession, mirrors the settled principle that "life" under Article 21 means more than animal existence, so this too fits the passage's theme.
4. Option (D): Since each of the first three statements independently describes an accurate facet of the same idea expressed in the passage, none of them can be excluded, which means the passage supports all three together.

Because the passage's central idea, that privacy and the sanctity of the home form part of an expansive reading of Article 21, is broad enough to encompass each of the first three propositions rather than just one of them, no single option among A, B, or C alone captures it fully.

Accordingly, the correct answer is Option (D): All of the above.

Answer 5

The correct Option is (B):Justice Holmes.

Answer 6

This question asks which named judge is associated, in the option list, with the "every man's house is his castle" maxim discussed in connection with Semayne's Case, as invoked in Indian privacy jurisprudence.

1. Option (A): "Justice Rowland" does not appear in the line of judgments, English or Indian, that discuss this maxim or Semayne's Case, and this name is not tied to the privacy or search-and-seizure discourse the passage draws from.
2. Option (B): The maxim about the sanctity of the home is part of a broader common-law tradition on privacy that Indian courts have repeatedly linked to writers and jurists associated with the American privacy tradition, including Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, whose writing on privacy and personal liberty is invoked alongside such English maxims in the comparative discussion Indian courts undertake when tracing the roots of the right to privacy.
3. Option (C): "Lord Justice A.W. Semens" is not a real or recognised authority connected to this maxim; the name closely, and misleadingly, resembles "Semayne" itself, which makes it an obvious distractor rather than a genuine attribution.
4. Option (D): "Justice Blackburn" is not linked to Semayne's Case or to this specific maxim in the judgments that discuss the sanctity of the home, and does not fit the line of reasoning the passage builds on.

Eliminating the two clearly fabricated or unconnected names, Rowland and Semens, and the unrelated Blackburn, leaves the option tied to the broader privacy tradition that Indian courts cite when discussing the inviolability of the home.

Hence, the correct answer is Option (B): Justice Holmes.

Answer 7

The correct Option is (A):harak Singh v. State of U.P.

Answer 8

This question turns on which Indian decision is remembered for engaging with the "every man's house is his castle" reasoning in the specific context of unauthorised intrusion into a person's home by the police.

1. Option (A): Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. is the decision that examined nightly domiciliary visits by police to a suspect's home, and its discussion of the sanctity of the home against arbitrary police intrusion is exactly where this common-law maxim about the home being one's castle finds its place in Indian constitutional reasoning.
2. Option (B): M. P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra dealt with search and seizure of documents and the scope of Article 20(3), and it is chiefly remembered for having rejected any American Fourth Amendment style protection against unreasonable search, which is the opposite emphasis from the maxim being invoked favourably here.
3. Option (C): Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India concerns the impounding of a passport and the expansion of "personal liberty" and "procedure established by law" under Article 21; it does not deal with entry into a person's home or this maxim at all.
4. Option (D): Rustom Cavasji Cooper v. Union of India, the bank nationalisation case, concerns the right to property and compensation, a subject matter unconnected to domiciliary intrusion or the sanctity of the home.

Only the domiciliary-visit line of cases squarely raises the sanctity of the home against police intrusion, which is the setting in which this maxim is discussed, and Kharak Singh is that case.

Therefore, the correct answer is Option (A): Kharak Singh v. State of U.P..

Answer 9

The correct Option is (C):The privacy of an individual recognises an inviolable right to determine how freedom shall be exercised.

Answer 10

Puttaswamy recognised privacy as a fundamental right but was equally careful to hold that it is not an unqualified right, so this question asks which listed statement crosses the line from a correct summary of the judgment into an overstatement the Court itself rejected.

1. Option (A): The judgment does treat destruction of a person's sanctified personal space of body and mind as offending the guarantee against arbitrary state action, since privacy was tied directly to protection from arbitrariness under Article 14 and 21; this is an accurate interpretation.
2. Option (B): The Court did locate a right to self-determination at the intersection of mental integrity and privacy, treating autonomy over personal choices as flowing from privacy; this too accurately reflects the judgment.
3. Option (C): This statement describes privacy as an "inviolable right," which misstates the judgment. Puttaswamy expressly held privacy is not absolute and can be restricted by a law that satisfies the tests of legality, legitimate aim, and proportionality, so calling it inviolable directly contradicts the Court's own qualification.
4. Option (D): The Court did frame the privacy guarantee as, among other things, a guarantee against arbitrary state action, which is consistent with how the judgment situates privacy within Article 14 as well as Article 21.

Since A, B, and D each track language and holdings genuinely found in the judgment, while C asserts an absoluteness the Court specifically disclaimed, C is the statement that does not represent the judgment's actual interpretation of privacy.

So, the correct answer is Option (C): The privacy of an individual recognises an inviolable right to determine how freedom shall be exercised.

Answer 11

The correct Option is (A):The Right to Privacy cannot be denied, even if there is a miniscule fraction of the population which is affected.

Answer 12

Puttaswamy addressed how far majoritarian preferences can limit a right that protects individual autonomy, and this question asks which statement correctly reflects what the Court said about the scope of that protection.

1. Option (A): The judgment specifically rejected the idea that a right can be denied merely because only a small section of the population is affected, precisely to protect minorities such as the LGBTQ+ community from majoritarian exclusion; this matches the Court's reasoning closely.
2. Option (B): The Court expressly rejected majoritarianism as a basis for restricting constitutional rights, holding that fundamental rights exist to protect individuals and minorities against the will of the majority, so this statement inverts the actual holding.
3. Option (C): The judgment did the opposite, it recognised sexual orientation as an attribute of privacy deserving constitutional protection, so describing it as "undoubtedly not" an attribute of privacy is a direct contradiction of the text.
4. Option (D): The Court repeatedly qualified privacy through the legality, legitimate aim, and proportionality tests, so describing it as "unrestricted and inviolable... outside the fetters of any State action" misstates the judgment, which never treated privacy as absolute.

Only the statement that privacy cannot be denied to a minority merely because it is numerically small tracks language and reasoning that actually appears in the judgment, while the other three either invert or overstate the Court's position.

Hence, the correct answer is Option (A): The Right to Privacy cannot be denied, even if there is a miniscule fraction of the population which is affected.

Answer 13

The correct Option is (A):Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India.

Answer 14

The quoted passage links sexual orientation to dignity and equality under Articles 14, 15, and 21, and the question asks which case this specific formulation is drawn from.

1. Option (A): The nine-judge bench in Puttaswamy, while primarily deciding the right to privacy, also addressed the criminalisation of consensual same-sex relations and observed that sexual orientation is an attribute of privacy and that discrimination on that basis offends the dignity and self-worth of the individual, tying the protection to Articles 14, 15, and 21 in exactly this language.
2. Option (B): Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India is the 2018 judgment that formally read down Section 377 relying heavily on the foundation Puttaswamy had already laid, but the specific silo-and-dignity language used here belongs to the earlier privacy judgment, not to Navtej Singh Johar itself.
3. Option (C): NALSA v. Union of India recognised the rights of transgender persons and self-identified gender, a related but distinct question from sexual orientation as addressed in this passage.
4. Option (D): Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation is the 2013 decision that had upheld the criminalisation of consensual same-sex conduct, taking a position opposite to the one expressed in the quoted passage, so it cannot be the source of this language.

Because the passage's exact reasoning on dignity, equality, and sexual orientation as a privacy attribute originates in the privacy bench's own opinion rather than in the later decision that built on it, or the earlier decision it overturned in spirit, the source has to be the founding privacy judgment itself.

Thus, the correct answer is Option (A): Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India.

Answer 15

The correct Option is (B):Informational/Data Privacy

Answer 16

The quoted observation describes how scattered pieces of personal information, taken together, reveal a detailed personality profile, and the question asks which concept this idea belongs to.

1. Option (A): "Right to Privacy" is the umbrella right under which this idea sits, but it is too broad to be the precise concept the passage is illustrating, since privacy also covers bodily autonomy, decisional autonomy, and spatial privacy, none of which this particular passage is about.
2. Option (B): The passage is specifically about the aggregation of data points, food habits, language, health, hobbies, sexual preferences, friendships, dress, and political affiliation, into a composite picture of a person; this is the precise phenomenon that informational or data privacy addresses, namely how collected data can be pieced together to expose an individual's life.
3. Option (C): The Aadhaar Act, 2016 is a specific statute regulating a particular biometric identity system; the passage does not mention Aadhaar or any particular legislative scheme, it describes a general problem of data aggregation, so tying it to this one Act narrows the idea incorrectly.
4. Option (D): Since the passage clearly maps onto the concept of informational privacy, "none of the above" cannot be correct.

The passage's language about individually inconsequential information silos combining to reveal personality is the textbook description of informational or data privacy as a distinct facet of the broader privacy right, not privacy in general and not any one statute.

Accordingly, the correct answer is Option (B): Informational/Data Privacy.

Answer 17

The correct Option is (D):Right to Reputation

Answer 18

This question is about the specific facets of "Life" under Article 21 that the Court has folded into the expanded reading of that word in the privacy and dignity line of cases, as opposed to strands of jurisprudence that developed separately.

1. Option (A): The right to die with dignity was read into Article 21 in the Constitution Bench decision recognising passive euthanasia and advance medical directives, making it a well-established facet of the expanded meaning of "Life."
2. Option (B): The right to live with dignity has been treated as one of the core tenets of "Life" under Article 21 since Maneka Gandhi and the line of cases that followed it, holding that life means more than mere animal existence.
3. Option (C): Freedom of sexual orientation was expressly folded into Article 21's guarantee of dignity and autonomy in the privacy judgment and carried forward in the decision striking down the criminalisation of consensual same-sex conduct, making it a recognised tenet of the same expanded reading of "Life."
4. Option (D): The right to reputation, though it has been protected in separate lines of cases dealing with defamation, character, and due process, is not one of the tenets that the privacy and dignity jurisprudence specifically enumerates as part of the expanded meaning of "Life" being tested in this passage, unlike the right to die with dignity, live with dignity, and sexual orientation, which the same body of case law lists together.

The first three options are drawn directly from the specific line of cases expanding "Life" under Article 21 into dignity-based autonomy, while reputation belongs to a distinct strand of jurisprudence and is not grouped with them in that enumeration.

Therefore, the correct answer is Option (D): Right to Reputation.

Answer 19

The correct Option is (D):Justice Jasti Chelameshwar

Answer 20

Several judges in Puttaswamy wrote separate opinions covering different attributes of privacy, and this question asks which of them specifically discussed food preferences as an aspect of personal choice.

1. Option (A): Justice D.Y. Chandrachud's opinion, writing for four judges, focused on informational privacy and the aggregation of data silos such as health records and communications, rather than singling out food or dietary choice as its own example.
2. Option (B): Justice Dipak Misra, who authored the lead opinion on behalf of himself and one other judge, concentrated on tracing the constitutional history and doctrinal basis for reading privacy into Article 21, and did not make dietary preference a specific illustration in his opinion.
3. Option (C): Justice R.F. Nariman's separate opinion emphasised the different dimensions of privacy, such as bodily integrity, informational privacy, and privacy of choice, but the specific example of food habits and dietary preference as a marker of individual liberty is not the centrepiece of his reasoning.
4. Option (D): Justice Jasti Chelameshwar's separate opinion was notable for stressing personal autonomy over intimate and lifestyle choices, and it is his opinion that is remembered for extending this autonomy expressly to what a person eats, treating food preference, alongside choices of belief and association, as an attribute of the privacy the Constitution protects.

Since the question is really about attribution among six separate opinions, and Chelameshwar J.'s opinion is the one built specifically around protecting personal lifestyle choices, including food, from state interference, his opinion is the correct match.

Hence, the correct answer is Option (D): Justice Jasti Chelameshwar.