Question

Read the following passage and answer the question that follows.

A major problem of Indian industrial and commercial development was the supply of capital. Until 1850, British capital was shy of Indian adventure. The risks and unknown factors were too great, and prospects in other directions too bright. The working capital of the agency houses after 1813 at first consisted mainly of the savings of the Company's servants. Their cries of woe when these houses fell as in the crisis of 1831 were loud and poignant. Indian capital was also shy for different reasons. It needed to acquire confidence in the new regime, and outside the presidency towns, to acquire the habit of investment. Investment for large-scale production for 'enabling' works like railways was an unfamiliar and suspected practice. Thus the first big developments came when European capital was coaxed into the country by government guarantees or went of its own free will to develop industries with which it was already familiar as in the case of jute or coal. Indian capital followed where it was in touch with European practice as in Bombay and dealing with familiar products like cotton. These considerations throw into all the greater relief the achievement of the Tatas in developing iron and steel. Thus the major part of the capital provided was British with a steadily increasing Indian proportion from 1900. As late as 1931-32 the capital of companies registered abroad was nearly four times that of companies registered in India. But this is not an exact guide because it leaves out of account the stock in British companies held by Indians, as well as government stocks. Speaking generally it may be said that the capital of the cotton industry was mainly Indian, that of the iron and steel industry entirely so, that of the jute industry about half and half, while the coal and plantation industries were mainly British, together with that used for the building of railways, irrigation, and other public works. Management in the cotton and steel industries was mainly Indian though European technicians were freely employed, that of the jute, coal, and the plantation industries being European, the jute men in particular being Scotch. Their capital, apart of course from government enterprise, operated through joint-stock companies and managing agencies. The latter arose through the convenience found by bodies of capitalists seeking to develop some new activity and lacking any Indian experience, of operating through local agents. It arose in the period after 1813 when private merchants took over the trade formerly monopolized by the Company. The money would be found in Britain to promote a tea garden, a coal mine, or a jute mill, but the management would be confided to a firm already on the spot. The managing agency was the hyphen connecting capital with experience and local knowledge. Until 1914 the policy of the government continued in the main to be one of 'enabling' private capital and enterprise to develop the country. Direct promotion was confined to public utilities like canals and railways. The line between enabling and interfering action became distinctly blurred, however, in the case of the cotton industry and there was a tendency for enabling action to pass over into the positive promotion of particular projects. This was most noticeable in the time of Lord Curzon with his establishment of an imperial department of agriculture with a research station at Pusa and a department of commerce and industry presided over by a sixth member of the Viceroy's Council. The first World War began the transition to a new period of active promotion and positive support. As the conflict lengthened there arose a demand for Indian manufactured goods. India failed to take full advantage of this opportunity, partly because of uncertainty as to the future and partly because the means for sudden expansion were lacking. The outcome of this situation was the appointment of an industrial commission in 1916 under pressure from London. The commission criticized the unequal development of Indian industry which had led to the missing of her war opportunity. A much closer co-operation with industry was planned through provincial departments of industry. Increased technical training and technical assistance to industry was proposed while it was suggested that the Central government should set up a stores department which should aim at making India self-sufficing in this respect. The commission's report was only partially implemented, but a stores department and provincial industrial departments were created and something was done towards promoting technical assistance. The importance of the report and its aftermath was that it marked the transition from the conception of Indian economy in broadly colonial terms with freedom for private enterprise to the conception of India as an autonomous economic unit.



From the passage it can be inferred that during the early part of twentieth century, starting a Greenfield project was more difficult for an Indian capitalist than for an European.

• A. Definitely true as inferred from the passage.
• B. It was true on a selective case by case basis.
• C. No trend of discrimination between the two categories of capitalists can be inferred from the passage.
• D. Preference was given to British capitalists, buffeted by the fact that the country was under British rule.

Hint:

Look for whether the passage ties the caution of Indian and European capital to nationality, or to unfamiliarity with an industry.

Answer 1

The Correct Option is C

The question asks whether the passage shows that starting a new, greenfield industrial venture was harder for an Indian capitalist than for a European one during the early twentieth century. To answer this we need to check what the passage actually says about why capital moved slowly, and whether that reason was tied to nationality or to something else.

1. Definitely true as inferred from the passage: The passage never states this as a certainty. It gives reasons for caution on both sides, not a rule that Indians always faced more difficulty than Europeans.
2. It was true on a selective case by case basis: This sounds plausible, but the passage gives no case by case comparison of Indian versus European ventures to support such a claim.
3. No trend of discrimination between the two categories of capitalists can be inferred from the passage: The passage explains that European capital was shy until 1850 too, and it entered fields it already knew, like jute and coal, often after government guarantees. Indian capital was shy for its own reasons: it had to build confidence in the new regime and get used to the very idea of investing. Both groups moved into industries they were already familiar with, cotton for Indians, jute and coal for Europeans. The Tata's entry into iron and steel is praised precisely because it broke this pattern of familiarity, not because Indians were blocked from doing so elsewhere. So the passage points to familiarity and confidence as the real drivers of investment behaviour, not a policy of favouring one group over the other.
4. Preference was given to British capitalists, buffeted by the fact that the country was under British rule: The passage mentions government guarantees helping European capital, but it never says this reflects a deliberate preference rooted in colonial rule. It ties the caution of both groups to unfamiliarity with new sectors, not to rule based favouritism.

Since the passage explains the difference in investment behaviour through unfamiliarity and confidence rather than through discrimination against Indian capitalists, option 3 is the safest and most textually supported inference.

Let's summarize:

• European and Indian capital both avoided unfamiliar ventures; the caution was about industry familiarity, not nationality.
• The Tata's steel venture is described as an exception that highlights general caution, not evidence of a specific bar on Indians.

The correct answer is option 3: no trend of discrimination between the two categories of capitalists can be inferred from the passage.