Question

Rani and Shiva would like to opt for surrogacy. They have been married for 6 years. Rani is aged 51 and Shiva is aged 53. Both Rani and Shiva have built successful business empires. They are now working together on a joint initiative. Due to the demanding nature of their work, they have not thought about children previously.
However, they are now keen to have a child via surrogacy. Are Rani and Shiva eligible for surrogacy under the SRA?

• A. Yes, because they have been married for more than 5 years.
• B. Yes, because they have financial capacity to bring up a child.
• C. No, because they do not fall within the legal requirements of intending parents.
• D. No, because they are not an infertile couple.
• A. Statement iii
• B. Statements i and iii
• C. Statements ii and iii
• D. Statements ii, iii, and iv
• A. Yes, because they have no biological children.
• B. No, because they have an adopted child
• C. Yes, because their adopted child has been diagnosed with Striker’s Syndrome.
• D. Yes, because their right to procreation and parenthood is protected under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.
• A. Yes, because Kishore and Noor are bound by the contract under the ICA
• B. Yes, because the intending parents and the surrogate meet the eligibility requirements under the SRA.
• C. Yes, because the surrogate meets the eligibility requirements under the SRA.
• D. No, because SRA allows only altruistic surrogacy, so the contract is not valid under the ICA.
• A. The non-discrimination clause does not explicitly mention sexual orientation
• B. Discrimination on the basis of sex could include discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
• C. The non-discrimination clause is not restricted to explicitly mentioned grounds.
• D. Surrogacy is restricted under the SRA to married couples, and only heterosexual couples can get married.

Answer 1

The Correct Option is C

The correct option is (C): No, because they do not fall within the legal requirements of intending parents.

Answer 2

This question checks whether marriage duration or financial standing alone is enough to qualify as "intending parents" for surrogacy under the SRA, or whether the couple must also satisfy the infertility and age conditions. Let's go through the options.

1. Option A (Yes, married more than five years): The five-year marriage requirement is one condition among several, not a standalone qualifier. Meeting it does not automatically make a couple eligible if other conditions, such as infertility, are unmet. This option isolates one true fact but draws the wrong conclusion from it.
2. Option B (Yes, they have financial capacity): Nowhere does the SRA, as described, condition eligibility on the couple's wealth or ability to support a child financially. This is not a recognised criterion at all.
3. Option C (No, they do not fall within the legal requirements of intending parents): The SRA restricts altruistic surrogacy to "legally wedded infertile Indian couples." Rani and Shiva have simply not tried to have children due to busy careers; there is no indication they are medically infertile, only that they have not attempted conception. Without established infertility, they do not meet the core definition of eligible intending parents, regardless of their marriage length. This correctly captures the overall shortfall in their eligibility.
4. Option D (No, because they are not an infertile couple): This captures one real reason they may be ineligible, but it treats infertility as the sole issue rather than the couple simply failing to establish they meet the legal definition of intending parents in the first place, which is the broader and more accurate framing of the problem.

Option C best reflects that Rani and Shiva, despite satisfying the marriage-duration condition, have not shown they meet the core statutory definition of eligible intending parents.

Therefore, the correct answer is that they do not fall within the legal requirements of intending parents.

Answer 3

The correct option is (A): Statement iii.

Answer 4

This question requires checking four statements about Geeta's eligibility as a surrogate against the SRA's conditions: she must be a close relative of the couple, a married woman with a child of her own, aged between 25 and 35, and someone who "has been a surrogate only once in her life." Let's test each statement.

1. Statement i (eligible because she is a close relative): Geeta is Rani's sister, satisfying the close-relative requirement. This statement correctly describes one criterion she meets, so it is true.
2. Statement ii (eligible because she is married): Geeta is married with a child of her own, satisfying that part of the definition. This statement is also true as far as it goes.
3. Statement iii (has been a surrogate twice and is now eligible): The SRA requires that the surrogate mother "has been a surrogate only once in her life." Geeta has already been a surrogate twice, which exceeds this limit and makes her ineligible on this ground, regardless of how many other conditions she meets. Claiming she is "now eligible" despite two prior surrogacies is factually wrong under the statute, making this statement false.
4. Statement iv (eligible because she is 29): Twenty-nine falls within the required 25-to-35 age band, so this statement correctly identifies a criterion she satisfies and is true.

Since statements i, ii, and iv each correctly identify a genuine condition Geeta meets, and only statement iii misstates the once-only surrogacy limit, only one statement is false.

Therefore, the correct answer is Statement iii.

Answer 5

The correct option is (C): Yes, because their adopted child has been diagnosed with Striker’s Syndrome.

Answer 6

The SRA generally bars couples who already have a biological or adopted child from surrogacy, but the passage carves out exceptions for children who are "mentally or physically challenged" or "suffering from a life-threatening disorder or fatal illness." The question is which option correctly explains Joseph and Neena's eligibility despite already having an adopted daughter.

1. Option A (Yes, because they have no biological children): This misstates the rule. The bar in the SRA covers couples with biological or adopted children, and Joseph and Neena do have an adopted daughter, Maya. Having no biological child does not, by itself, resolve the problem created by having an adopted one.
2. Option B (No, because they have an adopted child): This states the general prohibition correctly but ignores the exception that follows it in the very next sentence of the passage, for children with life-threatening or fatal conditions. It stops short of the full rule.
3. Option C (Yes, because their adopted child has Striker's Syndrome): Maya's diagnosis causes "slow neurological deterioration, with chances of death," which fits squarely within the stated exception for a child "suffering from a life-threatening disorder or fatal illness." This exception lifts the general bar on couples with an existing child, making Joseph and Neena eligible despite already having Maya.
4. Option D (Yes, because of their Article 21 right to procreation): While the passage notes a commentator's broader constitutional critique invoking Article 21, that is presented as an academic criticism of the statute's restrictions, not the operative legal rule that determines eligibility under the SRA itself. The concrete, applicable basis is the specific statutory exception in Option C, not this general constitutional argument.

Option C is the only one that correctly applies the specific statutory exception carved out for children with life-threatening illnesses.

Therefore, the correct answer is that Joseph and Neena are eligible because their adopted child has been diagnosed with Striker's Syndrome.

Answer 7

The correct option is (D): No, because SRA allows only altruistic surrogacy, so the contract is not valid under the ICA.

Answer 8

This question tests whether a surrogacy contract promising a cash payment to the surrogate is enforceable, given that the SRA permits only altruistic, not commercial, surrogacy. Let's evaluate each option.

1. Option A (Yes, bound by the contract under the ICA): The Indian Contract Act does bind parties to valid contracts, but it also provides that "a contract that is prohibited by any other law will not be valid under the ICA." Since the ₹2 lakh payment clause is prohibited by the SRA's ban on commercial surrogacy, that part of the contract cannot be treated as valid or binding, regardless of it having been signed in writing before two witnesses.
2. Option B (Yes, both meet SRA eligibility): Even if Kishore and Noor and the surrogate individually satisfy the eligibility conditions, meeting eligibility does not cure a separate, independent problem: the contract promises commercial payment, which the SRA bans outright regardless of who is eligible to participate.
3. Option C (Yes, the surrogate meets SRA eligibility): Like Option B, this addresses only the surrogate's personal qualification and does not address the illegality of the ₹2 lakh remuneration clause itself, which is the actual obstacle to enforcement.
4. Option D (No, since the SRA allows only altruistic surrogacy, so the contract is invalid under the ICA): The passage defines commercial surrogacy broadly to include any payment, reward, benefit or fee to the surrogate "except the medical expenses and such other prescribed expenses... and the insurance coverage." A flat ₹2 lakh per child clearly falls outside this narrow carve-out and constitutes banned commercial surrogacy. Because the SRA prohibits this term, the ICA itself renders that part of the contract invalid, so it cannot be enforced in court.

Only Option D correctly connects the SRA's ban on commercial payments with the ICA's rule that a legally prohibited term cannot be enforced as a valid contract.

Therefore, the correct answer is that the surrogate will not succeed, because the SRA allows only altruistic surrogacy, making the payment term invalid under the ICA.

Answer 9

The correct option is (C): The non-discrimination clause is not restricted to explicitly mentioned grounds.

Answer 10

The question asks which argument most strongly supports Karan and Daniel's claim that the SRA's restriction of surrogacy to married, and therefore heterosexual, couples discriminates against them under the Constitution's non-discrimination clause. The clause reads: "No citizen shall be discriminated on the basis of sex, caste, religion, nationality, place of birth or any other ground." Let's weigh each option.

1. Option A (The clause doesn't mention sexual orientation): This observation actually cuts against Karan and Daniel rather than supporting them, since it highlights an apparent gap in the listed grounds rather than showing how the clause still protects them.
2. Option B (Sex discrimination could include sexual orientation): This is a plausible argument, but it rests on an interpretive stretch, reading "sex" to encompass "sexual orientation," which is a debatable extension rather than something the clause's text directly supports.
3. Option C (The clause is not restricted to explicitly mentioned grounds): The clause itself ends with the phrase "or any other ground," making its list of protected grounds expressly open-ended rather than exhaustive. This textual feature directly supports extending protection to sexual orientation even though it isn't separately named, making it the strongest and most direct textual hook for Karan and Daniel's argument.
4. Option D (Surrogacy is restricted to married couples, and only heterosexual couples can marry): This accurately describes why Karan and Daniel are excluded from surrogacy, but it only restates the discriminatory outcome; it does not itself supply a reason why that outcome should be treated as unconstitutional discrimination under the clause.

Option C supplies the clearest textual basis, the clause's own "or any other ground" language, for reading sexual orientation into its protection.

Therefore, the correct answer is that the non-discrimination clause is not restricted to explicitly mentioned grounds.