Two players \( A \) and \( B \) are playing a game. Player \( A \) has two available actions \( a_1 \) and \( a_2 \). Player \( B \) has two available actions \( b_1 \) and \( b_2 \). The payoff matrix arising from their actions is presented below:
Let \( p \) be the probability that player \( A \) plays action \( a_1 \) in the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the game.
Then the value of p is ________ (round off to one decimal place).
Step 1: Define the payoffs for each player.
The payoff matrix shows the payoffs for both players based on their choices:
When \( A \) chooses \( a_1 \) and \( B \) chooses \( b_1 \), the payoff is \((-1, 3)\),
When \( A \) chooses \( a_1 \) and \( B \) chooses \( b_2 \), the payoff is \((4, -1)\),
When \( A \) chooses \( a_2 \) and \( B \) chooses \( b_1 \), the payoff is \((3, -4)\),
When \( A \) chooses \( a_2 \) and \( B \) chooses \( b_2 \), the payoff is \((-2, 2)\).
Step 2: Set up the mixed strategy for \( A \) and \( B \).
Let \( p \) be the probability that player \( A \) plays \( a_1 \), and \( 1 - p \) be the probability that player \( A \) plays \( a_2 \). Let \( q \) be the probability that player \( B \) plays \( b_1 \), and \( 1 - q \) be the probability that player \( B \) plays \( b_2 \).
Step 3: Calculate the expected payoff for \( A \).
Player \( A \) will be indifferent between choosing \( a_1 \) and \( a_2 \) in the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, so we need to calculate the expected payoffs for \( A \) when playing \( a_1 \) and \( a_2 \) and set them equal. The expected payoff for \( A \) when playing \( a_1 \) is: \[ {Payoff for } a_1 = -1q + 4(1 - q) = -q + 4 - 4q = 4 - 5q \] The expected payoff for \( A \) when playing \( a_2 \) is: \[ {Payoff for } a_2 = 3q - 2(1 - q) = 3q - 2 + 2q = 5q - 2 \] To find the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, set these two expected payoffs equal: \[ 4 - 5q = 5q - 2 \] Solving for \( q \): \[ 4 + 2 = 5q + 5q \quad \Rightarrow \quad 6 = 10q \quad \Rightarrow \quad q = 0.6 \] Step 4: Find the value of \( p \).
In a Nash equilibrium, player \( A \) is indifferent between playing \( a_1 \) and \( a_2 \), meaning the expected payoffs for \( a_1 \) and \( a_2 \) should be equal. Therefore, we use the same condition for \( A \) to be indifferent, but now substitute \( q = 0.6 \). The expected payoff for \( A \) when playing \( a_1 \) is: \[ {Payoff for } a_1 = 4 - 5(0.6) = 4 - 3 = 1 \] The expected payoff for \( A \) when playing \( a_2 \) is: \[ {Payoff for } a_2 = 5(0.6) - 2 = 3 - 2 = 1 \] Since the expected payoffs are equal, the value of \( p \) does not affect the equilibrium in this case, and the value of \( p \) can be determined to be: \[ p = 0.5 \] Thus, the value of \( p \) is \( \boxed{0.5} \).
Here are two analogous groups, Group-I and Group-II, that list words in their decreasing order of intensity. Identify the missing word in Group-II.
Abuse \( \rightarrow \) Insult \( \rightarrow \) Ridicule
__________ \( \rightarrow \) Praise \( \rightarrow \) Appreciate
Eight students (P, Q, R, S, T, U, V, and W) are playing musical chairs. The figure indicates their order of position at the start of the game. They play the game by moving forward in a circle in the clockwise direction.
After the 1st round, the 4th student behind P leaves the game.
After the 2nd round, the 5th student behind Q leaves the game.
After the 3rd round, the 3rd student behind V leaves the game.
After the 4th round, the 4th student behind U leaves the game.
Who all are left in the game after the 4th round?

The 12 musical notes are given as \( C, C^\#, D, D^\#, E, F, F^\#, G, G^\#, A, A^\#, B \). Frequency of each note is \( \sqrt[12]{2} \) times the frequency of the previous note. If the frequency of the note C is 130.8 Hz, then the ratio of frequencies of notes F# and C is: