Question

The purpose of the ‘science of law’ is to achieve

• A. Practical aspects for human conduct.
• B. Idealistic judicial abstractions.
• C. Pure knowledge based on reality.
• D. Judicial purpose.
• A. Employed by judges for application of law.
• B. Indicated in law books.
• C. Abstraction of social mind.
• D. Legal optimism
• A. Underlying principles of judicial morality
• B. Principles of professional ethics
• C. Practical purposes followed by judicial science.
• D. Classical theories of justice
• A. Judges are not professionally trained
• B. Judicial abstractions and deductions are different from reality
• C. Practical purposes followed by judicial science
• D. Notions for the judicial decisions are inferred from the decision of foreign courts.
• A. Generalised possibility
• B. Exclusivity
• C. Social interest
• D. Political interest
• A. The conduct of man ought to be humane.
• B. The conduct of man ought to be prudent
• C. The conduct of man be based on rules decided by courts.
• D. The conduct of man be based on moral and ethical parameters

Answer 1

The Correct Option is C

The correct option is (C) : Pure knowledge based on reality.

Answer 2

This question asks about the stated purpose of the "science of law" as the passage frames it, distinguishing the theoretical science of law from the practical science of law.

1. Option A: The passage attributes practical ends to the practical science of law, the discipline that trains judges to apply general propositions to specific cases. The pure "science of law" described at the outset is expressly set apart from serving practical ends, so this option describes the wrong branch of the distinction.
2. Option B: The passage never characterises the science of law as producing "idealistic" abstractions; it is the practical, judge-oriented branch that proceeds by abstraction and deduction, and even that branch is described as losing touch with reality rather than being idealistic by design.
3. Option C: The opening lines state plainly that the independent science of law exists "not to subserve practical ends but to serve pure knowledge, which is concerned with facts." This is an almost verbatim match for the purpose the passage assigns to the science of law.
4. Option D: "Judicial purpose" belongs to the practical science of law, which supplies judges with propositions to decide cases; the passage is careful to separate this judicial, practical purpose from the pure, knowledge-seeking purpose of the science of law proper.

Reading the option set against the opening sentence of the passage, only one option tracks the express purpose assigned to the science of law rather than to its practical counterpart.

Hence, the correct answer is Pure knowledge based on reality.

Answer 3

The correct option is (A) : Employed by judges for application of law.

Answer 4

The question is looking for the method that the passage attributes to the practical science of law, as opposed to methods associated with other branches of jurisprudence.

1. Option A: The passage says juristic science today is "exclusively a practical science of law and adequate methods have been evolved for the application of law by the judges." This directly names the method as the one judges use to apply law.
2. Option B: Nowhere does the passage describe the method as something merely "indicated in law books"; the emphasis throughout is on how judges actually apply propositions to decide disputes, not on a written compendium.
3. Option C: "Abstraction of social mind" is not a phrase or idea used anywhere in the passage; the abstractions discussed belong to juristic science's propositions, not to any notion of a collective social mind.
4. Option D: The passage is descriptive and even critical of the practical science losing contact with reality; it does not characterise the method as optimistic in any sense.

Only the option tied to judicial application of law reflects what the passage actually says about the prevailing method.

Hence, the correct answer is Employed by judges for application of law.

Answer 5

The correct option is (C) : Practical purposes followed by judicial science.

Answer 6

This question asks what dominates judicial thinking according to the passage's account of the jurist's mindset.

1. Option A: The passage does not speak of "judicial morality" as a guiding force; its concern is with the practical purposes that shape juristic reasoning, not with moral principles as such.
2. Option B: "Professional ethics" is likewise absent from the passage's vocabulary; the text is concerned with the purposive orientation of juristic science, not with a code of conduct for the profession.
3. Option C: The passage states directly that "human thinking is necessarily dominated by the underlying purpose and the thinking of the jurist is conditioned by the practical purposes pursued by juristic science." This is a near-exact restatement of the option.
4. Option D: Classical theories of justice are never invoked in the passage; the discussion stays within the practical-versus-theoretical framing of juristic science, not competing theories of justice.

The passage's own language about the jurist's thinking being conditioned by practical purposes leaves only one option standing.

Hence, the correct answer is Practical purposes followed by judicial science.

Answer 7

The correct option is (B) : Judicial abstractions and deductions are different from reality

Answer 8

The question asks for the reason the passage gives for juristic science losing its scientific character, so the answer should trace back to the specific sentence addressing that loss.

1. Option A: The passage never questions the training of judges; its critique is about the abstractions used, not the competence of the individuals applying them.
2. Option B: The passage states plainly that "juristic science as a whole proceeds by abstractions and deductions but sometimes loses contact with reality." Losing contact with reality is exactly what "losing scientific temperament" describes, since a science is expected to stay tethered to observable fact.
3. Option C: This describes the practical orientation of judicial science generally, which the passage treats as a defining feature rather than the specific cause of its scientific decline.
4. Option D: Reliance on foreign court decisions is not discussed anywhere in the passage; introducing it here would be reading in information the text does not contain.

Since the passage explicitly links the loss of contact with reality to the abstractions and deductions of juristic science, that is the stated cause of its declining scientific temperament.

Hence, the correct answer is Judicial abstractions and deductions are different from reality.

Answer 9

The correct option is (A) : Generalised possibility

Answer 10

This question tests recall of how the passage describes the formulation of legal propositions that juristic science supplies to judges.

1. Option A: The passage says juristic science aims "to supply the judge with legal propositions, formulated in the most general terms possible, in order that the greatest possible number of decisions might be derived from them." Being framed in the most general terms so as to cover the greatest possible number of cases is exactly what "generalised possibility" captures.
2. Option B: "Exclusivity" runs counter to the passage's description, which is about propositions being broad enough to apply widely, not narrow or exclusive to particular facts.
3. Option C: Social interest surfaces later in the passage in a different context (concerning fair investigation of crime in a separate excerpt), not in connection with how legal propositions are formulated here.
4. Option D: Political interest is not mentioned anywhere in this passage as a basis for legal propositions; the passage's focus is on generality of formulation, not on political considerations.

The passage's own description of legal propositions being cast in the most general terms to cover as many cases as possible points to generality, not exclusivity or any external interest, as their basis.

Hence, the correct answer is Generalised possibility.

Answer 11

The correct option is (C) : The conduct of man be based on rules decided by courts.

Answer 12

This question asks what judges expect of ordinary people's conduct according to the passage's closing lines.

1. Option A: Humaneness is not a standard the passage attributes to judicial expectation; the text speaks specifically about rules, not about humane conduct in general.
2. Option B: Prudence is likewise not the standard described; the passage's concern is with which set of rules people's conduct is measured against, not with the quality of prudence.
3. Option C: The passage states that judges "mean that the rules according to which courts decide are the rules according to which men ought to regulate their conduct." That is a direct statement that judicial expectation is for conduct to follow the rules courts apply.
4. Option D: Moral and ethical parameters are explicitly contrasted with this judicial view; the passage notes this outlook is "altogether different from true science" and does not root it in morality or ethics as the standard.

The passage's explicit statement about what judges expect of men's conduct matches only the option tying conduct to court-decided rules.

Hence, the correct answer is The conduct of man be based on rules decided by courts.