Question:
Principle: When a party to a contract has refused to perform, or disabled himself from performing, his promise in its entirety, the other party shall not put an end to the contract.
Facts: A engaged B on April 12 to enter his service on June 1, but on May 11, A wrote to B that his services would not be needed. On May 22, B joined C for employment.
Principle: When a party to a contract has refused to perform, or disabled himself from performing, his promise in its entirety, the other party shall not put an end to the contract.
Facts: A engaged B on April 12 to enter his service on June 1, but on May 11, A wrote to B that his services would not be needed. On May 22, B joined C for employment.
Facts: A engaged B on April 12 to enter his service on June 1, but on May 11, A wrote to B that his services would not be needed. On May 22, B joined C for employment.
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In contract law, unilateral termination by one party without mutual consent or legal grounds is not valid.
Updated On: Jul 15, 2026
- B cannot put the contract to an end.
- B can put the contract to an end.
- C can put his contract with B to an end.
- A must pay damages to B.
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The Correct Option is A
Approach Solution - 1
According to the principle, when one party refuses to perform their obligations under the contract, the other party cannot unilaterally terminate the contract. In this case, A communicated that B’s services would no longer be needed, but B still went ahead and joined C. As per the principle, B should have waited for the contract to naturally conclude or have it terminated by mutual agreement rather than simply abandoning it.
Thus, the correct answer is (A). B cannot put the contract to an end without legal grounds.
Option (B) is incorrect because the refusal of A does not grant B the right to end the contract. Option (C) is incorrect because the issue at hand involves A and B, and C is not a party in the original contract. Option (D) is incorrect because there is no immediate obligation for A to pay damages unless a breach occurs.
Thus, the correct answer is (A). B cannot put the contract to an end without legal grounds.
Option (B) is incorrect because the refusal of A does not grant B the right to end the contract. Option (C) is incorrect because the issue at hand involves A and B, and C is not a party in the original contract. Option (D) is incorrect because there is no immediate obligation for A to pay damages unless a breach occurs.
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Approach Solution -2
This principle departs from the ordinary common-sense reaction to a repudiation, so it's important to apply exactly what the rule says rather than what one might expect. Let's work through each option.
- B cannot put the contract to an end: The principle states that when a party has refused or disabled himself from performing his promise in its entirety, the other party shall not put an end to the contract. A's letter on May 11 refusing B's services is precisely such a refusal to perform in entirety. Applying the principle exactly as worded, that refusal by A does not give B the power to terminate the contract himself; the rule expressly withholds that power from B.
- B can put the contract to an end: This is the opposite of what the principle says. Even though A's May 11 letter looks like a clear repudiation that might ordinarily justify termination, this specific principle bars the other party, B, from treating the refusal as grounds to end the contract.
- C can put his contract with B to an end: The principle in the facts concerns the contract between A and B; C's separate arrangement with B is a different contract altogether, and nothing in the given principle speaks to C's rights over that separate engagement.
- A must pay damages to B: The principle as stated addresses only whether the contract can be brought to an end by the other party, it says nothing about a damages obligation, so this option introduces a remedy the principle doesn't establish.
Since the principle specifically denies the non-repudiating party the power to end the contract upon the other's refusal to perform in entirety, B does not get to treat A's May 11 letter as terminating the engagement.
Therefore, the correct answer is B cannot put the contract to an end.
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Approach Solution -3
This principle has an unusual structure worth isolating before applying it: it identifies a party who has refused to perform in entirety, and then it bars the other party, not the refusing one, from ending the contract. Checking the facts against exactly that two-step structure.
- B cannot put the contract to an end: A's May 11 letter, telling B his services would not be needed, is a refusal to perform in entirety, satisfying the first step. The second step of the principle then bars the other party, B, from ending the contract in response to that refusal, which is precisely the outcome this option states.
- B can put the contract to an end: This assumes the second step runs the opposite way, granting the non-refusing party a right to terminate. But the principle's second step withholds that power from the other party rather than granting it, so this option inverts what the rule actually does.
- C can put his contract with B to an end: The two-step structure here is built around the A-B contract specifically, A's refusal and B's resulting position. C's separate engagement with B is a different contract altogether, one the given principle doesn't address at all.
- A must pay damages to B: The principle's two steps concern only whether the contract can be ended, they say nothing about a damages remedy, so this option introduces a consequence the structure doesn't provide for.
Running A's May 11 letter through the principle's two-step structure, a refusal to perform in entirety followed by a bar on the other party ending the contract, lands on B being unable to terminate.
Therefore, the correct answer is B cannot put the contract to an end.
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Top CLAT Legal Studies Questions
- The Indian legal system places a significant emphasis on protecting the rights and welfare of children. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, is a vital piece of legislation in this regard. It is designed to ensure that children in conflict with the law receive special care, protection, and treatment, with the ultimate goal of their rehabilitation and reintegration into society.
One of the key provisions of the Act is the establishment of Juvenile Justice Boards (JJBs) at the district level. These boards consist of a Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of the first class and two social workers, at least one of whom should be a woman. The primary function of the JJB is to determine the age of the juvenile, the circumstances in which the offense was committed, and whether the juvenile should be sent to a special home or released on probation.
The Act makes a clear distinction between a “child in conflict with the law” and a “child in need of care and protection.” A child in conflict with the law is one who has committed an offense, while a child in need of care and protection is a child who is vulnerable or at risk and requires special care and support.
The Act introduces a unique approach to dealing with children who are in conflict with the law. For children between the ages of 16 and 18, who have committed heinous offenses, they can be tried as adults, subject to a preliminary assessment by the Juvenile Justice Board. This assessment considers the child’s mental and physical capacity to commit such an offense. If the board determines that the child should be tried as an adult, the case is transferred to the regular criminal courts.
The Act also places restrictions on the publication of information that could lead to the identification of a juvenile offender. This is done to protect the privacy and future prospects of the child. - In India, the legal landscape surrounding online defamation is a subject of significant interest and debate. With the rise of social media, and online platforms, cases of online defamation have become increasingly common. Defamation refers to making false statements about someone that harm their reputation. Online defamation includes defamatory statements made on the internet, including social media, blogs, forums, and other online platforms.
One critical aspect of online defamation is determining the liability of intermediaries, such as social media platforms or websites, for defamatory content posted by users. Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, provides a safe harbor for intermediaries, stating that they are not liable for third-party content if they act as intermediaries and follow due diligence in removing or disabling access to the content once notified.
However, determining whether an intermediary has fulfilled its due diligence obligations can be complex. The Indian judiciary has been actively interpreting this provision. One significant case is the Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, in which the Supreme Court clarified that intermediaries are required to act upon a valid court order or government directive for content removal, not upon private complaints.
The court also emphasized that the intermediaries should not take a proactive role in monitoring content, as this could potentially infringe on free speech. While the law provides a safe harbor, it does not absolve intermediaries from their responsibilities.
Online defamation cases often involve a balancing act between the right to freedom of expression and the right to reputation. The Indian legal system requires a careful examination of the content, context, and intent of the statements to determine whether they qualify as defamatory. Additionally, the plaintiff in an online defamation case must prove that the statement was false, damaging to their reputation, and made with a degree of fault, such as negligence or actual malice. - The Editors Guild of India has expressed concern over the “draconian provisions” of the Press and Registration of Periodicals (PRP) Bill, 2023, that can have an adverse impact on freedom of the press.
The Guild added: “Editors Guild of India would like the proposed bill to ensure that publishing of news in India remains free of encumbrances and intrusive checks on publishers by the Registrar, and that the primary emphasis of the Registrar and the PRP remains ‘registration’ and not ‘regulation’, as the latter has the potential of restricting freedom of the press.”
“In the definitions section, the term ‘specified authority’ gives power to government agencies beyond the Press Registrar, to conduct the functions of the Registrar, which could even include police and other law enforcement agencies. Given the intrusive, expansive, and vague nature of powers that the bill in any case allows to the Press Registrar, the power to further delegate this power to other government agencies including law enforcement agencies is deeply distressing,” the Guild said.
The statement says sections 4(1) and 11(4) allow the Registrar to deny the right to bring out a periodical and cancel the certificate of registration of a periodical to persons convicted of “terrorist act or unlawful activity” or “for having done anything against the security of the State”.
“Interestingly, the PRB Act, 1867, had no such provisions. Given the liberal and arbitrary use of UAPA (which is the basis for defining ‘terrorist act’ and ‘unlawful activity’), as well as other criminal laws, including sedition, against journalists and media organisations to suppress freedom of speech, the Guild is deeply concerned by the introduction of these new provisions, and the way they can be misused to deny the right to bring out news publications to persons who are critical of governments,” it said.
Among the other worrisome provisions listed by the Guild is Section 6(b), which gives power to the Press Registrar (as well as any other “specified authority”) to enter the premises of a periodical to “inspect or take copies of the relevant records or documents or ask any questions necessary for obtaining any information required to be furnished”
[Extracted, with edits and revisions from “Editors Guild of India expresses concern over draconian provisions of the Press and Registration of Periodicals Bills, 2023” published in The Telegraph dated 07-08-2023] - There are some advantages of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDPA), 2023. For instance, for the first time, personal data belonging to or identifying children will have to be classified separately, with such data carrying a greater degree of security and privacy. The law also seeks to reduce the rate and impact of data breaches targeting Indian businesses. The Digital Personal Data Protection law, however, goes a step beyond by imposing penalties for cases where data is breached as a result of a lack of implementation of adequate security controls. However, it could be said that the law isn’t balanced, because it provides wide exemptions to the processing of personal data to the government. For instance, data can be processed “in the interest of prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of any offence … in India.” These kinds of exemptions are dangerous as they stand to legitimise widespread and unwarranted collection of data under the guise that such collection and processing may ultimately be useful for preventing or deterring a crime.
Security agencies will have significant authority to collect and retain any data whatsoever, as is typically the case with exemptions relating to the maintenance of sovereignty, integrity, security of the state, preservation of public order, prevention of offences, and incitement to commit offences. The law also exempts processing of personal data held outside of India. The government is also exempt from being required to delete any data that it possesses, regardless of the purpose it may have been collected for, on the request of an individual, or by way of a prescribed data retention period.
The government is not bound by purpose limitations, allowing data collected for one specified purpose be used for a new, incompatible purpose, which stands in contrast to the regulations imposed on businesses.
[Extracted, with edits and revisions from “Digital Personal Data Protection Law Raises Questions About Consistency with Right to Privacy Ruling” published in The Wire dated 22-08-2023] - The Supreme Court on September 1 held that a child born of a void or voidable marriage can inherit the parent’s share in a joint Hindu family property. A three-judge Bench headed by Chief Justice of India D.Y. Chandrachud however clarified that such a child would not be entitled to rights in or to the property of any other person in the family. A voidable marriage is one that is made invalid by the husband or wife through a decree. A void marriage is invalid at its very inception.
Chief Justice Chandrachud said the first step to the inheritance of a child from a void or voidable marriage would be to ascertain the exact share of his parent in the ancestral property. This could be done by means of conducting a “notional partition” of the ancestral property and calculating how much of the property the parent would have got immediately before his death. Once the share of the deceased parent in the property is ascertained through such a notional partition, his heirs, including his children by means of void or voidable marriage, would be entitled to their portions in the share.
The Chief Justice said that Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act has statutorily conferred legitimacy to children born out of void or voidable marriages. In fact, Chief Justice Chandrachud pointed out that Section 16(3) stipulates that children from void and voidable marriages would have a right to their parents’ property. The court said the intent of granting legitimacy to such children in the Hindu Marriage Act should also be reflected in the Hindu Succession Act, which governs inheritance. Children from void or voidable marriages come within the ambit of “legitimate kinship” and cannot be regarded as illegitimate by the Hindu Succession Act when it comes to inheritance.
The case before the three-judge Bench was focused on an amended provision in the Hindu Marriage Act, Section 16(3). The case was referred to a larger Bench in 2011 after a Division Bench of the apex court refused to follow past precedents and championed the cause of children born out of illegitimate marriages.
“With changing social norms of legitimacy in every society, including ours, what was illegitimate in the past may be legitimate today. The concept of legitimacy stems from social consensus, in the shaping of which various social groups play a vital role,” Justice Ganguly, who authored the 2011 judgment, had observed.
During the hearings on the reference, Chief Justice Chandrachud had agreed with the Division Bench’s findings that children from void and voidable marriages had rights over the property, whether self-acquired or ancestral, of their parents
[Extracted with edits and revisions from “Children from void, voidable marriages entitled to parents’ share in ancestral property: Supreme Court”, by Krishnadas Rajagopal, The Hindu, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/children-from-void-voidable-marriages-arelegitimate-can-claim-rights-in-parents-properties-sc/article67259229.ece ]
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Top CLAT Contract Law Questions
- It is essential to the creation of a contract that both parties should agree to the same thing in the same sense. Mutual consent, which should also be a free consent, is the sine qua non of a valid agreement and one of its essential elements is that a thing is understood in the same sense by a party as is understood by the other. Not only consent, but free consent is provided in Section 10 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 to be necessary to the complete validity of a contract. Consent is free when it works without obstacles to impede its exercise. Where there is no consent or no real and certain object of consent, there can be no contract at all. Where there is consent, but not free consent, there is generally a contract voidable at the option of the party whose consent was not free. A general averment that consent was not freely obtained is not enough, and it is necessary to set up one of the vitiating elements such as fraud which includes, false assertion, active concealment, promise without intention of performing it, any other deceptive act, or any act declared as fraudulent. In order to constitute fraud, the act should have been done by the party to the contract, or by any other person with his connivance, or by his agent and with intent to deceive the other party thereto or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract. There is no duty upon parties to speak about facts likely to affect the other party’s consent to the contract and mere silence does not amount to fraud, unless the circumstances of the case show that there is duty to speak, or silence is, in itself equivalent to speech. On the other hand, misrepresentation falls into three categories: (i) a statement of fact, which if false, would be misrepresentation if the maker believes it to be true, but which is not justified by the information he possesses; (ii) any breach of duty which gains an advantage to the person committing it by misleading another to his prejudice, there being no intention to deceive; and (iii) causing a party to an agreement to make a mistake as to the substance of the thing which is the subject of the agreement, even though done innocently.
- Section 4 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 reads as follows:
Communication when complete - The communication of a proposal is complete when it comes to the knowledge of the person to whom it is made. The communication of an acceptance is complete, - as against the proposer, when it is put in a course of transmission to him so as to be out of the power of the acceptor; as against the acceptor, when it comes to the knowledge of the proposer.
Thus, the provision makes no difference in the position of the offeror. The offeror becomes bound when a properly addressed and adequately stamped letter of acceptance is posted. The acceptor does not become bound by merely posting his acceptance. He becomes bound only when his acceptance comes to the knowledge of the proposer. The contract is concluded at the place from where the proposal is accepted and communication of acceptance is dispatched, i.e., the address at which the proposal was sent. The court at that place would have jurisdiction to entertain a cause of action under the contract. This rule, that the communication of an acceptance is complete as against the proposer when the letter is posted, is probably intended to apply only when the parties are at a distance and they communicate by post. “Where, however, the parties are in each other’s presence or, though separated in space”, they are in direct communication, as, for example, by telephone, no contract will arise until the offeror receives the notification of acceptance - It is a well settled principle of contract law that parties cannot by contract exclude the jurisdiction of all courts. Such a contract would constitute an agreement in restraint of legal proceedings and contravene Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. However, where parties to a contract confer jurisdiction on one amongst multiple courts having proper jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts, the parties cannot be said to have ousted the jurisdiction of all courts. Such a contract is valid and will bind the parties to a civil action. Section 28. Agreements in restraint of legal proceedings, void-Every agreement, -
(a) by which any party thereto is restricted absolutely from enforcing his rights under or in respect of any contract, by the usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunals, or which limits the time within which he may thus enforce his rights; or
(b) which extinguishes the rights of any party thereto, or discharges any party thereto, from any liability, under or in respect of any contract on the expiry of a specified period so as to restrict any party from enforcing his rights, is void to the extent.
Parties cannot by agreement confer jurisdiction on a court which lacks the jurisdiction to adjudicate. But where several courts would have jurisdiction to try the subject matter of the dispute, they can stipulate that a suit be brought exclusively before one of the several courts, to the exclusion of the others. - The COVID-19 pandemic has taken the entire world hostage in less than four months, and the global economy has been hit the hardest with governments across the globe implementing stringent policies including lockdown to control the coronavirus outbreak. The pandemic today presents unprecedented challenges and impediments to businesses in conducting their normal operations. The lockdown across the world has caused delays in the performance of contracts and transactions. Now, the question that arises is whether the current situation can enable parties to a contract to alter their obligations with non-compliance of terms neither being regarded as a "default committed by any party" nor a "breach of contract"? There are certain well-accepted practices for dealing with such extraordinary situations in commercial transactions by the inclusion of force majeure & material adverse effect (MAE) clauses. Determination of the types of circumstances so covered by the force majeure clause contained in a contract is essential. Provisions of force majeure often cover natural disasters like hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes as "acts of God." Other covered events may include war, terrorism, civil disorder, fire, disease medical epidemics or by reasons of applicable laws or regulations. Broadly, the Courts have interpreted the term "Force Majeure" as an event that can neither be anticipated nor controlled by either of the contracting parties. A force majeure clause applies in the context of ongoing contractual arrangements, whereas, an MAE or material adverse change (MAC) clause applies to the allocation of risk in transactions before their closure or completion. Pandemic and related consequences such as government action is a type of event covered by a force majeure clause, however, its impact on the affected party's ability to perform its contractual obligations may vary depending upon contractual terms. It is common for force majeure clauses to specify the impact that the event or circumstances in question must have, in order for the clause to be triggered. References may be made, for example, to the event or circumstances having "prevented", "hindered" or "delayed" performance. These terms require different levels of impact on performance before a party can claim recourse to these clauses. In other words, the force majeure and MAC clauses act as an exception to what would otherwise be treated as a breach of contract. Certain contracts may state that, if a force majeure clause is applied, the contract may automatically be terminated. On the other hand, some contracts may even state that the duty to fulfil the contractual obligation may be suspended for a certain period of time and if the force majeure event is not curbed or treated even after such time, then eventually the contract may be terminated. Though there cannot be a one-size-fits-all solution to this question, and it depends upon how the force majeure clause is worded in a specific contract; and in the absence of the same, applicable laws related to the same will be required to be taken into consideration.
- The Contract Act 1872 deals with contract law in India, its rights, duties, and exceptions arising out of it. Section 2(h) of the Act gives us the definition of a contract, which is simply an agreement enforceable by law. To understand the difference between void agreements and voidable contracts it is important to talk about sections 2(h), 2(a). 20), 2(d), 14, 16 (3) and 15,24-28 of the Indian Contact Act. Void agreements are fundamentally invalid making them unenforceable by default. These agreements cannot be fulfilled as they consist of illegal elements, and they cannot be enforced even after subjecting it to both parties. However, in the case of voidable contract, the agreement is initially enforceable, but it is later on denied at the option of either of the parties due to various reasons.
Unless rejected by a party, this contract will remain valid and enforceable. The party who is at the disadvantage due to any circumstance applicable to the contract has the ability to render the agreement void. A void agreement is void ab initio making it impossible to rectify any defects in it while voidable contracts can be rectified. In case of a void agreement, neither of the parties is subject to any compensation for any losses but voidable contracts have some remedies.
A valid agreement forms a contract that may again be either valid or voidable. The primary difference between a void agreement and voidable contract is that a void agreement cannot be converted into a contract.
(Extracted with edits from A Comparative Study of Voidable Contracts and Void Agreements)
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- In the realm of contemporary literature, the interplay between character and setting is a nuanced dance that shapes the narrative’s essence. The setting, often described with painstaking detail, becomes more than a backdrop; it becomes a character, influencing the plot and character development.
Consider, for instance, the barren expanse of the desert in Jhumpa Lahiri’s The Namesake. The arid landscape mirrors the sense of isolation felt by the protagonist, Gogol, as he navigates his identity crisis in a foreign land. The relentless sun and vast sands are not mere descriptions; they are the silent witnesses to his inner turmoil.
On the other end of the literary spectrum, there is Arundhati Roy’s The God of Small Things. The lush, vibrant Kerala backwaters are not just the setting; they are a character woven into the fabric of the story. The teeming, humid landscape reflects the complex web of human relationships and secrets that unravel in the narrative. This interplay is not confined to contemporary literature alone. In Shakespeare’s timeless tragedy Macbeth, the eerie and foreboding setting of the Scottish moors casts a dark shadow over the characters’ actions. The moors, shrouded in mist and mystery, serve as an ever-present omen of the impending tragedy. - The crisis of justice that is the subject matter of discussion in the media today is in fact the crisis of “justice for the middle class”. The main difference between India and the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries is that whereas the middle class in these countries has reasonable access to justice, in India it does not. A vocal and powerful middle class has emerged in India since 1991. It is demanding reasonable access to justice. Much of the judicial reform effort will help meet this demand…
The question of justice for the poor is, however, an altogether different challenge. No country in the world has been able to secure justice for the poor. Most of the jails of the richest countries are filled with the poorest. The “masses” are more often victims of the criminal justice system than of crime. In India as well, jails are almost exclusively filled with the poor. The civil justice system is hardly accessible to them. They are often victimised by lawyers, touts and court staff. They are docket-excluded, a new type of untouchability. The language and the logic—and the colonial and feudal culture—of the judicial system are alien to them. It rarely takes cognisance of their needs and interests.
Their main concern, therefore, is to escape the attention of the justice system, criminal and civil. A landless Dalit person in the interior of Madhya Pradesh once gave me an insightful definition of a court from the perspective of the masses: “A court is a place where you are forcibly taken by the police to be punished; no one goes to a court.” In contrast, many lawyers and judges colloquially define a court as “a temple of justice where rights are protected”.
These sharply divergent visions mean that justice for one section is often injustice for another. Protecting the livelihood of traditional taxi and auto drivers from predatory pricing by corporate app-based taxi providers by imaginatively using the available tools of law to delay their incursion would be seen by the rich and by sections of the middle class as a failure of the judicial system, and possibly as also resulting in a downgrading of the “ease of doing business” measure. However, the masses would see such a judicial intervention as strong evidence of a good justice system. Although the conflict over competing visions of the nation and conflicting demands from social and economic segments have confined judicial reform of judicial administration mainly to “neutral” areas such as process reform, procedural law, technology, planning and court and case management, judge strength, and the workload of judges, there has been considerable improvement in these areas, and the judicial system has improved its performance.
[Extracted, with edits, from “Justice and the Two Ideas of India”, by G. Mohan Gopal, Frontline] - Everything she wanted was here, at Carignano, in Kasauli. Here, on the ridge of the mountain, in this quiet house. It was the place, and the time of life, that she had wanted and prepared for all her life-as she realized on the first day at Carignano, with a great, cool flowering of relief - and at last she had it. She wanted no one and nothing else. Whatever else came, or happened here, would be an unwelcome intrusion and distraction. This she tried to convey to the plodding postman with a cold and piercing stare from the height of the ridge onto his honest bull back. Unfortunately, he did not look up at her on the hilltop but stared stolidly down at the dust piling onto his shoes as he plodded on. A bullock-man, an oafish ox, she thought bitterly. She stepped backwards into the garden and the wind suddenly billowed up and threw the pine branches about as though to curtain her. She was grey, tall and thin and her silk sari made a sweeping, shivering sound and she fancied she could merge with the pine trees and be mistaken for one. To be a tree, no more and no less, was all she was prepared to undertake.
What pleased and satisfied her so, here at Carignano, was its barrenness. This was the chief virtue of all Kasauli of course-its starkness. It had rocks, it had pines, it had light and air. In every direction there was a sweeping view - to the north, of the mountains, to the south, of the plains. Occasionally an eagle swam through this clear unobstructed mass of light and air, that was all. And Carignano, her home on the ridge, had no more than that. Why should it? The sun shone on its white walls. Its windows were open the ones facing north opened on to the blue waves of the Himalayas flowing out and up to the line of ice and snow sketched upon the sky, while those that faced south looked down the plunging cliff to the plain stretching out, flat and sere to the blurred horizon.
Yes, there were some apricot trees close to the house. There were clumps of iris that had finished blooming. There was the kitchen with a wing of smoke lifting out of its chimney and a stack of wood outside its door. But these were incidental, almost unimportant.
[Extracted, with edits and revisions, from “Fire on the Mountain” by Anita Desai] - English literature is a vast and diverse field that has left an indelible mark on the world of letters. From the eloquent plays of William Shakespeare to the complex novels of Jane Austen and the profound poetry of William Wordsworth, English literature offers a window into the human experience. One of the luminaries of English literature is William Shakespeare, often hailed as the greatest playwright in the history of English language. His works, including Hamlet, Macbeth, and Romeo and Juliet, are celebrated for their exploration of human nature, love, ambition, and tragedy. His characters, such as the tormented Hamlet and the star-crossed lovers Romeo and Juliet, continue to captivate readers and audiences worldwide.
The 19th century ushered in a new era of literary giants. Jane Austen’s novels, such as Pride and Prejudice and Sense and Sensibility, provide incisive social commentary through the lens of wit and romance. Austen’s heroines, like Elizabeth Bennet and Elinor Dashwood, remain beloved literary figures known for their intelligence and resilience. The Romantic era brought forth poets like William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who celebrated * 8 UG the beauty of nature and the emotional intensity of the individual. Wordsworth’s ‘‘I Wandered Lonely as a Cloud’’ and Coleridge’s ‘‘The Rime of the Ancient Mariner’’ are testament to the power of the written words to evoke profound emotions and imagery. Moving towards 20th century, English literature continued to evolve. Virginia Woolf’s ground-breaking novel Mrs. Dalloway explored the inner thoughts and lives of its characters with a modernist narrative style. Dystopian visions, as seen in George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four provided stark warnings about the dangers of totalitarianism and the erosion of individual freedom.
Today, English literature is a global phenomenon, transcending borders and languages. Indian authors like Arundhati Roy, with her novel The God of Small Things, have won prestigious international literary awards. The book not only explores intricate family dynamics but also delves into the broader socio-political landscape of India. In summary, English literature is a testament to the enduring power of storytelling and the written word. It encompasses an array of authors, themes, and styles that continue to captivate and inspire readers across the world. - On the evening of the 10th, General Dyer arrived at Amritsar, and the Deputy-Commissioner handed over the civil power to him. He issued a proclamation by word of mouth that no meetings should be held. Two days later, after there had been no sort of riot, nor murder, General Dyer heard that a meeting was to be held at the Jallianwala Bagh. He proceeded there with about fifty troops, half British, half Indian, and a certain number of Ghurkas, armed with their kukris. The Jallianwala Bagh is an open space, half a mile square, which has one entry wide enough for three persons. The troops got in and lined up on a mound of debris. The walls, seven feet high, and the surrounding houses enclosed the people. There were, too, three alleys through which the people might have been able to pass. Within thirty seconds of the troops getting in, General Dyer gave orders to fire, and the crowd of people, estimated at anything from 5,000 to 20,000, who were sitting on the ground peacefully listening to the mob oratory, were fired on. The result of the troops’ fire into the mass of people we do not know. But we do know that Dyer’s own estimate of the casualties resulting from ten minutes continual individual firing, was 400 to 500 killed and 1,500 wounded. The people were not able to escape. They were people who had not offered any violence and who had not been warned. These people were shot down. After ten minutes, the ammunition was exhausted and the troops marched off, and they left 1,500 wounded there. There were men lying there for two days, dying of thirst, eating the ground, bleeding to death and nobody to look after them. Those who lived nearby came and carried away some of the wounded from the heap of dead and dying, but the unfortunate country people died there miserably of their wounds. This is what is done in 1919 in British India…
Centuries hence you will find Indian children brought up to this spot, just as they visit now the Cawnpore Well, and you can imagine the feelings of these Indians for generations over this terrible business.
[Col. Wedgwood, MP, speaking in the British Parliament, 22 December 1919]
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