Yes. The composition of the Waqf Board is constitutionally challengeable if non-Muslim members exceed statutory limits or undermine denominational control.
1. Article 26(b) – Denominational autonomy
A Waqf Board administers a religious endowment belonging to a particular denomination (the Muslim community). Under Art. 26(b):
“Every religious denomination has the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion.”
Excessive non-Muslim representation:
intrudes into internal religious management,
alters the denominational character of the Board,
violates 26(b) and 26(d) (administration of religious property).
2. Article 25 – Freedom of religion
Administration of waqf property is integrally tied to religious practice (graveyards, mosques, madrasas). Interference dilutes the autonomous functioning of religious institutions.
3. Article 14 – Arbitrariness
If non-Muslims exceed limits set by the Amendment:
classification loses rational nexus,
it becomes arbitrary,
Article 14 is violated because Hindu trust boards and Sikh gurdwara committees maintain denominational representation.
4. Precedent analogy SC in:
Shirur Mutt – autonomy of religious denominations is protected.
Sri Adi Visheshwara – State cannot take over permanent management of religious property.
These principles apply similarly to waqf administration.
Conclusion
The Board composition can be struck down for violating Articles 25, 26(b), 26(d), and 14.
The question is whether a Waqf Board whose composition has more non-Muslim members than the statutory limit allowed by the Amendment can be constitutionally challenged. The right way to test this is to ask what functions the Board actually performs, and then check whether an excessive non-Muslim presence interferes with those functions.
A State Waqf Board is not a general administrative body. It supervises mosques, graveyards, madrasas, and other properties dedicated to Islamic religious and charitable purposes, decides on their management, and often has a say in appointing mutawallis (managers) of individual waqfs. These are functions of religious administration, not ordinary secular governance.
Article 26(b) protects a religious denomination's right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, and Article 26(d) protects its right to administer property it owns. Both rights are held by the denomination and exercised through bodies the community controls or substantially influences. If the law changes the Board's composition so that non-Muslims dominate or approach parity with Muslim members, the community's practical control over decisions affecting mosques, graveyards, and madrasas is diluted, even though the Board formally remains a Muslim religious institution. This undermines the functional purpose that Articles 26(b) and 26(d) exist to protect.
Article 25 adds a further layer, since decisions the Board makes, such as who manages a mosque or how a graveyard is maintained, are not incidental to religion but are themselves part of religious practice and observance for the community that uses these institutions.
Article 14 is engaged for a different reason: unequal treatment. If the Amendment permits a Waqf Board to include a much higher proportion of non-Muslim members than what Hindu religious trust boards or Sikh gurdwara management committees are required to accommodate from outside their own community, the classification lacks a rational basis connected to any legitimate secular purpose, and singles out one religious community's institutions for weaker self-governance.
Because the excessive non-Muslim composition interferes with the functional core of religious self-administration and treats Muslim religious institutions less favourably than comparable religious bodies of other faiths, the composition can indeed be challenged under Articles 25, 26, and 14.