Question

Rani and Shiva would like to opt for surrogacy. They have been married for 6 years. Rani is aged 51 and Shiva is aged 53. Both Rani and Shiva have built successful business empires. They are now working together on a joint initiative. Due to the demanding nature of their work, they have not thought about children previously. However, they are now keen to have a child via surrogacy. Are Rani and Shiva eligible for surrogacy under the SRA?

• A. Yes, because they have been married for more than 5 years.
• B. Yes, because they have financial capacity to bring up a child.
• C. No, because they do not fall within the legal requirements of intending parents.
• D. No, because they are not an infertile couple.
• A. Statement iii
• B. Statements ii and iii
• C. Statements ii, iii, and iv
• D. Statements i, iii, and iv
• A. Yes, because they have no biological children.
• B. No, because they have an adopted child.
• C. Yes, because their adopted child has been diagnosed with Striker’s Syndrome.
• D. Yes, because their right to procreation and parenthood is protected under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.
• A. Yes, because Kishore and Noor are bound by the contract under the ICA.
• B. Yes, because the intending parents and the surrogate meet the eligibility requirements under the SRA.
• C. No, because the surrogate meets the eligibility requirements under the SRA.
• D. No, because SRA allows only altruistic surrogacy, so the contract is not valid under the ICA.
• A. The non-discrimination clause does not explicitly mention sexual orientation.
• B. Discrimination on the basis of sex could include discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
• C. The non-discrimination clause is not restricted to explicitly mentioned grounds.
• D. Surrogacy is restricted under the SRA to married couples, and only heterosexual couples can get married.

Answer 1

The Correct Option is C

Step 1 (Surrogacy eligibility under SRA).
The Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 specifies that only legally married Indian couples, who are infertile, are eligible for surrogacy. The couple must also meet specific age and marital requirements.
Step 2 (Rani and Shiva’s situation).
Rani and Shiva, though married for more than five years, are not infertile, which disqualifies them from eligibility under the SRA.
Step 3 (Conclusion).
Rani and Shiva are not eligible for surrogacy because they do not meet the infertility requirement under the SRA.
\[ \boxed{\text{No, because they do not fall within the legal requirements of intending parents. (Option C)}} \]

Answer 2

The Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 sets out several conditions an intending couple must meet before they can access surrogacy: legal marriage, a minimum of five years of marriage, a set age band (husband 26-55, wife 23-50), and infertility. Rani and Shiva's facts need to be checked against all of these, not just one.

1. Option A (married more than 5 years): True, but this is only one of several conditions. Meeting the marriage-duration requirement does not mean every other requirement is also met, so this option is incomplete as a basis for eligibility.
2. Option B (financial capacity to raise a child): The SRA's eligibility conditions are about marital status, age, and infertility, not about wealth or the ability to financially support a child. This is not a recognised ground at all.
3. Option C (do not fall within the legal requirements of intending parents): Rani is 51, which is above the SRA's upper age limit of 50 for a wife, so the couple already fails the age condition. On top of that, nothing in the facts shows they are infertile; they simply say they had not thought about children because of work. Since more than one condition is unmet, this option captures the real, complete picture of why they are ineligible.
4. Option D (not an infertile couple): This is true as far as it goes, since infertility is never established on the facts, but it only addresses one of the two problems. It leaves out the separate and equally disqualifying issue of Rani's age exceeding the 50-year cap.

Because Rani and Shiva miss both the wife's age limit and the infertility requirement, the accurate description is that they simply do not meet the SRA's overall eligibility conditions for intending parents, not just one isolated condition.

Therefore, the correct answer is No, because they do not fall within the legal requirements of intending parents.

Answer 3

Step 1 (Eligibility requirements for surrogate).
Under the SRA, a surrogate mother must meet specific criteria. She should be a close relative, married with at least one child of her own, aged between 25 and 35, and have been a surrogate only once in her life.
Step 2 (Geeta’s situation).
- Statement ii: While Geeta is married, the requirement is for her to be a close relative, which makes this requirement unnecessary. - Statement iii: Geeta has been a surrogate more than once, which violates the requirement that a surrogate can only be a surrogate once.
Step 3 (Conclusion).
Geeta is ineligible based on her being a surrogate twice. Statements ii and iii are false.
\[ \boxed{\text{Statements ii and iii (Option B)}} \]

Answer 4

The SRA sets four conditions for a surrogate: she must be a close relative of the intending couple, married with a child of her own, aged between 25 and 35, and must not have acted as a surrogate more than once before. Geeta is Rani's sister, 29, married with one child, and has already been a surrogate twice. Each of the four statements needs to be checked against exactly what it claims, not just against the final outcome.

1. Statement i (close relative): Geeta is indeed Rani's sister, and close relative is one full, standalone condition under the SRA. Stating that this condition is met is accurate, so this statement is true.
2. Statement ii (married): The actual SRA condition is not simply married, it is married and has at least one child of her own. By reducing the requirement to just being married and leaving out the child component, this statement misstates what the condition actually is, even though Geeta happens to satisfy the fuller condition too. Because it inaccurately frames the requirement, this statement is false.
3. Statement iii (surrogate twice, now eligible): The SRA allows a woman to be a surrogate only once in her life. Geeta has already done it twice, so she is disqualified on this ground alone, regardless of meeting every other condition. Calling her eligible here is simply wrong, so this statement is false.
4. Statement iv (aged 29): The age bracket under the SRA is 25 to 35, and 29 falls cleanly within that range. This is a complete and accurate statement of the age condition being met, so it is true.

Statements i and iv correctly and completely describe conditions Geeta satisfies, while statement ii understates what married actually requires and statement iii wrongly treats her second surrogacy as acceptable.

Therefore, the correct answer is Statements ii and iii.

Answer 5

Step 1 (Eligibility under SRA).
The SRA prohibits surrogacy for couples who already have a biological or adopted child, unless the child suffers from a life-threatening disorder or fatal illness.
Step 2 (Application to Joseph and Neena).
Since Maya, their adopted child, is diagnosed with a fatal illness, Joseph and Neena qualify for surrogacy under the Act.
Step 3 (Conclusion).
Joseph and Neena are eligible for surrogacy under the SRA due to their adopted child’s condition.
\[ \boxed{\text{Yes, because their adopted child has been diagnosed with Striker’s Syndrome. (Option C)}} \]

Answer 6

The SRA generally bars couples who already have a child, biological or adopted, from accessing surrogacy, but it carves out an exception where that existing child suffers from a life-threatening disorder or fatal illness. Joseph and Neena have an adopted daughter, Maya, diagnosed with a progressively fatal condition. Let's test each option against this exception.

1. Option A (no biological children): This misses the point of the bar entirely; the SRA's restriction covers both biological and adopted children, so simply having no biological child does not clear them, since Maya, their adopted daughter, still counts.
2. Option B (they have an adopted child): True as a fact, and this is exactly why the general bar would normally apply to them. But this option stops at the general rule and ignores the exception that applies on these facts, so it is not the complete or correct answer.
3. Option C (adopted child diagnosed with Striker's Syndrome): Maya's condition causes progressive neurological deterioration with a real chance of death, which is precisely the kind of life-threatening or fatal illness the SRA exception is written for. This takes Joseph and Neena out of the general bar and back into eligibility.
4. Option D (Article 21 right to procreation and parenthood): Reproductive autonomy is indeed discussed as a constitutional value in the surrounding commentary, but the SRA itself is a specific statute with its own conditions; eligibility here turns on satisfying the statutory exception, not on invoking a broad constitutional right that sits outside the Act's own text.

It is Maya's diagnosis, not the absence of a biological child or a constitutional argument, that lifts the SRA's usual bar in this specific case.

Therefore, the correct answer is Yes, because their adopted child has been diagnosed with Striker's Syndrome.

Answer 7

Step 1 (Review of Surrogacy Regulation Act).
Under the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021, commercial surrogacy is banned in India. The SRA allows only altruistic surrogacy, which means the surrogate cannot receive any payment other than medical expenses and prescribed expenses.
Step 2 (Review of the contract).
Since Kishore and Noor are required to remunerate the surrogate with ₹2 lakh, this contract is commercial, violating the provisions of the SRA. Such a contract is not valid under the Indian Contract Act, as it is prohibited under the SRA.
Step 3 (Conclusion).
The surrogate will not succeed in demanding payment as the contract violates the provisions of the SRA.
\[ \boxed{\text{No, because SRA allows only altruistic surrogacy, so the contract is not valid under the ICA. (Option D)}} \]

Answer 8

Kishore and Noor signed a contract promising the surrogate ₹2 lakh per child, on top of covering her medical expenses. The SRA only permits altruistic surrogacy, where the surrogate can receive medical and prescribed expenses but no fee, reward, or payment beyond that. The question is whether the surrogate can go to court to enforce the ₹2 lakh promise.

1. Option A (bound by the contract under the ICA): The Indian Contract Act does bind parties to their agreements, but only where the agreement is itself lawful. A contract for something the law prohibits cannot be enforced just because it was signed, in writing, and witnessed; those formalities do not cure an illegal object.
2. Option B (both parties meet SRA eligibility, so it succeeds): Kishore and Noor being eligible intending parents, and the surrogate being an eligible surrogate, is a separate question from whether the specific payment term in their contract is lawful. Meeting eligibility does not make an otherwise banned commercial payment enforceable.
3. Option C (surrogate meets SRA eligibility, so she fails): This option reaches the right result for the wrong reason; the surrogate's own eligibility has nothing to do with why the ₹2 lakh claim fails. The real problem is the nature of the payment itself, not her personal qualification.
4. Option D (only altruistic surrogacy is allowed, so the contract is invalid under the ICA): The ₹2 lakh is plainly a fee for the surrogacy, not a medical or prescribed expense, which makes it commercial surrogacy, something the SRA bans outright. Because the ICA treats a contract as invalid if it is prohibited by another law, this payment clause cannot be enforced in court.

The surrogate will not succeed, not because of her own qualifications, but because the payment she is suing over is exactly the kind of commercial arrangement the SRA does not permit, which drags the contract term down with it under the ICA.

Therefore, the correct answer is No, because SRA allows only altruistic surrogacy, so the contract is not valid under the ICA.

Answer 9

Step 1 (Non-discrimination clause).
The Constitution’s non-discrimination clause prohibits discrimination based on various grounds, including sex. The argument can be made that discrimination on the basis of sex can extend to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
Step 2 (Application to Karan and Daniel’s case).
Karan and Daniel are being denied access to surrogacy under the SRA simply because they are a homosexual couple, which is discriminatory based on sexual orientation. This can be viewed as a violation of the right to equality under the Constitution.
Step 3 (Conclusion).
The strongest argument supporting Karan and Daniel’s claim is that discrimination on the basis of sex includes discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
\[ \boxed{\text{Discrimination on the basis of sex could include discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. (Option B)}} \]

Answer 10

Karan and Daniel cannot marry under the Hindu Marriage Act, so they cannot meet the SRA's requirement of being a legally wedded couple, and they want to argue this scheme discriminates against them on the ground of sexual orientation. The non-discrimination clause lists sex, caste, religion, nationality, and place of birth, but not sexual orientation by name. The task is to find the strongest argument for their side.

1. Option A (clause doesn't mention sexual orientation): This is actually an argument against Karan and Daniel, not for them, since it highlights the very gap they need to get around. It cannot be their strongest argument because it works against their claim.
2. Option B (discrimination on sex could include sexual orientation): Courts have recognised that sex as a ground of non-discrimination is not limited to the biological male-female binary; it can extend to how a person's intimate relationships and identity are treated, including sexual orientation. This reading lets Karan and Daniel bring their claim within an existing, named ground rather than needing a brand-new one, which makes it their strongest and most direct argument.
3. Option C (the clause isn't limited to listed grounds): This is a real argument and could help, but it is a weaker, more open-ended claim than pointing to an existing named ground like sex. Courts tend to find it easier to extend a listed ground than to invent an entirely unlisted one, so this is not as strong as Option B.
4. Option D (only heterosexual couples can marry, so they're excluded from surrogacy): This just restates the problem Karan and Daniel already face; it explains why they are excluded but does not give any reason why that exclusion is discriminatory or unconstitutional. It supports the SRA's position more than theirs.

Framing sexual orientation as falling within the existing ground of sex gives Karan and Daniel a direct textual hook, which is stronger than relying on an open-ended reading of the clause or simply restating the marriage bar.

Therefore, the correct answer is Discrimination on the basis of sex could include discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.