Question

The power to promulgate an ordinance is an instance of the:

• A. Executive power of the Governor
• B. Delegated power of the Governor
• C. Sovereign prerogative power of the Governor
• D. None of the above
• A. Legislative power is vested in the legislatures by the Constitution of India
• B. It is a colourable exercise of power under the Constitution of India
• C. The role of the Executive is to implement a law, not make it
• D. None of the above
• A. Both Houses are not in session
• B. When a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation
• C. When the state has been placed under President’s rule
• D. None of the above
• A. Six weeks
• B. Six months
• C. Six-and-a-half months
• D. One year
• A. An Ordinance which is not laid before the Legislature in the manner prescribed by Article 213 shall not have any legal effect and consequences.
• B. An Ordinance which is not laid before the Legislature in the manner prescribed by Article 213 shall be void from the date that it should have obtained approval.
• C. An Ordinance which is not laid before the Legislature in the manner prescribed by Article 213 shall be void from the date the ordinance is replaced by a law made by the Legislature to replace the Ordinance.
• D. An Ordinance which is not laid before the Legislature in the manner prescribed by Article 213 shall be considered as a temporary statute.
• A. i alone is correct
• B. i and ii are correct
• C. i, ii and iii are correct
• D. None of the above
• A. i, ii and iii are correct
• B. i and iii are correct
• C. i and ii are correct
• D. None is correct
• A. Is not subject to judicial review since it is a political question
• B. Is subject to judicial review with regard to the relevancy of the material on which such satisfaction is based
• C. Is subject to judicial review with regard to the adequacy of materials on which such satisfaction is based
• D. None of the above
• A. i, ii, and iii are correct
• B. ii and iii are correct
• C. i and iii are correct
• D. All the above are correct
• A. Statutory in nature and has binding effect upon the Government
• B. A mere expression of the opinion of the House
• C. A decision of the House relating to the control of its proceedings
• D. An exercise of delegated legislation

Answer 1

The Correct Option is A

Step 1: Constitutional provision.
The Governor’s ordinance-making power is derived from Article 213 of the Constitution of India. It allows the Governor to promulgate ordinances when the Legislative Assembly (or both Houses in a bicameral state) is not in session.
Step 2: Nature of the power.
Although ordinance-making is a law-making function, it is exercised by the Executive (Governor) on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Therefore, it is categorised under the Governor’s executive power, not as a delegated legislative power in the usual sense.
Step 3: Elimination of other options.
(B) Delegated power — not correct; this is a constitutional power, not delegated by legislature.
(C) Sovereign prerogative — India does not recognise absolute “Crown-like” prerogatives; all powers stem from the Constitution.
\[ \boxed{\text{Executive power of the Governor}} \]

Answer 2

The question asks how the Governor's ordinance-making power under Article 213 should be classified. Let's test each option against the source and nature of this power.

1. Executive power of the Governor: Although promulgating an ordinance produces a law-like text, the power itself is exercised by the Governor as head of the state executive, acting on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, exactly as with other executive functions. The Constitution places this power in Article 213, within the part of the Constitution dealing with the state executive, not the state legislature.
2. Delegated power of the Governor: Delegated legislation is power handed down by a legislature to an executive body through a specific statute, subject to that statute's limits. The Governor's ordinance power is not handed down by the state legislature at all; it flows directly from the Constitution itself, so it cannot be called a delegated power.
3. Sovereign prerogative power of the Governor: A prerogative power, in the older common law sense, is an inherent, largely unchecked power of the Crown that exists outside any written text. Indian constitutional governance recognises no such free-standing prerogative; every power the Governor holds, including the ordinance power, is traceable to and limited by specific constitutional provisions and judicial review.
4. None of the above: This is ruled out because the power fits cleanly within the executive power of the Governor description.

Since the power is conferred directly on the Governor as part of the state executive and is exercised on ministerial advice rather than under any legislative delegation or unchecked prerogative, it is properly classified as an executive power.

Therefore, the correct answer is Executive power of the Governor.

Answer 3

Step 1: Principle in D.C. Wadhwa.
The Supreme Court criticised the practice of repeatedly re-promulgating ordinances without placing them before the legislature. This undermined the role of the legislature as the primary law-making body.
Step 2: Core reasoning.
Re-promulgation amounts to the Executive bypassing the Legislature, thereby usurping legislative functions. Since legislative power is constitutionally vested in legislatures (Arts. 168–212 for states), this practice was labelled a “fraud on the Constitution.” 
Step 3: Eliminate distractors.
(B) “Colourable exercise of power” is a possible characterisation but the primary doctrinal basis used was that legislative power rests with legislatures.
(C) is correct in spirit but not the direct holding cited in the case.
\[ \boxed{\text{Legislative power is vested in the legislatures by the Constitution of India}} \]

Answer 4

The question asks for the precise reason the Constitution Bench in D.C. Wadhwa gave for calling repeated re-promulgation of ordinances a fraud on the Constitution. Let's weigh each option against that specific reasoning.

1. Legislative power is vested in the legislatures by the Constitution of India: The Court's central point was that the ordinance-making power is meant to be a stop-gap, emergency substitute for the legislature, not a parallel and permanent law-making channel. Because the Constitution assigns ordinary law-making power to the elected legislature, repeatedly re-issuing ordinances instead of taking a bill through the legislature defeats that constitutional design, which is exactly the fraud the Court identified.
2. It is a colourable exercise of power under the Constitution of India: Colourable exercise of power is a broader doctrine used when a power is used for a purpose other than the one it was granted for, dressed up to look valid. While repeated re-promulgation does have this flavour, the Court's stated reasoning in D.C. Wadhwa focused specifically on displacing the legislature's constitutional role, not on this general doctrine as such.
3. The role of the Executive is to implement a law, not make it: This is a broader separation-of-powers statement about the executive generally. It is true in spirit but does not capture the Court's specific reasoning, since the ordinance power itself is a recognised, if limited, law-making function of the executive; the objection was to its repeated and permanent use bypassing the legislature, not to the executive making law in a single valid instance.
4. None of the above: Ruled out because option 1 matches the Court's own stated reasoning.

The Court's real target was the displacement of the legislature from the position the Constitution reserves for it as the primary law-making body, which is captured precisely by the first option.

Therefore, the correct answer is Legislative power is vested in the legislatures by the Constitution of India.

Answer 5

Step 1: Condition under Article 213.
An ordinance can be issued only when the legislature is not in session. In a bicameral state, this means both Houses must not be in session. 
Step 2: Why?
The ordinance power is an emergency law-making mechanism meant to deal with situations when immediate action is required, and the normal legislative process is unavailable. 
Step 3: Eliminate wrong options.
(B) Emergency is irrelevant; ordinance power is independent of emergency provisions.
(C) President’s Rule shifts law-making to Parliament under Art. 356; the Governor doesn’t exercise ordinance power in that context.
\[ \boxed{\text{Both Houses are not in session}} \]

Answer 6

The question asks precisely when the Governor of a bicameral state can promulgate an ordinance. Let's test each option against the text of Article 213.

1. Both Houses are not in session: Article 213(1) allows the Governor to legislate by ordinance only if the Legislature of the State is not in session. In a bicameral state, the Legislature consists of two Houses, so this condition is satisfied only when neither House is sitting. This matches the text exactly.
2. When a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation: Emergency proclamations under Articles 352, 356, or 360 deal with entirely separate constitutional machinery for national, state, or financial emergencies. Article 213 makes no reference to any such proclamation as a precondition, so this option introduces a requirement the provision does not actually contain.
3. When the state has been placed under President's Rule: President's Rule under Article 356 is itself a special situation where the state legislature's powers may be exercised by or under the authority of Parliament, and it is not a precondition for the routine use of Article 213; ordinances are promulgated in normal times whenever the legislature happens to be out of session, with or without President's Rule.
4. None of the above: Ruled out because the plain text of Article 213(1) directly supports the not-in-session condition.

The only condition Article 213 actually imposes is that the legislature, meaning both Houses in a bicameral state, must not be in session at the time.

Therefore, the correct answer is Both Houses are not in session.

Answer 7

Step 1: Maximum duration calculation.
An ordinance can be promulgated at any time when the legislature is not in session. It must be laid before the legislature upon reassembly and will cease to operate six weeks after the legislature reconvenes, unless approved. 
Step 2: Derivation of 6.5 months.
If the Governor issues an ordinance on the first day after the legislature adjourns for 6 months, that ordinance lasts the adjournment period (6 months) + 6 weeks (1.5 months) after reassembly. Hence, maximum possible life = 6 months + 6 weeks = 6.5 months. 
Step 3: Judicial reference.
The Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar case confirms that laying before the legislature is mandatory, and the “cease to operate” clause in Art. 213(2)(a) is strict. \[ \boxed{\text{Six-and-a-half months}} \]

Answer 8

This question asks for the outer limit on how long an ordinance can remain in force, so the analysis has to combine the constitutional text with a worst-case timeline. Let's test each option.

1. Six weeks: Six weeks is only the period counted from the day the legislature reassembles after being adjourned; it is not the total possible life of the ordinance from the day it was first promulgated, since the ordinance may have already been in force for months before the legislature even reassembles.
2. Six months: Under the relevant constitutional rules, a state legislature cannot go more than six months without meeting, so six months is the longest possible gap between two sessions. But this figure alone ignores the additional six-week window the ordinance enjoys after the legislature reassembles, so it understates the true maximum.
3. Six-and-a-half months: Picture the Governor issuing an ordinance on the very day the legislature adjourns for the maximum permitted gap of six months. The ordinance survives that entire six-month gap, and then continues to survive for a further six weeks, about one and a half months, after the legislature reassembles, since it only ceases to operate at the end of that six-week window unless approved earlier. Six months plus six weeks works out to about six and a half months, which is the outer limit.
4. One year: A full year exceeds the six-month cap on the gap between two legislative sessions plus the additional six-week grace period; there is no constitutional basis for an ordinance surviving that long without ever being placed before the legislature.

Adding the maximum permissible gap between sessions to the six-week window after reassembly gives the true worst-case survival period for an ordinance.

Therefore, the correct answer is Six-and-a-half months.

Answer 9

Step 1: Understanding the KK Singh ruling.
The Supreme Court in Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (2017) held that the requirement to lay an ordinance before the legislature under Article 213(2) is mandatory. Failure to do so results in the ordinance having no legal effect. 
Step 2: Overruling earlier decisions.
Earlier 5-Judge bench rulings had taken a more lenient view, treating such non-laid ordinances as valid until expiration. KK Singh explicitly overruled this. 
Step 3: Why Option (A) is correct.
The judgment clarified that non-compliance renders the ordinance void ab initio in terms of enforceability — it cannot produce legal consequences. \[ \boxed{\text{No legal effect if not laid before Legislature as per Art. 213}} \]

Answer 10

This question tests the precise legal consequence the Supreme Court in Krishna Kumar Singh attached to an ordinance that is never laid before the legislature as Article 213 requires. Let's examine each formulation.

1. Shall not have any legal effect and consequences: The Court held that laying an ordinance before the legislature is a mandatory constitutional requirement, and failure to comply means the ordinance never validly matured into something with binding legal force in the first place; anything done or claimed under it can be treated as having had no legal effect. This is the clean, unqualified position the Court adopted, overruling earlier decisions that had allowed such ordinances to be treated as valid until they lapsed.
2. Shall be void from the date that it should have obtained approval: This suggests the ordinance was valid for some period and only becomes void from a specific later date tied to when approval was due. That is closer to the older, overruled view that treated non-laid ordinances as valid until some cut-off point, rather than the position the Court actually adopted.
3. Shall be void from the date the ordinance is replaced by a law made by the Legislature: This ties invalidity to a separate legislative event, the enactment of a replacement law, which is not the test the Court applied; an ordinance's fate under Article 213(2)(a) does not depend on whether or when a replacement Act is later passed.
4. Shall be considered as a temporary statute: The Court specifically rejected equating a lapsed ordinance with a temporary statute that runs its course and expires on its own terms, since that would let the executive achieve permanent effects through repeated short-lived ordinances without ever answering to the legislature.

The Court's actual holding was the strongest of the four formulations: an ordinance not laid before the legislature as required simply carries no legal effect or consequences at all.

Therefore, the correct answer is An Ordinance which is not laid before the Legislature in the manner prescribed by Article 213 shall not have any legal effect and consequences.

Answer 11

Step 1: Ordinance as ‘law’ under Article 13.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held (e.g., in A.K. Roy v. Union of India) that ordinances are “law” within the meaning of Article 13(3)(a). Hence, they are subject to Fundamental Rights review. 
Step 2: On prior approval.
(ii) is incorrect: Prior approval of the President is not required in all cases — only in specific circumstances under the provisos to Art. 213(1). 
Step 3: On legislative competence.
(iii) is incorrect: Ordinances must conform to the same subject-matter restrictions as any State law under Article 246 and the Seventh Schedule. \[ \boxed{\text{i alone is correct}} \]

Answer 12

This question gives three separate statements about ordinances and asks which combination is correct, so each statement needs to be tested on its own before matching to an option.

1. i alone is correct: Statement (i) says an ordinance is treated as law for Article 13 purposes, which is accurate since the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that ordinances fall within the definition of law in Article 13(3)(a) and are therefore open to challenge on fundamental rights grounds, exactly like an Act of the legislature. If statements (ii) and (iii) turn out to be wrong, this is the only option left standing.
2. i and ii are correct: Statement (ii) claims prior Presidential approval is required in all cases. Article 213 only requires the Governor to reserve an ordinance for the President's consideration in specific listed situations, such as when the state is under President's Rule or when the ordinance touches particular subjects, not universally for every ordinance. Since (ii) overstates the requirement, this option cannot be correct.
3. i, ii and iii are correct: This additionally treats statement (iii) as correct, which claims an ordinance is free from the subject-matter limits of Article 246 and the Seventh Schedule. An ordinance is a substitute for an Act of the legislature and must stay within the same legislative competence limits as any Act on that subject; it enjoys no special exemption from Article 246. Since both (ii) and (iii) are wrong, this option fails on two counts.
4. None of the above: This would only be correct if statement (i) were also wrong, but (i) is a well-settled and accurate proposition, so this option is ruled out.

Testing each statement individually shows only statement (i) survives scrutiny, while (ii) and (iii) both overstate the constraints on the ordinance power.

Therefore, the correct answer is i alone is correct.

Answer 13

Step 1: Requirement under provisos to Article 213(1).
The Governor must reserve an ordinance for President’s consideration in three situations: 1. When a state is under President’s Rule (Art. 356) — i.e., Governor acts under Union’s directions.
2. When ordinance relates to restrictions under Art. 304(b) — this requires President’s sanction.
3. When ordinance is repugnant to an existing Parliamentary law in the Concurrent List — requires President’s assent to be valid.
Step 2: Matching to statements.
All three given statements match the constitutional text exactly, hence all are correct. \[ \boxed{\text{i, ii and iii are correct}} \]

Answer 14

This question lists three separate situations and asks whether the Governor must reserve an ordinance for the President's consideration in each. Each situation needs to be checked against the actual constitutional requirement.

1. i, ii and iii are correct: Statement (i) is accurate because when a state is under President's Rule, the Governor administers the state effectively on behalf of the Union, so any ordinance in that period must be reserved for Presidential consideration. Statement (ii) is accurate because Article 304(b) restrictions on trade and commerce require the President's previous sanction before a state Bill, and equally an ordinance covering the same ground, can impose them. Statement (iii) is accurate because an ordinance touching a Concurrent List subject that conflicts with an existing central law needs the President's assent to prevail, exactly as a state Act would under Article 254(2). All three requirements independently trace back to real constitutional provisions.
2. i and iii are correct: This drops statement (ii), but the Article 304(b) requirement of prior Presidential sanction for reasonable restrictions on trade and commerce genuinely applies to state legislation on that subject, including ordinances covering the same ground, so dropping it is not justified.
3. i and ii are correct: This drops statement (iii), but repugnancy with a Concurrent List central law is one of the clearest, most settled reservation triggers, so dropping it leaves out a well-established requirement.
4. None is correct: This is ruled out immediately because all three statements each rest on an identifiable constitutional rule requiring reservation for the President.

Since each of the three situations independently satisfies a genuine constitutional trigger for Presidential reservation, none of them can be safely dropped.

Therefore, the correct answer is i, ii and iii are correct.

Answer 15

Step 1: Governor’s satisfaction under Art. 213(1).
The Constitution requires “satisfaction” of the Governor as a precondition to promulgating an ordinance. This is a constitutional safeguard against arbitrary ordinance-making. 
Step 2: Judicial review scope as per KK Singh.
The Court clarified that while the adequacy of material (how much or how strong the evidence is) is not reviewable, the relevancy of the material (whether it has any rational nexus to the urgency requirement) is open to judicial review. 
Step 3: Elimination of options.
(A) is incorrect — satisfaction is justiciable. (C) is incorrect — adequacy is non-justiciable. (D) is incorrect — (B) matches the Court’s holding. \[ \boxed{\text{Judicial review limited to relevancy of material — not adequacy.}} \]

Answer 16

This question asks exactly how far judicial review extends over the Governor's satisfaction before promulgating an ordinance. Let's weigh each option.

1. Is not subject to judicial review since it is a political question: If courts could never look behind the Governor's satisfaction, the requirement of satisfaction in Article 213(1) would become an empty formality that could never be checked even for obvious abuse, such as issuing an ordinance where the material relied on has nothing to do with any urgency at all. The seven-judge bench in Krishna Kumar Singh rejected treating this as wholly non-justiciable.
2. Is subject to judicial review with regard to the relevancy of the material on which such satisfaction is based: The Court held that while it will not weigh how strong or sufficient the material is, it will check whether the material has any rational connection at all to the claimed need for immediate action. This targeted, relevancy-based review is the specific standard the Court adopted, striking a balance between unchecked executive discretion and full-blown reappraisal of facts by judges.
3. Is subject to judicial review with regard to the adequacy of materials on which such satisfaction is based: Reviewing adequacy would mean courts second-guessing how much material was enough or how convincing it was, effectively substituting their own judgment for the Governor's on a factual question of urgency. The Court specifically declined to take review that far, since that would turn the ordinance power into something the judiciary effectively exercises instead of the executive.
4. None of the above: Ruled out because option 2 correctly states the standard the Court actually applied.

The Court settled on a middle path: satisfaction is justiciable, but only to check whether the material relied upon is relevant to the claimed urgency, not whether that material was sufficient in amount or weight.

Therefore, the correct answer is Is subject to judicial review with regard to the relevancy of the material on which such satisfaction is based.

Answer 17

Step 1: Understanding “ceases to operate”.
Art. 213(2) uses “ceases to operate” for ordinances post six weeks from reassembly or upon disapproval. The Court explained this phrase does not mean repeal, voidness, or temporary nature — it has its own constitutional connotation. 
Step 2: Role of Section 6, General Clauses Act.
Section 6 generally applies on repeal unless excluded. In KK Singh, the Court held that in absence of a savings clause in Art. 213, Section 6 does not automatically preserve rights from a lapsed ordinance. 
Step 3: Why all four statements are correct.
All four reflect the majority’s nuanced distinctions: i — Correct: Ceasing is different from voidness. ii — Correct: Different from temporary statutes enacted with fixed expiry. iii — Correct: Different from repeal of permanent law. iv — Correct: No saving without explicit provision. \[ \boxed{\text{All four statements correct as per KK Singh.}} \]

Answer 18

This question lists four separate propositions about what ceases to operate means for a lapsed ordinance, and asks which combination the majority in Krishna Kumar Singh accepted. Each statement is checked below.

1. i, ii, and iii are correct: This combination captures three of the four distinctions the majority actually drew, from voidness, from a temporary statute, and from a repealed statute, but leaves out the fourth point about the absence of a savings clause, which the Court treated as an equally important and separate holding, not a minor add-on.
2. ii and iii are correct: This drops statement (i) as well, but the Court was explicit that ceasing to operate is conceptually distinct from a law being void from inception; a void law never had legal existence, whereas an ordinance that ceases to operate did validly exist and function until the specified point.
3. i and iii are correct: This drops statement (ii), yet the Court also separately distinguished a lapsed ordinance from a temporary statute, since a temporary statute is designed from the outset with a fixed expiry built into its own text, unlike an ordinance whose cessation depends on external events like reassembly of the legislature.
4. All the above are correct: The majority judgment draws all four distinctions as separate, deliberate points: cessation is not voidness (i), not the expiry of a temporary statute (ii), not repeal of a permanent law (iii), and, absent an express savings clause in Article 213 itself, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act does not automatically step in to preserve rights and liabilities that arose under the lapsed ordinance (iv). Each of these four propositions appears independently in the judgment's reasoning.

Since the Court treated all four distinctions as separate and necessary parts of its reasoning on what ceases to operate means, none of the four statements can be safely dropped.

Therefore, the correct answer is All the above are correct.

Answer 19

Step 1: Legal effect of disapproval resolution.
Under Art. 213(2)(a), if the Legislature passes a resolution disapproving an ordinance, it shall cease to operate from the date of such resolution. Step 2: Nature of the resolution.
Since this outcome is mandated by the Constitution, the resolution is not merely an advisory opinion — it is binding and has statutory force. Step 3: Eliminating other options.
(B) is incorrect — it’s more than an opinion. (C) is incorrect — control of proceedings is irrelevant; effect is constitutional. (D) is incorrect — this is not delegated legislation but a constitutional check. \[ \boxed{\text{Statutory in nature, binding on Government.}} \]

Answer 20

The question asks how to characterise a legislative resolution disapproving an ordinance under Article 213(2)(a). Let's test each option against the actual constitutional consequence of such a resolution.

1. Statutory in nature and has binding effect upon the Government: Article 213(2)(a) itself states that once such a resolution is passed, the ordinance shall cease to operate from that date. Because the Constitution attaches this direct, automatic legal consequence to the resolution, the resolution is not a mere expression of view but an act with binding legal force built into the constitutional text itself.
2. A mere expression of the opinion of the House: A purely advisory opinion, like many resolutions passed on general policy matters, has no automatic legal consequence attached to it; the government remains free to act as it sees fit. Since disapproval here automatically ends the ordinance's operation without any further step, this resolution is doing far more than merely expressing an opinion.
3. A decision of the House relating to the control of its proceedings: Matters of control of proceedings concern how the House manages its own internal business, such as its rules of debate or discipline of members, and typically fall within the House's own internal privileges. A resolution disapproving an ordinance instead has an external, substantive legal effect on the validity of a piece of executive law-making, which is a different category altogether.
4. An exercise of delegated legislation: Delegated legislation is law made by an executive body under authority handed down by the legislature through a specific statute. A legislative resolution disapproving an ordinance is not the legislature delegating anything; if anything, it is the legislature reasserting its own supremacy over a piece of executive law-making, which is the opposite of delegation.

Because Article 213(2)(a) itself makes the ordinance automatically cease to operate on passage of the disapproving resolution, the resolution carries direct, binding legal force rather than being a mere opinion, an internal procedural matter, or delegated legislation.

Therefore, the correct answer is Statutory in nature and has binding effect upon the Government.