Step 1: Utility functions
Anu's utility function: \[ U^{Anu}(a,b) = a + 2b \] Binu's utility function: \[ U^{Binu}(a,b) = \min\{a,\,2b\} \] Initial endowments: - Anu: \((0,\,12)\) - Binu: \((12,\,0)\) Total resources: \((12,\,12)\).
Step 2: Anu’s preferences
For Anu, the marginal utilities are: \[ MU_a = 1, \quad MU_b = 2 \] So, her marginal rate of substitution (MRS) is: \[ MRS_{Anu} = \frac{MU_a}{MU_b} = \frac{1}{2}. \] This means Anu values bananas twice as much as apricots.
Step 3: Binu’s preferences
Since \[ U^{Binu}(a,b) = \min\{a,2b\}, \] Binu will consume in the fixed proportion: \[ a = 2b. \] Thus her consumption always lies on the line \(a=2b\).
Step 4: Competitive equilibrium
In equilibrium, markets clear: \[ a^{Anu} + a^{Binu} = 12, \quad b^{Anu} + b^{Binu} = 12. \] Also, Binu’s bundle must satisfy \(a^{Binu} = 2b^{Binu}\).
Step 5: Testing feasible allocations for Anu
Candidate allocations for Anu (a,b):
Among these, (9,9) gives the highest utility (27), but violates Binu’s consumption rule since that leaves (3,3) for Binu, which does not satisfy \(a=2b\). The feasible bundle that satisfies Binu’s proportion condition is **(6,9)**, leaving (6,3) for Binu, which lies on her \(a=2b\) line.
Final Answer:
Anu’s optimal consumption bundle in competitive equilibrium is: \[ \boxed{(6 \;\; \text{apricots}, \; 9 \;\; \text{bananas})} \]
For a closed economy with no government expenditure and taxes, the aggregate consumption function (\(C\)) is given by: \[ C = 100 + 0.75 \, Y_d \] where \( Y_d \) is the disposable income. If the total investment is 80, the equilibrium output is ____________ (in integer).
Piku faces a lottery with outcomes of ₹24, ₹12, ₹48 and ₹6 given by the following probability distribution: 
She is indifferent between the lottery and receiving ₹28 with certainty. Given the information we can conclude that Piku is a
Consider an individual who maximizes her expected utility having Bernoulli utility function