This is a Cournot oligopoly problem where each firm chooses its quantity of natural spring water, assuming the other firms' quantities are fixed. The market demand is given by \( P(Q) = a - Q \), where \( Q \) is the total quantity produced by all firms, and \( Q = \sum_{i=1}^n q_i \).
Each firm \( i \) has a cost function of the form \( C_i = c q_i \), where \( c \) is the constant marginal cost of production.
Step 1: Reaction Function of Each Firm
To find the equilibrium market price, we first derive the reaction function of each firm. The profit function for firm \( i \) is:
\[
\pi_i = P(Q) q_i - C_i = (a - Q) q_i - c q_i = (a - \sum_{i=1}^n q_i) q_i - c q_i
\]
Firm \( i \) maximizes its profit by setting its derivative with respect to \( q_i \) equal to zero:
\[
\frac{d\pi_i}{dq_i} = a - Q - q_i - c = 0
\]
Simplifying:
\[
a - \sum_{i=1}^n q_i - q_i - c = 0
\]
\[
a - q_i - c = \sum_{i \neq j} q_j
\]
Step 2: Symmetric Equilibrium
Since the firms are symmetric, each firm will choose the same quantity \( q_i = q \). Therefore, the total quantity produced is \( Q = nq \), and the reaction function becomes:
\[
a - q - c = (n - 1)q
\]
Solving for \( q \):
\[
q = \frac{a - c}{n + 1}
\]
Step 3: Equilibrium Market Price
The total quantity in the market is \( Q = nq \), so the equilibrium price is:
\[
P(Q) = a - Q = a - n \left( \frac{a - c}{n + 1} \right)
\]
Simplifying:
\[
P(Q) = a - \frac{n(a - c)}{n + 1}
\]
Thus, the equilibrium market price is:
\[
P(Q) = \frac{a}{n + 1} + \frac{nc}{n + 1}
\]
This matches option (B).
Final Answer:
\boxed{(B) \text{ \( \frac{a}{(n + 1)} + \frac{nc}{(n + 1)} \) }}